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Introducing 

 
Performativity, performance studies and 
digital cultures 
MARTINA LEEKER, IMANUEL SCHIPPER AND TIMON BEYES 
 
 
Performing the Digital seeks to map and reflect registers of performance and 
techno-social layers of performativity in today’s digital cultures. The book’s 
basic proposition is that the ubiquity and pervasiveness of digital media and their 
networked infrastructures profoundly influence the ways and styles in which  
performativity appears and is enacted. Contemporary technological apparatuses 
and media provoke new forms of ‘intra-action’ between what is usually consid-
ered to be either human or machinic agency, to use Barad’s terminology of 
posthumanist performativity (Barad 2003). 
In this sense, digital cultures are performative cultures. They condition and 
are shaped by techno-social processes and agencies, and they afford new possi-
bilities for performative practices and interventions. It follows that the study of 
performativity in its heterogeneous dimensions cannot afford to ignore the agen-
tial forces and effects of digital technologies and their entanglements with  
human bodies. Accordingly, investigations of social, economic and political pro-
cesses conducted in and across other disciplines have to reckon with the  
performativity of digital devices and algorithmic organizing. The book’s genesis 
and development – and, we hope, the discussions it will instigate – were there-
fore informed by two guiding questions: How is performativity shaped by con-
temporary technological conditions? And how do performative practices reflect 
and alter techno-social formations? 
In proposing answers to these questions, Performing the Digital offers a 
double contribution. First, we see the book as part of the wider ‘performative 
turn’ in the cultural and social sciences (Bachmann-Medick 2016; Thrift 2008), 
contributing to an understanding of how techno-social performativity – or per-
haps a regime of digital performativity – effects the world we live in. More spe-
cifically, this collection seeks to map and thus make visible the relations between 
10 | MARTINA LEEKER, IMANUEL SCHIPPER AND TIMON BEYES  
distinct approaches, overcoming the usual boundaries of focusing either on the 
performativity of affect (see Angerer, Leistert, this volume), or of markets (see 
Lange, Schröter, this volume), or of organization (see Beyes, McKenzie, this 
volume), or of critique (see Kozel, Leeker, this volume), etc. In its manifoldness 
and malleability, the notion of performativity emerges as a powerful concept to 
explore and reimagine digital cultures.  
Second, we aim to contribute to and further develop recent engagements with 
technological developments and media-theoretical concepts in the field of per-
formance studies itself (Auslander 2005; Bay-Cheng et al. 2010; Salter 2010). 
By relating questions and issues of performance and performativity to the broad-
er empirical and conceptual landscape of digital cultures, the notion of perfor-
mance is not limited to art-, dance- or theater-based practices but is seen as  
encapsulated in wider processes of techno-social emergence, production and 
control (McKenzie 2001).  
Conceived as an explorative venture into territory of performativity (studies) 
and digital cultures, Performing the Digital brings together scholars from differ-
ent disciplines – performance studies, media theory, sociology, organization 
studies – and practitioners of performance. Arranged according to the ‘doings’ 
that are in the focus of the respective chapters, the book’s map of themes, con-
cerns and concepts of ‘performing the digital’ as well as the interrelations  
between them presents a timely, promising and, we believe, exciting field of  
research.  
In the remainder of this introduction, the collection is contextualized with a 
short discussion of its two guiding themes: the performativity of digital cultures, 
and performance studies’ encounter with digital technologies. Based on this, the 
book’s outline and the sequence of notions and chapters are briefly presented. 
 
 
DIGITAL CULTURES AND PERFORMATIVITY 
 
If we were to assume that digital technologies were merely tools, conveniently 
on hand and ready for human deployment, then this book would be superfluous. 
Yet perhaps now more than ever, such an image of technology seems patently 
absurd. As the prevalence of the terms ‘ubiquitous’ and ‘pervasive’ in conjunc-
tion with technologies, media and computing indicates (Ekman 2013), life is 
embedded in, and interwoven with, technological environments (Hörl 2013; 
Engemann/Sprenger 2015) – from the fiber-optic cables of the Internet to the 
omnipresence of intelligent artifacts that can, in part, communicate with one  
another without the intervention of human subjects. As a result, the book is 
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framed through the notion of ‘digital cultures’. Digital technologies now widely, 
perhaps even invariably participate in the ‘making’ of culture (Deuze 2006; Gere 
2008; Stalder 2016).1  
Correspondingly, the understandings of performativity and performative 
practices need to be rethought. To put it somewhat crudely, digital devices and 
infrastructures perform, and they make humans (and non-humans) perform. 
‘Smart things’ profile and categorize, foresee and predict, propose and delete, 
charm and become dubious. Such ascriptions would have been perceived as  
suspect forms of anthropomorphization only a few years ago (Tholen 1994); now 
they come across as matter-of-factly descriptions of what technological objects 
and software do. And the consequences are serious. Consider the financial mar-
kets and their algorithms of high frequency trading (see Lange, this volume), the 
everyday organization of affect (see Angerer, this volume), the simulations of 
climate change research or the dressage of the quantified self and its self-
optimization devices (Baxmann et al. 2016). Yet this is not merely a technologi-
cal or medial a-priori of cultural forms and processes. In what amounts to  
techno-social interplays, human bodies also make digital technologies perform, 
through, for instance, embodied movements, gestures and habits, and the prac-
tices of streaming, updating, capturing, uploading, linking, saving, sharing, 
trashing, trolling etc. (Chun 2016).  
Now, traditional or conventional notions of performativity and performance 
are grounded in the distinction between human and technological performance 
(see Leeker, this volume). Human performativity is linked to intentionality,  
reflexivity and sense-making, to embodiment, repetition and transgression. The 
technological, one the other hand, refers to deterministic operations without  
semiotic or affective qualities. This neat separation of human agency and non-
human ‘procedurality’ has become untenable. Human bodies and technological 
apparatuses enter instead into a relation of performativity, a redistribution of 
agetial constellations towards a techno-social ‘mangle of practice’, to use  
Pickering’s term (Pickering 1995) (and it is by no means clear that, in this man-
gle, ‘performing devices’ are necessarily cooperative, as Schröter (2015) has 
pointed out). In digital cultures, we might then say, the ‘performative turn’ 
                                                           
1  As Baecker (2007) argued, media revolutions, such as the invention of the printing 
press, are accompanied by new cultural processes, practices and forms that emerge to 
make the ensuing excesses of words, images and affects ‘manageable’ (Baecker 2007: 
7). What Baecker called the ‘next society’ is negotiated in today’s discussions on ‘dig-
ital cultures’. We opt for ‘cultures’ in the plural, since these processes, practices and 
forms are multiple, heterogeneous and partly contested. 
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(McKenzie 2001; Fischer-Lichte 2004) needs to embrace its own ‘technological 
turn’. The following essays explore different forms, registers and understandings 
of technological cum social performativity.  
 
 
PERFORMANCE STUDIES AND DIGITAL CULTURES 
 
For an investigation of performativity, performance studies is likely the first  
discipline brought to mind. In this context, Performing the Digital’s transdisci-
plinary set-up echoes the development of this relatively young field, which 
emerged in the 1980s. While there are various schools and branches of perfor-
mance studies (see Pelias/VanOosting 1987; Madison/Hamera 2006;  
Powell/Shaffer 2009),2 they share certain similarities. First, they can be charac-
terized by a lively symbiosis between “aesthetic practices and the study of them” 
(Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2008: 46), i.e. by a strong linkage between artistic prac-
tice and reflective analysis. Second, there is a marked tendency across the differ-
ent schools towards the inclusion of a variety of research fields and approaches. 
As befits its ‘object’ of analysis and practice, performance studies both draws on 
methods and theories of a range of disciplines and contributes to their respective 
discourses (as is manifested by the wider performative turn in the cultural and 
social sciences). Third, performance studies explores bodies, identities, events, 
and narratives in terms of “the myriad ways in which meaning is created and  
social life is shaped” (Pearson/Shanks 2001: xiii). As Schechner (2006: 40) 
wrote, “[a]ny behavior, event, action, or thing can be studied ‘as’ performance”. 
Reflecting the circumstances under which something is considered to be 
‘performance’ and exploring how performativity takes place and unfolds is 
therefore more important than a-priori definitions of what performance ‘is’ or 
might be. This is precisely why influential scholars (e.g. McKenzie 2001;  
Jackson 2004; Bay-Cheng et al. 2010) called for the field to distance itself from 
what currently defines the education and professional activities of performance 
workers, from Western concepts of theater and dance, and from the understand-
ing of performance as an art form. Instead, performance studies should regard  
itself as a “means of understanding historical, social, and cultural processes” 
(Schechner 2008: 9); and “[p]erformance must be construed as a ‘broad spec-
trum’ or ‘continuum’ of human actions ranging from ritual, play, sports, popular 
                                                           
2  Indeed, performance is “an essentially contested concept, meaning that its very exist-
ence is bound up in disagreement about what it is, and that the disagreement over its 
essence is itself part of that essence” (Strine et al. 1990: 187-188). 
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entertainments, the performing arts and everyday life performances to the  
enactment of social, professional, gender, race and class roles, and on to healing, 
the media and the internet” (Schechner 2006: 2). Similarly, Fischer-Lichte  
proposed that what she called “performative studies” would denote the study of 
culture through the perspective of the performative; it thus stands for a “specific 
interdisciplinary approach to different subjects, which are analyzed from the per-
spective of the performative” (Fischer-Lichte 2012: 134; our translation).3  
Clearly, then, researching and intervening into the present and performativity 
of digital cultures call for the sensibilities and approaches of performance stud-
ies. To do so, however, the field is challenged to more fully embrace and grapple 
with today’s technological condition and the human/non-human or perhaps 
‘posthuman’ performances that shape social and cultural processes (Bay-Cheng 
et al. 2010). This collection and its respective contributions seek to help push the 
field towards a more sustained engagement with performance and performativity 
‘after’ digital media.  
 
 
AN ASSEMBLAGE OF DOINGS 
 
The book’s structure seeks to reflect and, yes, perform its aims and rationale. As 
the outcome of an explorative, transdisciplinary endeavour into the messy and 
complex sphere of relations of digital cultures, performativity and performance 
studies, it constitutes “the beginnings of a map, or, more accurately perhaps, a 
map of beginnings” (Pile/Thrift 1995: 2) – an assemblage of phenomena, cases 
and concepts through which we can begin to chart and further explore the  
performative makings of and in digital cultures. After all, and contradicting the 
                                                           
3  We here use the notion of transdisciplinarity (and not inter- or crossdisciplinarity). A 
contested term, of course (Osborne 2015), ‘transdisciplinarity’ pragmatically entails 
an orientation towards and alongside phenomena or spheres of phenomena that require 
the reflexive mobilization of different and diverse theoretical contexts and methodical 
practices. As Osborne (2015) recently pointed out, the potential of transdisciplinarity 
– against its restriction to practical rationality and technocratic problem-solving – re-
sides in the construction of a problem and the definition of a joint field of research, 
which harbors the potential of unexpected twists and of the problematization of estab-
lished concepts and methods. In this sense feminist theory, for example, and gender 
studies and media studies can all be regarded as transdisciplinary research contexts 
par excellence – as well as, we would add, performance studies or performativity stud-
ies.  
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tropes of transparency and participation that seem to befall the jubilant discus-
sions of technological progress, the techno-social relations and procedures of 
‘performing the digital’ are largely invisible, obscure and opaque, cloaked in  
secrecy and incomprehensibility (Beyes/Pias 2014) or ‘black boxing’ and obfus-
cation (Galloway 2014). Under these conditions, the strategies and tactics of 
conducting research, of doing theory and of scholarly representation are open to 
debate and experimentation (e.g. Galloway 2011).  
How, then, to perform ‘performing the digital’ through the time-honored 
medium of the book? Rather than structuring this collection according to differ-
ent theoretical approaches, pre-given aspects of performance studies or social 
spheres or systems, we have opted for a non-hierarchical and ‘flat’ way of order-
ing the chapters – manifesting a ‘map of beginnings’ and perhaps a kind of 
queering of dominant registers of scholarly book production. The contributions 
are framed through ‘doings’; they thus enter into and engage with the complexity 
of digital cultures by way of specific processual notions. We have sought to lend 
the sequencing of the ‘doings’ a certain narrative coherence or flow: 
To begin, there is historicizing: Martina Leeker inquires into the parallel 
trajectories of performance theory and media technologies up to the present, and 
in this context discusses the possibilities and limits of critique in digital cultures. 
From there, Scott deLahunta and Florian Jenett delve into a concrete perfor-
mance in and on digital cultures through the notion and practice of annotating in 
the enactment of digital choreographies. This is one way of affecting human 
bodies by way of coding; the following chapter by Marie-Luise Angerer enlists 
affect theory, in particular the notion of the ‘affective interval’, to ponder the 
performative effects of digital ‘co-processing’ between media technology and 
human bodies. Such digitally produced ‘involuntary moments’ have taken on a 
particularly serious and quite uncanny role in the financial markets, as  
Ann-Christina Lange demonstrates in her investigation of the algorithmic  
exploitation of time-delays in financial trading.  
That the affective landscape is increasingly shaped by mobile media technol-
ogies leads to new forms of surveillance as well as to new ways of performing 
with and through such media. In her contribution, Susan Kozel reflects on  
encrypting as a performative counter-practice to control and ‘dataveillance’. 
That protesting is reconfigured through digital devices such as mobile phones 
and the ways such reconfiguration occurs is explored in the subsequent chapter 
by Oliver Leistert. Drawing upon Guattari’s notion of post-media, Leistert  
examines the problems for collective enunciations that the modulation of affect 
via mobile devices poses. Perhaps, however, the digital possibilities of performa-
tive cartography offer alternative and emancipatory forms of mapping, as  
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Sigrid Merx studies by following a concrete artistic intervention in Amsterdam. 
Such performances thus have to deal with urban topographies that are marked 
through tags. Relating Lefebvre’s ‘triadic’ notion of space to digital tagging, 
Margarete Jahrmann studies the gamification of urban space for commercial 
and activist purposes. Such urban art changes the role and practices of audience 
and spectators from watching and listening to co-producing. Discussing works 
by Ligna and Rimini Protokoll, Imanuel Schipper analyzes the turn towards 
‘the performative spectator’.  
Beyond temporary interventions, there is the performative labor of institut-
ing. Melanie Mohren and Bernhard Herbordt reflect on their own artistic 
practice of ‘performing institutions’. From here, it is a small step to apprehend-
ing processes of organizing as performative. Timon Beyes reads Tom  
McCarthy’s novel Satin Island (2015) as a novel on intersecting layers of ‘per-
forming organization’, in particular with regard to a posthumanist performativi-
ty. And the markets? They are prone to crashing. Taking issue with Michel  
Callon’s influential work on the performativity of economic thought, Jens 
Schröter shows how this kind of performance theory lacks a notion of crisis and 
seems thus incapable of thinking and exploring alternative forms of organizing. 
Perhaps, such forms can be experimented with in education. Inquiring into the 
relationship of performance and democratizing digitality, Jon McKenzie dis-
cusses the potential of ‘critical design pedagogy’.  
As this brief tour through the contributions shows, mapping different ways of 
exploring and theorizing performativity in digital cultures is a critical project. It 
is critical in at least two ways: For one, we need to learn to think and apprehend 
how techno-social performativity – as a kind of actualization or further devel-
opment of the regime of performativity analyzed by McKenzie (2001) –  
inscribes human and non-human actors into what can for instance be called  
affective (Angerer 2014) and governmental (Rouvroy 2011) regimes. Second, 
especially the interventionist and practice-based chapters in this book demon-
strate the possibilities of queering and at least temporarily reconfiguring such  
regimes. In digital cultures, too, performance theory thus offers a two-fold agen-
da of critique: to investigate the intricate relation of power and performativity, 
and to insist on the openness and changeability that is immanent to performative 
processes. It is up to scholars and practitioners (and scholar-practitioners) of per-
formativity to further pursue and interweave both trajectories. 
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Performing (the) digital 
Positions of critique in digital cultures 
MARTINA LEEKER 
 
 
Digital cultures1 are performative cultures. This assumption is illustrated by the 
ubiquitous and invisible infrastructures that constitute them, which are interstrat-
ified by so-called ‘smart things’2 (Engemann/Sprenger 2015; Günel/Halpern 
2016), creating a socio-technical environment, in which performances of the 
technological come about. While human users may not be able to comprehend 
the entire technological performance, they are without a doubt intertwined with 
it. The digital performs, the human reacts to the agency the technologies suggest, 
and vice versa: “Performing (the) Digital”.3  
  
                                                           
1  The usage of a plural implies that digital cultures are constituted through a variety of 
simultaneously existing cultural configurations, which are molded by digital objects 
and operations. Cultures and technologies are inseparable and constantly and mutually 
influence each other. For further information on research to the topic of digital cul-
tures see “DCRL Questions: What are digital cultures?“ – a research interviews video 
series, Digital Cultures Research Lab, Leuphana University Lüneburg, available at 
http://www.leuphana.de/en/research-centers/cdc/digital-cultures-research-lab/projects 
/dcrl-questions.html. 
2 The notion of ‘things’ highlights the new status of ‘objects’ as performative. If the  
notion ‘objects’ is used, it refers to the new context.  
3 The following is therefore not an analysis of artistic performances, which employ me-
dia (cf. Leeker 2001), but much rather a contextualization of the same. 
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There is a considerable genealogical background to this assumption, which needs 
to be reconstructed. It is founded within a ‘discourse history of performativity’,4 
which has been taking place across scientific disciplines concerning technology 
and the humanities since the 1950s. It is through this history that the reciprocity 
of performance between humans and technology was established. As a result, 
technical things and computational operations could be understood as performa-
tive, while at the same time relieving human agency from mere intentional and 
representational action.  
The expanded definition of performativity allows consideration of a ‘disposi-
tif of the performative within digital cultures’, which corresponds to the scenario 
above. This dispositif is constituted by an ensoulment5 of technical things up to 
the point of having agency that is not entirely relatable or controllable by hu-
mans. The result is a ‘technological wonderland’6 that functions autonomously 
and (mostly) without friction in the metaphorical backrooms of society, thereby 
fascinating its inhabitants and inviting them to linger and loiter (Pflüger 2008). 
Simultaneously, this dispositif does not conceal its precarity: it is constantly at 
risk of technological failure and the revelation of its ensoulment and magic as 
pure illusion. This ambivalent relationship between control and loss of control 
does not, however, reduce its fascinating power of seduction; on the contrary, the 
ambivalent game only increases its appeal. Performativity therefore implies not a 
simple expression of action, but a complex amalgam of a performance and pro-
duction (mis-en-scène) history of unrestricted, ensouled technologies. As out-
lined below, their purpose is to create a politics and an economy of ‘self-illusion’ 
                                                           
4 This historic analysis of discourse does not intend to identify a ‘correct’ definition of 
performativity. It aims instead to decipher which concepts of performativity are  
generated within which contexts, what their effects are, and how they are separated 
and combined with other conceptualizations of the same. 
5 Current theoretical conceptions of animism and ensoulment differ from the spiritual 
traditions of the 19th century (Hagen 1999), which informed notions of performances 
with technology up until the 1960s (Leeker 2016b). The latter depended on explaining 
technological worlds with inexplicable phenomena, such as ghosts or ethereal concep-
tions. Contemporary animism however is purely operative, which makes it all the 
more fascinating.  
6 ‘Wonder’ in this case refers to occurrences that cannot be understood and are there-
fore processed only through illusions, as would be the case in a magic trick. In this 
translation, wonder and enchantment are used interchangeably [note from translator]. 
As the magic happens on the technological side, a power divide is established between 
technical things and human users. 
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(Leeker 2012; 2016b) of human actants, which can be understood as a form of 
governmentality (Foucault’s notion of governmentality, cf. Lemke 2001). There 
is a specific way of generating a self7 in digital cultures, which is linked to their 
dependency on data and interaction. Only when something is present can it be 
mined for data and be engaged with. It is only under these conditions that socio-
technological environments produce a self. This self is an illusion, as it is pure 
invention and it is not relevant in itself, but only within its functionality – a prin-
cipal obscured by the self-illusion mechanisms of the technological wonderland. 
‘Ubiquitous computing’ marks a paradigmatic manifestation of discourse and 
dispositif in the context of performativity. This concept plays a central role with-
in a genealogy of current digital cultures and is therefore a vital component in 
deciphering the realities they produce as dispositif of the performative. Their 
constitution and effects will be elaborated upon, exemplified through the mani-
festos and technological things by the artist and engineer Rich Gold,8 one of the 
leading researchers at the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (Xerox PARC). The 
essay follows the hypothesis that Gold’s inventions were essential to the creation 
of the narrative of fascination and enchantment (cf. Sprenger 2016)9 of a techno-
logical being within digital cultures, thereby mysteriously binding them to the 
human user.  
Art – specifically performance art – has traditionally prevailed as a method 
of gaining the distance necessary for a reflection and critique of techno-cultural 
conditions (McKenzie 2001; 2005; 2013). Within ‘performing (the) digital’ 
however, this is complicated by an appropriation of technological seduction. The 
scholarly analysis of the dispositif of the performative more often than not is 
merely descriptive rather than analytical.10 How then can performative methods 
                                                           
7  At this point it is vital to clarify that the text does not share the assumption of an ex-
istence of a self prior to technological conditions and environments, which is endan-
gered by the same. Instead, the underlying premise is that these conditions produce a 
self, which is specific to the logic of digital cultures.  
8  Gold, Rich: Official Homepage, July 26, 2016 (http://web.archive.org/web/20040 
223013202/http://www.richgold.org/index.htm) 
9  Florian Sprenger (2016) has instigated a seismic shift in seeing ensoulment and won-
der as constituents of digital cultures in ubiquitous computing. He has graciously pro-
vided his text prior to publication for this analysis. 
10  Critique in digital cultures is therefore always constitutively and inescapably self-
referential. Its explorations necessarily employ digital tools, as is e.g. necessary for 
the evaluation of big data. This constitution influences the understanding of science it-
self, to a point that self-reflexive scientific research is being postulated as an essential 
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engage with these cultures on a critical level? Methods and epistemology of so-
called artistic research (Gramelsberger 2009) may hold an answer to this ques-
tion.  
 
 
1. PERFORMATIVITY THROUGHOUT THE DISCIPLINES:  
A HISTORIC OUTLINE OF A DISCOURSE 
 
An outline11 of the discourse history of performativity (Wirth 2002b; Seier 2007) 
shows the performance of machines becoming more human, and inversely, the 
becoming-operational of human agency. From this venture, the narratives of an 
unleashing of technology become apparent. It materializes an alignment of hu-
man and technology, the creation of agencies of action between humans and 
technological objects, as well as the (re-)enchantment of the world through hu-
man and technological performances. 
 
1.1 Austin Cybernetic 
 
This discourse history of performativity has its origins with John Austin's speech 
act theory,12 which the British philosopher presented in twelve lectures as a visit-
ing professor at Harvard University in 1955. Published posthumously in 1962 
under the title How to do Things With Words (Austin 1975), it became the prima-
ry authority on speech act theory, developing a fundamental repositioning of the 
status of speech. Speech was no longer seen as a description of reality, it no 
longer functions solely as an expression of something that can be true or false. 
Rather, it develops agency, as words directly produce the actions they are  
expressing. Austin calls these words (verbs) that have an illocutionary force 
‘performative’ and the circumstance of creating this agency ‘performativity’. 
                                                           
methodology of digital cultures research analyzing the governmental effects and af-
fects of the same. 
11  Instead of offering an all-encompassing history of performativity, the intention is to 
focus on central systemic aspects involved in constructing a certain dispositif of the 
performative.  
12  This starting point was chosen because relevant theorists of performativity mostly re-
fer to Austin in their work. However, the interrelation of semiotics, theater/ 
performance and computational history reach as far back as the early 1900s, for ex-
ample within Frege’s logic of language, Hilbert’s self-referential mathematics and 
Edward Gordon Craig’s symbolic theater (Leeker 2013a: 87-106). 
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Once triggered, the ‘performative turn’ grows throughout the decades, undergo-
ing modifications by social sciences, technology studies and the humanities, as 
well as computer engineering, which lead to a re-definition and conceptualiza-
tion of culture and technology as performative.  
This transfer induces a cultivation of the epistemological conditions of the 
performative turn, which coincided with a realization that language/media have 
gained their own driving force and power. As they gain agency, they become 
self-referential. This means that they produce the things they articulate and their 
articulations are never about something that exists outside of them. However, 
this seemingly emancipatory condition leads to a precariousness of the relation-
ship of language/media, as well as that of their users to the world. As speech acts 
are dependent on a variety of factors, some of which are beyond the user’s con-
trol, the possibility of a failed speech act is prevalent. Attempting to contain and 
minimize this risk, Austin embeds speech acts in a system of social conventions 
and institutional ties, creating an extensive list of ‘doctrine of infelicities’ (e. g., 
abuse, misfires), which prevent unsuccessful speech acts (Rolf 2009: 26-36). He 
also excludes insincere speech acts, such as utterances on the stage of a theater 
from felicitous or successful speech (Austin 1975). These precautions will later 
reappear in computational engineering and programming language, as well as in 
a re-orientation of the human and human performance within cultural sciences. 
For it is exactly those infelicitous speech acts that will later cause an intense cri-
tique of autonomous subjectivity (Derrida 1988). Arguing that language/media 
has its own driving force, an intentional media user is radically put to question. 
The biggest effect of speech act theory however, is the merge of the symbolic 
level and action. This effect, spreading through disciplines and cultures, is remi-
niscent of the magical conditions13 that every utterance may become reality.14  
It is, therefore, essential for the dispositif of the performative within digital 
cultures to note that the performative turn has facilitated an approximation and 
equalization of medial, technological and human performances. Although Austin 
                                                           
13 Hartmut Winkler (2004: 215-230) has explicated the power of the merge of the sym-
bolic and the practical sphere and as a result advocates for a strict differentiation of 
performativity according to their degree of practical reference. 
14 Austin later reformulated his speech act theory to include locutionary, illocutionary 
and perlocutionary acts. This differentiation dissolved the difference between consta-
tive (related to truth) and performative (related to action) utterances, so that every ut-
terance would become an act, thereby universalizing the performativity of language 
(cf. Wirth 2002: 9-60). 
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did not reference media history,15 the relevance and detonating force of speech 
act theory fully develops within its contextualization in the development of the 
computer and cybernetics throughout the 1950s.16 For the unleashing of lan-
guage, the collateral subversion of traditional concepts of subjectivity and the 
coinciding of symbolic representation and action, all run parallel to a practical-
productive phase of cybernetics (Kline 2009; 2015), following the heated theo-
retical discussions on cybernetics in the 1940s (Pias 2002). Since then, speech 
act theory and computational coding have formed strong ties, or as Inke Arns 
puts it: 
 
“In code, ‘saying’ and ‘doing’ merge in so far as these speech acts are not descriptive or 
representational, they instead directly affect, move or create their effects […] Ultimately, 
performativity results in the magical merging of the signifier and the signified […].” (Arns 
2001: n. pag.; my translation)17 
 
In addition, the performativity of code is put to use in cybernetic machines and 
systems (Mindell 2000). Not only do they begin to operate autonomously via 
feedback loops, information processing and closed circuits (Pias 2004), they also 
begin to have agency within the world (Lettkemann/Meister 2004). The crucial 
point in this performative turn is therefore the direct human integration into this 
systemic self-organization as one of many data processing operators (Mindell 
                                                           
15 It can be assumed that Austin was aware of the automatization and formalization of 
human language. During his time at Harvard, he was closely associated with Noam 
Chomsky, who was working on the formalization of language at M.I.T at the time. 
Bernard Geoghegan (2011: 96-126) has laid out a plausible exploration that Claude 
Shannon's information theory and Norbert Wiener’s cybernetic theorems in the 1950s 
strongly influenced Roman Jakobson’s concepts and practices of formalization of lan-
guage, as well as impacting on Levi-Strauss’ ethnographic work. In effect, it is a via-
ble assumption that changes in media relations and technological conditions challenge 
different scientific disciplines in similar ways and are therefore implicitly or explicitly 
dealt with in an interdisciplinary manner.  
16 Further research would be required to assert whether this happened simultaneously or 
if speech act theory only became possible within the technological conditions of the 
computer and the epistemological framing of cybernetics. 
17 “Im Code fallen ‘Sagen’ und ‘Tun’ zusammen, insofern diese Sprechakte keine Be-
schreibung oder Repräsentation von etwas sind, sondern diese direkt affizieren, in 
Bewegung setzen, Effekte zeitigen. […] Performativität läuft so letztlich auf die magi-
sche Ineinssetzung von Zeichen und Bezeichnetem hinaus […].” (Arns 2001: n. pag.) 
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2001; 2002). The conception and recognition of speech act theory is consequent-
ly contemporaneous with the becoming-performative of the computer. From a 
perspective of media epistemology and history, the performative turn can there-
fore also be read as enabling a narrative of unleashed technology, as well as an 
alignment of a technological and human-centric conception of performances. 
The result of this genesis and transmission history is that the different forms of 
performativity are no longer separate. Performativity represents an inevitable 
techno-sociality with magical omens.  
 
1.2 Immigration of speech acts to the computer 
 
The interaction of performativity of language and the computer brought about a 
new model of techno-human relationships in the 1980s and 1990s. Through the 
developing ‘workplace studies’, speech act theory migrates into the systems and 
programming of “Computer Supported Cooperative Work” (CSCW) 
(Knoblauch/Heath 1999). Here, programs are implemented to facilitate work-
flows in conference and meeting systems. Formalized speech act theory becomes 
a key player in multi-agent regulations and communication processes (Schulz-
Schaeffer 2000), as well as in electronic transaction processing (Elgass 1996). At 
this stage, the infelicitous speech acts described by Austin become relevant to 
the development of programs regulating computers and human-machine interac-
tions, as well as mediated communication between humans or between machines 
respectively. These infelicitous speech acts serve as a framework for translating 
philosophical models of language into algorithmic speech acts. These should be 
successful as long as human and technical ‘fallacies’ about the fixed allocation 
of performative verbs to certain actions are excluded as much as possible. 
Within the discourse history of performativity, this produces the crucial point 
that technological performances become ‘more humane’. Drawing upon disap-
pointments in scientific research on artificial intelligence, technical accidents 
and human error in interaction with technological systems, Terry Winogard de-
velops a modest “Language/Action Perspective”, and demands consideration of 
social factors when working with computers (Flores/Winograd 1986; 
Knoblauch/Heath 1999: 165). Because communication and action are not ar-
ranged rationally, they are highly dependent on contingent occurrences within 
social contexts (Suchman 1987; 1993). This means that human actors are merely 
partners or counterparts that enable technological performances to become more 
humane, allowing for the situatedness and processual character of technology to 
become a factor for labor, organization and economy (Knoblauch/Heath 1999: 
166). 
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This new condition allows for the dispositif of the performative within digital 
cultures a positive discursive reassessment of the precarity of performative 
speech acts, which Austin had deemed to be problematic. While they are modu-
larized through the technological level, the level of human communication un-
chains them. This leads to a consolidation and ennoblement of performativity of 
technology, which is nonetheless an illusion, as code cannot be noise (Arns 
2001). It would then lead to a systemic breakdown. This mise-en-scène of per-
formativity results in a discursive belief of supposedly inevitable socio-
technological systems (Suchman 1983; 1993; Knoblauch 1999), which is nur-
tured by the interdisciplinary work of engineers, computational and information 
scientists, sociologists, as well as ethnographers and anthropologists. The more 
their work interacts, the more technological and anthropological systems are ap-
proximated and engage in permanent and mutual influence.18 These socio-
technological systems are less a fact, however, than an invention through which 
digital cultures, deeply rooted in technological forms of cooperation, can come 
into existence.19 Orit Halpern (2014) even describes technology as having be-
come a permanent demo or testing ground (test bed) since the 1970s. To contin-
uously develop in a recursive process, this demo needs crisis, accidents, catas-
trophe and human deficiency. Interactions and a lust for catastrophe and emer-
gence thereby become virulent as factors for the discourse history of performa-
tivity, which is accompanied by illusion and the occlusion of technical opera-
tions.  
 
1.3 Operationalizing the performative in cultural  
and theater studies 
 
Contrary to the performative becoming-more-humane of technologies, the dis-
courses on performativity in cultural and theater studies result in an operationali-
zation of concepts of performativity, which inserts itself into spaces, where 
                                                           
18 Heath/Knoblauch give an example of this mutual influence: “dass die Patienten die 
Schilderung ihrer Beschwerden und Symptome sehr genau darauf abstimmen, wie der 
Arzt die Daten in das Computersystem eingibt.” (Knoblauch/Heath 1999: 170) 
(“…that patients, when speaking of their grievances, react to the data the doctors re-
trieve and feed to their computational systems”; my translation) 
19 Against this media historic backdrop it would be necessary to investigate the dis-
course on techno-ecologies, as well as the rediscovery of Gilbert Simondon as a part 
of euphorically welcomed socio-technological liaisons of the human and the techno-
logical. 
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speech acts/performativity develops its own power, a third force next to human 
and media.20 This third entity is generative in accordance with non-
comprehensible laws, creating something where there was previously nothing. 
According to Jacques Derrida (1988), language is generative through self-
referential iterations and repetition.21 Consistent with Judith Butler (1998), per-
formatives produce gender, identity and subjectivity. Finally, Sybille Krämer 
(2002: 345) clarifies that media need embodiment in operations such as writing, 
reading and interpreting; therefore voices, for example, can disturb utterances 
and actions when words have been lost to the wind. 
The conception of performativity outlined in theater studies (Fischer-Lichte 
2004) in and throughout the mid-1990s (Fischer-Lichte/Kolesch 1998)22 shows 
an affinity towards the technological as well. Even if it went by almost unnotice-
ably, there are deep structural similarities to the performative turn of technology. 
That is, the notion of autopoiesis is introduced, which of course describes cyber-
netic feedback (Beniger 1986). Within autopoiesis, cultural and artistic perfor-
mances complete the coincidence of signs and actions, as well as the resulting 
self-referentiality of performance. This is demonstrated by the emphasis on so-
called ‘co-presence’ as constituent to artistic performance (Fischer-Lichte 2004). 
                                                           
20 “Media anthropology expeditiously retaliates this operationality with de-anthro-
pomorphization: „Damit sieht sich so […] geforderte Medienanthropologie auf einmal 
[…] in der Verantwortung, allerhand von dem, was sie eigentlich bloß verwerfen 
wollte, wie Bewusstsein und Intention, zu analysieren, und zwar in ihrer realitätsbe-
gründenden Funktion als Operatoren der Komplexitätsreduktion, als Formen der Ver-
dichtung oder des Blackboxing im komplexen Feld der Medienanthropologie“ (En-
gell/Siegert 2013: 9-10) (“media-anthropology, challenged in this way, suddenly has 
the responsibility of analyzing everything it attempted to dismiss, e.g. consciousness 
and intention, and attempt an understanding of these functions as constitutional opera-
tors, reducing complexity, increasing consolidation or black-boxing within the com-
plex field of media anthropology” [my translation]). 
21 Sybille Krämer emphasizes the possibility of finding successful speech acts through 
re-iterations and performances in the theatrical sense even in Austin’s theories.  
According to Krämer, every execution of a speech act is a re-iteration of the same, 
which includes the power of iterability and alteration. Speech acts function the same 
way rituals do, manifesting themselves upon their repetition.  
22 The following refers especially to the work on performativity in theater studies 
through the collaborative research of the Sonderforschungsbereich “Kulturen des  
Performativen” (cultures of performativity) at Freie Universität Berlin (cf. Fischer-
Lichte/Kolesch 1998). 
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Co-presence implies that the bodily presence of the actors and the audience mu-
tually produce the roles, as well as the performance. Performance itself, then be-
comes a speech act, producing what it enacts: subjects, bodies, spaces, enact-
ment, but also a designation of performativity as liminality (Fischer-Lichte 2004: 
305-314) of transformed humans.  
This background makes it even more surprising that theater studies tend to 
disapprove of the notion that technology can perform (Otto 2013: 55-67). The 
performances of technical things and their regulatory algorithms are seen as 
sheer and reductive ‘performance’ (German: Performanz), as opposed to human 
performance, which is open, unpredictable and emergent (McKenzie 2001). 
However, computational sciences and engineering practices have recorded a jolt 
towards performativity (Suchman 1983; 1993), which positions it in a discursive 
field of emergence, unpredictability and contingency. Where the becoming-
performative of the computer was meant to bind it into humane structures, the 
humanities ultimately dispose of the human in the performative.  
The denial of performativity of technological performance in some areas of 
theater studies, sorting it into a system of mere operationality, seems to have a 
specific cause. The discourses in theater studies constructs itself in this way, so 
as to hide the effects of their own performativity, which parallels a transfor-
mation of human performances into a chain of operations. The genealogy of per-
formativity emerges as an amalgam of affirmation, contradiction and occlusion. 
From this, the initial scenario can emerge as a performance of technological 
things and environments in which the human still plays a role, even if it is small 
and precarious. 
 
1.4 Performance as enchantment 
 
The assertion of the re-enchantment of culture through the power of performa-
tivity (Fischer-Lichte 2004: 315-362) is the most important contribution from 
analysis of artistic performances in theater studies in favor of the dispositif of the 
performative. According to Erika Fischer-Lichte, performativity corresponds 
with a renunciation of “comprehensive ability” (Fischer-Lichte 2004: 362), 
which results in re-enchantment and an “embodied mind” (ibid.). It is the duty of 
human agents to act in life, as enactment would take place in art (cf. Fischer-
Lichte 2004: 362). The unleashing through performances is accompanied by an 
enchantment of culture, which, according to Fischer-Lichte, parallels “modern 
society” (Fischer-Lichte 2004: 360):  
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“Increasingly, they mediate the conviction that the world is indeed criss-crossed by invisi-
ble forces, which influence us in secrecy. Although we sense them physically, we cannot 
see or hear them. It is the assumption that in nature and society emergences occur that are 
beyond intentionality, planning and prediction; that everything is connected.” (Fischer-
Lichte 2004: 360; my translation)23 
 
Through this enchantment, the world becomes “just as inaccessible as the auto-
poietic feedback loop that is effective in performances” (Fischer-Lichte 2004: 
361).24  
Performativity as a magical power thereby determines that recognition is 
suspended and is replaced by the merging of human agents with their technolog-
ical environment. A condition of non-knowing, emergence and unpredictability 
becomes the basis for existence. The coinciding of speech and action through 
speech act theory turns into a gateway for ontological and inherent magic and 
enchantment. As Sybille Krämer (2002: 323) has lucidly noted, the principle of 
representation necessary to overcome this magic is thereby extinguished. The 
human, technology and media converge, so that an over-identification of human 
agents is delineated, with which they succumb to the illusion of digital omni-
presence and omnipotence. This only promotes the unleashing and autonomy of 
the technological, as well as commitment to it. 
 
 
  
                                                           
23 “Zunehmend vermitteln sie die Überzeugung, daß die Welt in der Tat von unsichtba-
ren Kräften durchzogen ist, die auf uns einwirken, ohne daß wir sie zu sehen oder zu 
hören vermöchten, obwohl wir ihre Auswirkungen körperlich erspüren können; daß in 
der Natur und in den Gesellschaften Emergenzen auftreten, die sich jeglicher Intentio-
nalität, Planung und Vorausberechnung entziehen; daß alles mit allem verknüpft ist 
[…].” (Fischer-Lichte 2004: 360) There are distinct similarities between these  
concepts of performativity and the discourse on techno-ecologies (Hörl 2011). For  
instance, Mark B Hansen (2011: 365-409) has also explored the invisible forces that 
operate within media ecologies. 
24 “[…] ähnlich unverfügbar wie jene autopoietische feedback-Schleife, die in Auffüh-
rungen wirkt.” (Fischer-Lichte 2004: 361) 
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1.5 From performativity discourse to a dispositif  
of the performative 
 
The variety of discourses emerging within the different disciplines can be bun-
dled to form a discourse history of performativity in light of a dispositif of the 
performative. Foucault’s conceptual framing of the dispositif offers an under-
standing of the latter, which he describes as following: 
 
“What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensem-
ble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic 
propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the appa-
ratus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these 
elements.” (Foucault 1980: 194) 
 
Accordingly, the dispositif of the performative within digital cultures creates a 
setting in which material formations, practices and discourses are immersed into 
a network of relationality. It can be added that it “has at its major function at a 
given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need” (Foucault 1980: 
195). It will be necessary to analyze which needs the dispositif of performativity 
within digital cultures responds to, and what solutions it offers. 
All of the above point to a situation in which human and technological per-
formances have become compatible with a dispositif of the performative within 
digital cultures on the basis of a heterogeneous discursive field of performativity. 
It is a hypothesis that this unclear collective arrangement, impossible to homog-
enize, should enable a place for the uniqueness of human performance with the 
result that human agents can produce a self within socio-technical environ-
ments.25 These environments could be strongly dependent on a self, as the pro-
duction of human agents in the discourse on performativity in all its contradicto-
ry concepts suggests. In comparison to the autonomous and intentional self, this 
is a new concept. Because this new self is fundamentally linked to technology in 
the socio-technological discursive field, but at the same time suggests self-
dependency of agency to a limited extent. This is demonstrated in the interaction 
with programs as it happens within CSCW, just as it is shown in cultural perfor-
mances. At the same time, the self is confronted with the obscuring of technolo-
gy through enchantment. Due to these configurations it is a hypothesis that the 
                                                           
25 The concept of the self has been perpetuated in spite of it’s permanent swan song  
(cf. Derrida 1988; Butler 1998). 
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production of self within digital cultures now relies on a self-illusion, which ob-
scures its technological operations, while at the same time binding the human to 
them. The generation of a self has to be analyzed within the framework of the 
dispositif of the performative within digital cultures and their governmental ef-
fects (Lemke 2001).  
With this prefix the discourse turns into a dispositif, illustrated and exempli-
fied by the magical world of ubiquitous computing created by Rich Gold at the 
beginning of the 1990s. It is not by chance that great similarities appear in the 
descriptions of Erika Fischer-Lichte (2004) when she talks about the enchanting 
performativity of artistic performances. 
 
 
2. RICH GOLD’S UBIQUITOUS MAGICAL TOY WONDERLAND 
– INTO THE DISPOSITIF OF PERFORMATIVITY WITHIN 
DIGITAL CULTURES 
 
Ubiquitous computing of the 1990s has made joint performances of technologi-
cal and human agents common practice. The performativity of technological per-
formances, once regulated and ensured by speech acts, can now wander from the 
CSCW systems out into space and back into technological things. Through this, 
these things are assigned agency and begin to ‘speak’ and ‘answer’ to humans, 
albeit to a limited extent in Weiser’s days.26 The performatives live within the 
things, which serve as agential callings to their users.  
In this manner, the performances satisfy the conceptual framework of the 
dispositif, laid out here according to Foucault (1980). In the following section, it 
will be clarified which necessities ubiquitous computing responds to according 
to the dispositif of performative, and which effects of governmentality it educes.  
 
  
                                                           
26 Mark Weiser (1991) imagines the subservient spirits as foresighted and proactive and 
underlines his theorem with a short anecdote: “Sal awakens: she smells coffee. A few 
minutes ago her alarm clock, alerted by her restless rolling before waking, had quietly 
asked ‘coffee?’, and she had mumbled ‘yes.’ ‘Yes’ and 'no' are the only words it 
knows.” 
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2.1 Ubiquitous Computing and the Arts 
 
In 1988, the inventor of ubiquitous computing (Rogers 2006), Mark Weiser27 
began working on this new project, which he described as: “Ubiquitous compu-
ting is the method of enhancing computer use by making many computers avail-
able throughout the physical environment, but making them effectively invisible 
to the user” (Weiser 1993: 75). It marks the dawn of a new world “in which each 
person is continually interacting with hundreds of nearby wirelessly intercon-
nected computers” (ibid.). This circumferential and mundane socio-technological 
situation “penetrate[s] all groups in society” (Weiser 1991) and Weiser believed 
that “sociologically, ubiquitous computing may mean the decline of the comput-
er addict” (ibid.). For him, the effects of addiction materialize within the con-
stant need to be with one’s technological things. “Its highest ideal is to make a 
computer so exciting, so wonderful, so interesting, that we never want to be 
without it” (Weiser 1996: n. pag.). Simultaneously, “[…] its highest ideal is to 
make a computer so embedded, so fitting, so natural, that we use it without even 
thinking about it” (Weiser 1996). In summary, this constitutes the following: 
Large and immobile computers migrate into small mobile technological things, 
which form an environment within which they themselves become invisible. 
This situation allows for human users to engage with technologies without re-
flecting on them, as they become increasingly obscured. This leads to an ongo-
ing and increasing addiction, which pervades the whole of society. The user is in 
the technological world, which is omnipresent, commonplace and indispensable.  
One of the main accomplishments of Weiser’s transdisciplinary task force 
may have been making this ambivalent world more palatable to the user. Over a 
period of four years, Rich Gold was an important member of the force. He joined 
the Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) by XEROX in 1991. Gold was a musi-
cian, composer, performer, writer, designer, comic-strip artist, game developer, 
toy maker and a multitalented all round inventor. These qualities allowed him to 
develop ubiquitous computing into a children’s magical wonderland, in which 
technological objects are animate (cf. Sprenger 2016), function in the backrooms 
of society and enter into agential relations with humans.28 
                                                           
27  Cf. Mark Weiser’s homepage (http://pubweb.parc.xerox.com/weiser/weiser.html) 
28  Of his function within the lab, Gold says: “But the other task was to construct a  
philosophy. A Ubi-Comp Cult. My ubi-philosophy was based on Weiser’s formula-
tions, but also divergent from it (he was enough of a genius to know that sub-cults 
were a good thing.) My formulation of Ubi-Comp started with Ubi-Comp product 
genres […].” (Gold 2002: 66) 
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Rich Gold’s ubiquitous worlds can be seen as performative (McGonical 1999: 
8), when applying the criteria laid out in the previous chapters. Firstly, the tech-
nological performances bring about liminal experiences (Fischer-Lichte 2004). 
Secondly, the action they constitute is always a repetition (Krämer 2002), in 
Gold’s case, repeated actions with commonplace objects and toys, and lastly, the 
symbolic and practical levels collapse into one.  
With this, ubiquitous computing can be seen as a dispositif of the performa-
tive, demarcating the determining basis for contemporary digital cultures and 
their seduction. As will be shown in following passages, it is a world in which 
consciously constructed mis-wiring, enchantment and seduction become strate-
gies, binding the users and operating through their self-illusion. This production 
or generation of the self is highly strategic and is encouraged incessantly. For 
technological things and their infrastructures require a self with human agency, 
to be operated and developed. A person or individual however, is of no im-
portance (Rouvroy 2013). 
 
2.2 “Little Computer People” – less equal agencies 
 
Figure 1: Little Computer People  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gold, Rich (2008): The Plenitude: Design and Engineering in the Era of 
Ubiquitous Computing, Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 50. 
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The esprit which feeds the dispositif of the performative within ubiquitous com-
puting can be channeled through a computer game, “Little Computer People” 
(1985), which Gold developed in the 1980s when working for Activison (Gold 
2002: 130-132). The aim of the game was to nurture a little computational figure 
inhabiting a virtual dollhouse, keeping it fed, active and groomed with the help 
of the keyboard and joystick.29 The programmers claimed that these small inhab-
itants were responsible for bugs within the computational systems (Höltgen 
2011).  
In this belief, they ascribe an independent existence to the computer, as it in-
teracts with the user in the form of the little computer people (ibid.), while the 
users are responsible for the well-being of the technological object. What is deci-
sive within this scenario is that the computer no longer needs to be anthropo-
morphized. Instead, the technological history of the human is transformed into a 
new model. The circuits and codes within the computer receive their own form 
of agency, whereby the human user enters the agential community via the small 
figure. The specificity of this community is that the power structure is hierarchic, 
because bugs could develop within the system should the little figure not be tak-
en care of appropriately. Gazing upon this situation from contemporary digital 
cultures, the metaphor within “Little Computer People” couldn’t have been more 
fitting. These days, human agents are data generators who feed technological 
things with data that keeps them up and running.  
 
2.3 Technological objects as toys.  
Repetition and transformation  
 
The playful seduction intrinsic to the computer game, which didn’t lead to en-
tirely cooperative agential ensembles with technological things, are carried forth 
in Rich Gold’s conception of ubiquitous computing. Here, the method of binding 
users to the technological environment through cooperative strategies is pre-
served and modified. The modification is compounded through the emergence of 
the technological things from the computer and the performances are located 
within entities engaging with the toys in the room.  
 
“My formulation of Ubi-Comp started with Ubi-Comp product genres, a carry over from 
my toy days. Each product category genre had its own history, metaphor, shelf space, use 
                                                           
29 The game has been categorized as the predecessor for the tamagotchi, as well as the 
computer game ‘the SIMS’ (Höltgen 2011).  
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in the world, sales method, manufacturing technique, aesthetics, dependencies and other 
products dependent on it.” (Gold 2002: 66) 
 
This recourse to a toy universe trivialized the essence of these objects, but also 
offered an advantage. As things we are familiar with from our childhood, they 
are easily accessible and interaction is intuitive.30 As Gold put it: “Lastly, they 
are colonizing in that they take the forms of already existing, historically-
determined, objects of the Plenitude. There are Ubi-pens, Ubi-cars, Ubi-T-shirts, 
Ubi-walls, Ubi-notepads, Ubi-Shoes” (Gold 2002: 207). Gold’s techno-social 
universe is inhabited by commonplace objects, which are nonetheless fascinat-
ing, as they have been made animate. As Gold says: “Many of the objects about 
us seem alive, or as I often say, ‘enspirited’” (Gold 1993b).  
 
Figure 2: Artist’s kitchen  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gold, Rich (2002): The Plenitude: Design and Engineering in the Era of 
Ubiquitous Computing, Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 208. 
 
  
                                                           
30 Gold’s technological objects are more appealing and fun than the reality of ubiquitous 
computing would turn out to be. Weiser created small, mobile devices for collabora-
tive work processes, like tablets, pads, and boards. These functioned through the logic 
generated by ubiquitous computing within workplace studies (Friedwald 2008; 
Bell/Dourish 2011) and tended to be counter-intuitive. 
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Gold himself states: “So what kinds of toys did I design? I guess the simple an-
swer is that I tried to design computer toys that didn’t look like computers. I 
wanted the mysterious effects of computation, but I wanted it in non-mysterious 
objects” (Gold 2002: 137). 
 
Figure 3: Colonization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gold, Rich (2002): The Plenitude: Design and Engineering in the Era of  
Ubiquitous Computing, Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 117. 
 
Within this colonization it is essential that the things are not only occupied, but 
involved in an artistic-performative process of transformation through the de-
signer, as well as the user. A chain of translations occurs, through which the new 
form and function of the familiar toy is reassessed intuitively. The technological 
objects repeat a cultural context, transforming it through their iterations. The re-
sult is that one feels familiar and at home within technological worlds, and also 
creatively challenged. However, the creative achievement does not lie within 
subversion of the familiar, but rather in the consolidation of appearances, in-
scriptions and agencies.  
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2.4 Dancers in the dark 
 
The technological things are not only familiar, they are now also enspirited and 
magical. Gold compares ubiquitous computing with a children’s bedroom late at 
night, when the toys begin to dance as soon as the grown-ups have turned off the 
lights: “This new augmented reality is perhaps a little like the enchanted village, 
in which common objects have magically acquired new abilities, a village where 
toy blocks really do sing and dance when I turn out the lights” (Gold 1993a).  
The things are easily accessible; there is a specific attitude to engaging with 
them. One should approach and act with them like in a children’s magical won-
derland. Things will guide the way, once the user has opened all channels of per-
ception. As Gold says: “In my sophistry, all things in the world have tiny per-
sonalities, little ‘selves’, small consciousnesses. These enlivened objects help 
and hinder, collude and conspire, whisper and talk with each other and with us” 
(Gold 1993b). Things are therefore performative here, as it were, in the sense of 
the speech act, because they carry calls for action (Gibson 1979) within them. 
They provide guidence on how to manage them and which actions are appropri-
ate. With Gold, things remain in the shadows; they are dancers in the dark. In 
this way, the call for action manifests more in the form of seduction, inclina-
tions, fumbling experimentation rather than through cognitive performance. It is 
more of a felt and experienced action that creates performative artistic and aes-
thetic practice. The power divide between technological objects and the user that 
was established within Gold’s “Little Computer People” is continued. However, 
threat is not manifested in the technological thing; it lies within the dark envi-
ronment surrounding its existence. Embodiment through an environment makes 
it increasingly difficult to escape looming threat and ambiguity. 
Jane McGonical (1999: 29-32) has related Gold’s scenario of ubiquitous 
computing in the children’s darkened bedrooms to Winnicot’s theory of transi-
tional objects (Winnicott 1971). This theory describes a child’s compensatory 
transfer of affect to e.g. a stuffed animal after the loss of the omnipotence pre-
sent through symbiosis with its mother. While this may seem far-fetched, it does 
resonate with Gold’s depiction of a darkened nursery – his ubiquitous computa-
tional universes are enchanting and seductive. Users alternate between emanci-
pation and disempowerment. In interaction with technological objects, users are 
omnipotent. At the same time, they are harassed, seduced and led into darkness. 
Here is the first glimpse of governmentality within the dispositif of the per-
formative within digital cultures. They arise from the constant oscillation be-
tween empowerment and disempowerment, which creates and maintains the self-
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illusion while repeatedly destroying it. The result is a self-reliant interplay of de-
struction and re-generation of the self (Moser 2013). 
 
2.5 Ubicomp. Theater with mis-wiring 
 
Within Gold’s explanations of the nursery tales as masquerade, he specifies the 
governmental effect and its methods as follows:  
 
“The everyday objects themselves become a kind of ruse: a baby doll (or toy block) might 
look like a familiar remnant of childhood but it is really only one of a thousand distributed 
nodes which control the functioning of the whole house. Likewise, the baby doll itself ac-
tivates its own mechanisms, behaviors and charms based partly on the comings and goings 
of its adopted (organic) family, and partly on digital discussions with other objects in the 
house.” (Gold 1993a) 
 
Things are not only performative, they also play a theatrical part, equivalent to 
Austin’s un-serious speech acts on stage. Gold’s magical wonderland then be-
comes a history of mise-en-scène of the performative, in which it performs 
something other than it is, while keeping this circumstance hidden. What this 
‘other’ is made of can be deciphered with the help of the objects. They are not 
mere things, but intersections, which could control e.g. an entire house. This ex-
emplifies that the performance lies within technological environments and not 
within the thing itself. Ubiquitous computing does not correspond with things, 
but rather the environments they are embedded in. The likeable objects are mere 
distractions from the regulatory and controlling operations. It is necessary to take 
a closer look, to define what their calls to action are actually obscuring. In Rich 
Gold’s words:  
 
“Ubiquitous Computing is a new metaphor in which computers are spread invisibly 
throughout the environment, embedded and hiding as it were, within the objects of our 
everyday life. Each of these computers can talk with any of the other computers much like 
chattering animals in a living jungle, sometimes exchanging detailed information, some-
times just noting who’s around.” (Gold 1993a) 
 
The new objects, now computers, obscure their function as nodes and intersec-
tions of technological operations and grids, where they exchange data taken from 
human agency and transform them in their own logic. What emanates is a doubly 
structured performativity: The unleashing of technological objects into the per-
formative is accompanied by the performance of a history of mise-en-scène, in 
which technological performances are obscured.  
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These mise-en-scènes rely on interaction with technological objects and cun-
ningly implement the mis-wiring Gold supposes are in the human brain. “Our 
brain thinks that it’s fun”, Gold (2002: 137) says of the interaction. However:  
 
“Interactivity exploits one of the mis-wirings of our minds: if something moves and reacts 
based on invisible forces (like the calculations of a small computer chip) we think it is 
alive. Our economy is now based on this mis-wiring.” (Gold 2007, 53) 
 
That humans blithely participate in the technological environment is an effect of 
their enchantment, seduction and circumvention and also due to an exploitation 
of neurological conditions. These form the basis of an inescapable data economy 
as subconscious levels of perception and processing of human agents are put to 
use. The techno-ubiquitous universe is therefore a perfidious and ambivalent 
game, a positively techno-neurotic theater. Interactions and affordances are the 
interfaces of a ubiquitous wireless connection, as Weiser (1991) has correctly 
noted, which challenge the users on a psycho-neural level. Users are deliberately 
misguided, deceived, bedazzled and duped to enable and uphold the technologi-
cal ecologies. This theatrical play corresponds with the technological conditions 
in digital cultures. 
 
2.6 Lazy spirit 
 
The effects of this ubiquitous magical wonderland are not mitigated by this dou-
bled performativity. As Gold states: “Our pattern-matching mechanisms seem to 
make only a lazy distinction between the symbol and the symbolized. This is 
surely what allows advertising to work, not to mention art, literature, painting, 
erotica and of course, language itself.” (Gold 1993a) 
Enabled since Austin, the collapse of differentiation between the symbolic 
level and agency blossoms within technological performances. A positioning 
outside of these structures has become just as impossible as a position of cri-
tique. Caught in the magical wonderland, one can perform solely for the sake of 
economic players (e. g., Amazon, travel agencies or health insurance compa-
nies), or original data politics in the sense of data behaviorism (Rouvroy 2012), 
which inserts surfaces to obscure its own interests and technological processes. 
The magic spell takes effect and temptation wins. A lack of differentiation is no 
longer the exception – just as Austin had explicated through the conception of 
‘action language’ – but has become the status quo. The magical wonderland of 
theatrical sciences and artistic performance respectively (in the opinion of Erika 
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Fischer-Lichte, 2004), as well as the world of ubiquitous computing, undergo a 
joint venture and, in doing so, promote and enable each other. 
 
2.7 The necessity and use of the dispositif of the performative 
within digital cultures 
 
Within the dispositif of the performative that paradigmatically came to light 
through Rich Gold’s visions, a technological and humane performance of a life 
with and in socio-technological environments can be designed and regulated. It 
is constituted from fascinations such as (a) playing with of control and loss of 
control, (b) enspirited things and opaque technological environments, (c) the 
completely imbalanced cooperation with technological things and the dissolution 
into agential communities with the same, (d) the insecurity of evidence and un-
foreseeable technological and cultural processes, and finally (e) technological 
seduction. The independence and restricted intelligibility of technological envi-
ronments refer to the Foucauldian plight (1980 [1977]), to which the dispositif of 
the performative responds. With regard to the independence of technology, the 
socio-technological performativity produces a new highly dubious cooperative 
configuration of the relationship between technology and the human. This differs 
strongly from the traditional model of an instrumental relationship between the 
two. In this model the technological was a secondary object to an autonomous 
subject. In breaking with the old paradigm through the socio-technological per-
formance, human agency, subsumed within agential communities, still has a 
place in informational technological systems and infrastructures. Furthermore, 
socio-technological explanatory models allow for redefinitions of the ‘human’ 
and ‘technology’, which in theory should allow for a differentiated engagement 
with complicated historical formations of technology and culture. These should 
then react to technological environments and their capacity to process complex 
data. In effect this leads to a black-boxing of technology, which cannot be 
grasped through traditional methods of theory generation and understanding (cf. 
Beyes/Pias 2014).31 
Finally, the dispositif described creates a specific form of becoming self and 
self-governance, which, as exemplified by Rich Gold’s infantile magical won-
derland, feels secure within these new environments. The strategy of self-illusion 
takes place in performance within the agential communities, where actually the 
                                                           
31 However, Rich Gold’s work exemplifies how non-comprehension and non-knowledge 
are mostly an effect of smart exploitations of mis-wiring, as well as intellectual  
laziness. 
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desire to cooperate with the human agent is lacking. The self is an illusion in the 
sense that it is created solely to entertain the operations of technological objects 
and infrastructures, without substantiating itself or receiving attention for any-
thing other than its function. To secure these operations, the illusionary self is 
continuously ‘addressed’ and thereby perpetuated. This generation of self is 
methodologically grounded in the enchantment and seduction of enspirited 
things, as well as psycho-neuronal mis-wiring, through which it becomes self-
illusion. This way of producing and simulating a self is constitutive for the con-
dition, function and preservation of digital cultures. The illusionary, conjured 
self, once generated, begins to resist the exposure of its precarious existence, 
thereby securing the data flow necessary for the politics and economy of these 
infrastructures (Günel/Halpern 2016). From a governmental angle of digital cul-
tures, this self is a huge asset, as it governs itself for the sake of keeping up the 
illusion and is automatically piloted by technology. This makes it impossible, or 
at least deeply difficult, to reach an awareness of the magical enchantment and 
mis-wiring it is subjected to, just as it obscures the real political and economic 
structures.  
Looking into this history of performativity might help to define how digital 
cultures make their human agents give away their data and feel at home in tech-
nological environments. A contradictory ‘regime of nevertheless’ develops, in 
which, despite all insecurity, despite insight into the doubly performative consti-
tution, and with all knowledge of the obscurity of technology, as well as its en-
chantment and seduction, thought and action nevertheless succumb.  
 
 
3. PERFORMING THE PERFORMING THE DIGITAL. 
POSITIONS OF CRITIQUE 
 
The question arises, how positions for observation, reflection and critique can be 
found in the situation of performative ubiquity? When the symbolic level and 
agency merge and create a reality beyond mere representation, when perfor-
mances that were previously considered methods of subversion (Butler 1998; 
McKenzie 2005, 2013) are constitutive for digital cultures, there seems to be no 
possibility of escaping or even undermining these structures.  
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3.1 Performance as critique, according to Foucault 
 
According to Foucault (1992), critique is not a critique of the possibilities and 
conditions of knowledge and awareness, nor does it constitute judgment. Cri-
tique of knowledge/epistemology is transformed into the search for the genesis 
of knowledge/epistemology, as well as the power structures, which enable them 
or which they produce. Instead of passing judgment, the aim is exposure to e.g. 
reveal functions and effects of categorizations and interpretations, even one’s 
own attitudes and assessments in an attempt to suspend them (Seier 2011). This 
is what Florian Sprenger calls a “genealogical critique” (Sprenger 2014: 12), 
which “tells the story of a becoming and confronts what has become with its 
contingency: It is possible that everything may have been different and it is pos-
sible that everything will be different. This applies especially to the genealogists 
themselves. Critique is therefore the creation of space for the non-essential and 
the annulment of common sense” (Sprenger 2014: 12-13; my translation).32  
Based on this methodological and systematic understanding, a critique of the 
dispositif of the performative requires an understanding of how governance, de-
duced from Foucault’s understanding of governmentality, functions in this sce-
nario. This is the basis to steer a practice, which enables – to paraphrase Fou-
cault – not to be governed by an identifiable constellation of power in such a 
way. Critique is never the suspension of power structures, but always the other 
side of this coin. Hence, power itself, as well as one’s own part within power 
structures, have to be understood in order to undermine them (Raunig 2008; Sei-
er 2011; Sprenger 2014). Critique within the dispositif of the performative 
means recognizing the seduction, enchantment, the psycho-neuronal occupation, 
as well as the self-illusion, so as to be able to subvert them. It is then a strategy 
to develop a performance of ‘performing (the) digital’. To do so, the following 
section will present methods of a ‘discursive aesthetic’, as well as forms of 
knowledge and existences within artistic research (Busch 2009). Within theory 
and practice of the latter, the focus will be on the epistemological power to ques-
tion and subvert knowledge structures in particular. In this way, critique can be-
come a practice, exploiting the notion of genealogical critique that everything is, 
to an extent, contingent. 
                                                           
32 […] erzählt die Geschichte eines Gewordenseins und konfrontiert das Gewordene so 
mit seiner Kontingenz: Es wäre möglich, dass alles anders gewesen ist, und es ist 
möglich, dass alles anders sein wird. Dies betrifft insbesondere den Genealogen 
selbst. Kritik heißt demnach, einen Raum für das Nichtnotwendige zu schaffen und 
Selbstverständnisse auszuhebeln (Sprenger 2014: 12-13). 
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3.2 Queering through performance 
 
Jon McKenzie (2001; 2005; 2013) has developed helpful theoretical and practi-
cal research to specify reflexive performance. He has elaborated upon performa-
tivity as a competitive display of technology and the self, replacing discipline in 
“becoming the central dispositif of power and knowledge of our times” (McKen-
zie 2013: 44). He also investigates its subversions, as seen with, e.g., the Design 
Lab of the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Its task would be “to democratize 
digitality” (McKenzie, this volume). At the same time, the following will ex-
plore McKenzie’s entry point and approach, so as to suggest a modification of 
the same.  
For McKenzie, the problem with a critical performativity lies within the vast 
scope of the dispositif of knowledge and power of the performative that it is dif-
ficult to elude. It ranges from the system-optimizing performance within neolib-
eral organizational structures – “perform, or else” (McKenzie 2001) – to high-
functioning performances of technology, as well as cultural and artistic perfor-
mances (McKenzie 2013). This combination makes it difficult to view perfor-
mances solely as instruments of resistance of contemporary constellations of 
power, as would be often assumed within performance and theater studies 
(McKenzie 2005: 23). McKenzie (ibid.) suggests three categorizations of per-
formances (organizational, technological and cultural), seeing them to be part of 
a socio-technological machine of production and organization, which allow for a 
differentiated view. He calls these categorizations of “machinic performance” 
(ibid.), where the components of this ‘machine’ can be distinguished from each 
other through the degree and the quality of their effects and values and in this 
sense: performance. McKenzie distinguishes between “efficiency” (organiza-
tional performance), “effectiveness” (technological performance) and “efficacy” 
(e.g., cultural performance) (ibid.: 24), whereby each performance can turn into 
the named effects and values. It is therefore a continuous tightrope walk, wheth-
er artistic performances are suitable for intersecting, or queering societal power 
structures and technological norms, as they can only happen ‘within’ socio-
technological arrangements (ibid.: 28), “[…] seeking out and making connec-
tions with mutant elements already at work within them, while at the same time 
guarding against the microfacsisms that inhabit activist groups of the Right and 
even, at times, the Left” (ibid.: 28-29). 
The subversive mutations within artistic performance may however, so also 
McKenzie, lead to an affirmation of a technological self, when its characteristics 
– namely transgressiveness, resistance and liminality – collide with technologi-
cal or organizational performativity. This problematic turn may come up in 
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McKenzie’s experiments, perhaps due to the effect of the performative in digital 
cultures. If, for example, technological performativity is evaluated positively and 
develops into a description of the situation within digital cultures, just as if with-
in these, knowledge of complexity and unpredictable conditions would deter-
mine the state of the art, then artistic performance can no longer queer the sys-
tem of normative and efficient performativity. It would engage in cooperation 
and repetition of the same nature, instead of intervening (Leeker 2015). This tip-
ping point is present even in McKenzie’s work, when he states:  
 
“My guiding premise is that the traditional distinction between active and contemplative 
lives is collapsing in our own digital moment, and turning into a new, mixed performative 
life that is bringing with it new modes that are more networked than hierarchical, more 
collaborative than individual, more ecological than humanist, more affective than theoreti-
cal, more holistic than specialized, more fragmented than unified. I call these post-
ideational modes of thought and action, since they move us away from Western culture’s 
most fundamental assumptions about thinking, the image of distinct ideas, specialized dis-
ciplines, stable subjects and objects of knowledge, and clear distinctions between theory 
and practice, argument and rhetoric, writing and media. New performative modes of 
‘thought-action’ draw instead from such areas as experimental arts, indigenous media, 
neuroscience, and recombinant culture, mashing up practices of orality and literacy, stabil-
ity and plasticity, mythic and dialectical thought, visual and aural forms, contemplative 
and active lives.” (McKenzie n.d: 1) 
 
3.3 Perspectives on discourse-analytical aesthetics 
and permanent observation 
 
To prevent the constitution of cultural performances from becoming mere repeti-
tion of the dispositif of the performative, an altered form of critique will be ex-
plored. Due to the equiprimordial sense of the discourses on performativity, a 
performative configuration may not be the most suitable. Hence, the ‘performing 
of performances’ of the dispositif will be the focus. It is considered an applied 
critique with performative methods, informed by media history and media epis-
temology. Instead of formulating a specific discourse, it is necessary to register 
the discursive formations, reconstruct their genesis and analyze them. Subse-
quently, an aesthetic can be carved out, which makes these analyses visible and 
experienceable, foregrounds their ability to change, while at the same time re-
flecting upon their effects. Based on genealogical critique, a discourse-analytical 
aesthetic can be produced (Leeker 2013b; 2014a; 2014b). This aesthetic may 
form statements, but also substantial and creative suggestions (re-design), which 
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nonetheless differ from McKenzie’s ideas. An essential factor would be the ob-
servation of their productivity. Based on the discursive productivity, which is 
more difficult to pinpoint within digital cultures due to the consolidation of sym-
bolic and practical levels, while simultaneously being increased by these same 
factors, constant observation is the crucial silver bullet in the barrel of critique. 
“Queering” would then consist not of designing or creating performativity, but 
rather in intersecting its discursiveness.  
In the following, two examples are introduced, with which this discourse-
analytical aesthetic was tried and tested. The examples consist of student pro-
jects the author devised within the transdisciplinary field of ‘Complementary 
Studies’ at Leuphana University Lüneburg. Both projects theoretically engaged 
with contemporary socio-technological discourses and had the task of visualizing 
and thereby enabling a critique of their effects. On the one hand, this includes 
the examination of the problematic positioning of human agents within un-
leashed technological environments. On the other hand, the students engaged 
with methodologies to critically deal with the non-knowledge and not-
comprehension intrinsic to digital cultures. 
 
3.4 You can never be too paranoid! 
 
Paranoia will be elaborated as an appropriate method and epistemological atti-
tude of providing critique for the dispositif of the performative within digital cul-
tures that can be realized and tested through performance. As Marie-Luise An-
gerer has claimed, you can never be too paranoid (Leeker 2013b). Digital cul-
tures are increasingly non-transparent, directing human agency on an affective 
level (affective computing) and are implemented for operations in the dark. Par-
anoia is no longer a pathological condition, but has become an indispensable 
modality for knowledge creation and an epistemological machine.  
This insight was explored through a video installation performance on “Me-
dia and Paranoia” (2014) (Leeker 2014a).33 Film clips about paranoia produced 
by RFID or webcam hacking were confronted with paranoia arising due to the 
interventionist activist group ‘Anonymous’ or the ‘darknet’ (Leeker 2014b). This 
range of paranoid fields is symptomatic for the ambivalent status of paranoia, as 
its focused usage has already been taken up within contexts of the political left 
                                                           
33 The project developed from a seminar in the winter semester of 2014/15. The installa-
tion was made up of film clips covering the project theme, as well as faked vlogs the 
students produced thematically. A final presentation gathered all films into one live 
composition. 
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as well as by groups aiming at resistance or political education (c.f. McKenzie as 
quoted above). Consequently, paranoia is necessary and yet problematic. Not on-
ly does it level political camps, it is also involved in cultural production process-
es, creating the fear it is meant to overcome. In this way, paranoia is a strategy of 
governmentality, which Eva Horn identifies as a “political style of digital cul-
tures” (Horn 2012: n. pag.).  
The installation, which serves as a showcase for a methodology of critique in 
digital cultures, aimed to clarify these ambivalences of paranoia – being at the 
same time an instrument of knowledge and governmental discourse – and still 
put its reflexive potential to use as a behavioral pattern and a form of knowledge 
production. A contradictory situation is created, which is just as paranoid as its 
object of study, so that paranoia, resurfacing as a form of knowledge production, 
can be implemented against the paranoia of governmental discourse, without ab-
sorbing or reinstating the latter. The performative installation transpired to be a 
suitable aesthetic method, for it created a situation that was both immersive and 
reflexive. Visitors of the installation were drawn into the paranoid environment, 
while at the same time being forced to critically question the often contrary con-
tributions presented.  
In this way, educated paranoia comes to be an essential method of perform-
ing the performing in digital cultures and could be implemented in different con-
texts, institutes and projects. 
 
3.5 Owlglass pranks with disabled things 
 
A second method of critically performing within the dispositif of the performa-
tive is the engagement with ‘owlglass pranks’. Discourses are taken seriously 
and exaggerated to a point of over-affirmation. This pointed and exaggerated 
embodiment probes its governmental consequences and epistemic effects, there-
by considering modalities of change.  
Through this critical method, the exhibition/performance ‘Versehrte Dinge’ 
(disabled things)34 assessed the contemporary plane of discourse within digital 
cultures ‘after’ ubiquitous computing. The current situation is embossed by a 
‘techno-ecologism’ (Hörl 2011), which acts on the observation that singular me-
dia entities have dissolved into a techno-social environment, which is inhabited 
by smart things (Engemann/Sprenger 2015) that intend to engage and cooperate 
                                                           
34 This project took place within a student seminar in the winter semester of 2015/16. An 
audiovisual and textual documentation and analysis of the project is in preparation 
(Leeker 2016c). 
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with human users (Latour 2001; Gießmann/Schüttpelz 2015). Here, things would 
gain an emancipated status, equitable to other entities (Latour 2001) within 
symmetric agencies. The socio-technological environment is translated into a 
hyper-nervous system of existences, which addresses, affects and appropriates 
the human on a preconscious level (Hansen 2011). 
Owlglass pranks raised the question of whether things and technological en-
vironments then have their own agency and rights. For example, can damaged 
things simply be disposed of within these new conditions? If not, what does that 
mean for human agents, surrounded by broken technical things? The exhibition 
created a parallel universe in which a Magna Carta of things was presented as a 
daycare center with psychological support for broken things. The over-
affirmation presented ‘Siri’ as a fairy godmother of mediated knowledge produc-
tion. The delivery and circulation of data became a right, as they are equal to 
human agents. This over-affirmation intentionally induced a reflection of the un-
leashing of objects, which visitors could experience within the exhibition and its 
performances.  
Within this form of artistic research with discourse-analytical aesthetics, an-
other method was an incessant ambivalence meant to drive visitors into an alter-
nating state of emotions and thought, which was induced by guides leading them 
through the exhibition. These guides prompted euphoric, as exemplified in 
Weiser and Rich Gold’s work, and critical views of the given situation. In the 
case of the latter, the critique was grounded in analyses of contemporary dis-
courses on techno-ecologies and things from media- and cultural studies, which 
engage with their utilization for capitalistic chains of valorization (Schröter 
2015) and the phantasm of techno-totality (Engemann/Sprenger 2015: 58).35 
It is here that the circle comes to a close. The narratives of the dispositif of 
the performative are simultaneously a foundation for a critique of the same with-
in artistic performance with discourse-analytical aesthetics. The performance of 
owlglass tales deconstructs the performativity inherent to digital cultures from a 
position of media history and epistemological critique, without directly suggest-
                                                           
35 As Engemann and Sprenger put it: „Die Totalitätsfigur der Ubiquität und ihres An-
spruchs eines totalen Einschlusses in eine Welt der Adressierbarkeit verweist auf his-
torische Formationen von Allwissen und Weltschließung, die in ihren theologischen, 
aber auch geschichtsphilosophische Dimensionen bislang kaum reflektiert wurden“ 
(“the figurative totality of ubiquity and its claim to a total enclosure into a world of 
addressability points to historical formations of omniscient and foreclosed worlds, 
which have hardly been reflected upon within dimensions of theology and philosophy 
of history”) (Engemann/Sprenger 2015: 58; my translation). 
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ing alternative worlds. Contrary to Jon McKenzie’s suggestions, different design 
models can only prosper through a reflection and recognition of the governmen-
tality of the dispositif of the digital. The problematic situation, in which scholar-
ly disciplines describing and analyzing digital cultures will always reproduce the 
things they are describing, is diverted to a certain extent, as the over-affirmation 
of discourses of things and techno-environments allows the altering of designs 
by divesting them of discourse. 
 
3.6 Artistic research as critical practice 
 
In closing, artistic research will be described as a critique of the dispositif of the 
performative within the unique conditions of digital cultures. This leads to an 
understanding of critique as a practice that creates alternatives to a problematic 
democratizing configuration, which follows performative maelstroms (cf. 
McKenzie). This ‘praxeological turn’ is essential, as Gerald Raunig (2008) has 
explained, as critique is only effective when it does not stagnate as an attitude, 
but leads to an alternative conception of living. A necessity within this process, 
as Raunig explores, is the doubled figure of critique as “suspension and re-
composition”. The particular task of suspending a judgement is to create spaces 
for new composition and practice. Raunig clarifies that this practice of re-
composition relates to a manipulation of “textual machines” and “social ma-
chines” (Raunig 2008). It is imperative to not only appropriate texts and interpre-
tations, but also actual habits of living. It should be stressed that this re-
composition as critical praxis lies within an affirmation of a techno-social ‘have-
become’; hence the goal is the claim that the modes of living are not manifest 
and could always be different. 
Raunig (2008) exemplifies this critical practice through a scenario of re-
sistance. The Beguines were female members of a Christian denomination in the 
13th century, who took no vows and did not live in confinement, thereby leading 
a life outside of the regulations of a pastoral community as a practicing critique. 
The reconfiguration of textual machines takes place through, according to 
Raunig (ibid.: n. pag.), “the attempt to intensify, reinterpret and rewrite them, the 
excessive application and outdoing of the rule, the over-affirmation and exagger-
ation of the regulations: to the extent that Beguines exercised ecstatic practices”. 
Concerning social machines, Raunig goes on to say: “[…] Beguines […] lived 
unmarried and in poverty, or more strongly formulated: in the rejection of the 
marital dominance of men and in the rejection of wealth, which was also under-
stood at the time in the sense of a rejection of power and higher position  (ibid.: 
n. pag.). 
”
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The suggestion here and within the two projects “Media and Paranoia” and 
“Disabled Things” is that they can be seen as examples of artistic research for-
mulating a critical practice within digital cultures. The projects fulfill Raunig’s 
criteria of critique as a practice. Within artistic practice the textual machine is 
subverted, especially in the form of a discourse-analytical aesthetic. For exam-
ple, when meaning is suspended through over-affirmation or exaggeration and 
knowledge can be re-configured. Furthermore, Raunig (2008) hints at the textual 
work of the Beguines to be “ecstatic practice”, creating non-biblical messages, 
such as performative practices of knowledge production, building a basis from 
which knowledge can be re-configured. Within the project “Media and Para-
noia”, the paranoid status of the ‘Anonymous’ collective and the ‘darknet’ was 
only discovered through the performance within the installation. From here, 
knowledge and the production of it could be reconfigured as a form of enlight-
ened or educated paranoia. A contestation of the social machine happened when 
the protagonists of artistic research began falling out of each of their various dis-
ciplines and reconfiguring the same.36 For they are not generally accepted within 
an artistic context, nor within academia, but reconfigure their life and work with-
in academic contexts from a marginalized position. Fittingly, Raunig writes of 
the Beguines: “This means that the Beguines were border-crossers, who were 
always and from the start in danger of being thrown into the outside of ecclesias-
tical immanence” (ibid.: n. pag.).  
Finally, artistic research can represent a practice, which develops in the tradi-
tion of the Beguine practices as a model for critique. This transfer is especially 
useful within the specific conditions of the dispositif of the performative within 
digital cultures, for both engage with knowledge, understanding and the drawing 
up of boundaries.37 Because of the mentioned self-referentiality of digital cul-
tures and the irritation of conceptions of reliable knowledge due to the signifi-
cance of illusions (Gramelsberger 2009; Pias 2011), the current situation makes 
knowledge itself unreliable and inaccessible (Beyes/Pias 2014). In this context, 
                                                           
36  This includes the foundation of institutes for artistic research or the creation of PhD-
programs at art academies, which, despite all just critique, have managed to question 
and reconfigure traditional knowledge regimes (cf. Busch 2009: 141-158). 
37 At this point, artistic practice is not understood as its own or different, non-rational 
knowledge (Mersch 2009: 27-47; Badura et al. 2015). From a discourse-critical point 
of view, these concepts should be viewed within their productive effects, e.g. in the 
way they produce knowledge. Through articulation of a different, aesthetic knowl-
edge, the same is produced and commissioned to consolidate or discredit knowledges 
from within rational sciences.  
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artistic research targets the borders and evidence of knowing and non-
knowledge, understanding and non-comprehension, as well as the borders be-
tween the human and the technological, acting as theory and practice to question 
these concepts.38 Artistic research can therefore be seen as a critical practice 
within digital cultures,39 which collects and negotiates spectrums of unsettling 
knowledge and pushes thresholds in a specific manner.  
The constant observation of the dispositif of the performative within digital 
cultures, as it is cultivated within discourse-analytical aesthetics, can at least spo-
radically become a ‘practice of critique’ through the constitution of artistic re-
search. 
 
Translated by Sara Morais 
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Dance is a field of artistic practice(s) commonly associated with bodily move-
ments and with the concept of a choreographer making certain kinds of decisions 
about where and when these movements will be performed in front of an audi-
ence on a stage. There is plentiful evidence for this understanding of dance even 
though there is little consensus within the field itself about things like the physi-
cal training of dancers, the education of choreographers or even if choreography 
needs to include dancers. Still a large part of the dance field pays deep attention 
to human movement and a host of associated and evolving practices experienced 
through and with movement. And as with experience, dance can be understood 
as something continuous, ephemeral, i.e. disappearing from moment-to-moment 
and difficult if not impossible to document. However, this conception of dance 
as impossible to document has been thoroughly challenged, first by artists and 
then scholars exploring how ideas and concepts occurring in movement and in 
choreographic creation can be recorded, analysed and shared. Instead of focusing 
on ideas about movement or about dances, these approaches have concentrated 
on forms of logic occurring intrinsically in movement and movement making. 
Results of this research have been and continue to be published for further study 
and engagement, testing the impact such “choreographic ideas” might have on 
the world outside of the rehearsal studio (cf. deLahunta 2013). 
In the discussion to follow, we will draw attention to some dance artists who 
have been amongst the first to explore alternative approaches to the documenta-
tion and transmission of movement ideas. The relevance for digital cultures is 
that these artists and their collaborators embraced digital media as the most ef-
fective means of doing this work, to render the “complex spatial-corporeal-
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temporal relationships involved in dance […] visible, accessible and compre-
hendible to a reader” (deLahunta 2013: 174). We will show how this basic inter-
est on the part of choreographers in using digital media tools has developed in 
parallel with other evolutions in human-computer relations.  
The examples of digital dance documentation we will refer to in this chapter 
come under the heading of Choreographic Objects, the title of a series of work-
shops organised in 2008-2009 centring on the output of four research teams 
working in collaboration with the well-known choreographers William Forsythe, 
Siobhan Davies, Wayne McGregor and Emio Greco | PC.1 These teams were 
working to bring choreographic ideas and processes into newly productive ex-
changes with both general audiences and other specialist knowledge areas. The 
digital resources developed to mediate this exchange included interactive scores 
and installations, choreographic software agents and digital dance archives. 
“Created with the intention to articulate and disseminate choreographic thought” 
(Blades 2015: 26), these resources constituted the choreographic objects that 
were the focus of the workshops. 
Seen from this perspective, the concept of choreographic objects can be used 
to frame other projects seeking to document and disseminate the unique working 
procedures of renowned dance artists. Some of these choreographic objects once 
published, e.g. William Forsythe’s “Improvisation Technologies” or Anne Tere-
sa de Keersmaeker’s “A Choreographer’s Score”, have been subject to much fur-
ther analysis and study. Conceived of as the beginnings of a “new form of dance 
literature” (Groves et al. 2007: 91), they have been valued for their potential ed-
ucational benefit, as a reference for interdisciplinary research, discussed critical-
ly by performance scholars and taken as a stimulus for other artists and design-
ers. This chapter intends to pose a new question about these choreographic ob-
jects. As information abstracted from the corporeal, digitised and now existing as 
computable data, can they still best be thought of as capturing and communi-
cating the unique approaches of individual artists? Does the condition of being 
data suggest an even more fundamental change to the ways in which we think 
about the nature of choreographic objects? They have already been studied in 
their own right as a partial basis for a new philosophy of movement (cf. Portano-
va 2013; Sutil 2015). Should they be re-considered as they enter the datasphere 
as digital objects, more in line with the ideas of digital philosophers and re-
searchers? 
We will use the application, practice and function of annotation to explore 
the connection between choreographic objects and digital objects. There are 
                                                           
1  Cf. http://projects.beyondtext.ac.uk/choreographicobjects 
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three perspectives on annotation to pay attention to; 1) as a means of communi-
cating principles of movement or choreographic practice which we will refer to 
as ‘annotation for representation’; 2) as a practice of coding audiovisual media 
when studying human movement behaviour which we call ‘coding annotation’; 
and 3) when the function of annotation is to assist machine-based information 
processing or interoperability, or ‘computable annotation’. It should become 
clear that ‘coding annotation’ has particular relevance because of the practice of 
annotating as a way of thinking about time-based phenomena. 
 
 
INTEROPERABILITY 
 
In May 2015, Yuk Hui and Simon Worthington convened a workshop at 
Leuphana University Lüneburg titled Future for the Annotation of Digital Ob-
jects to explore “new conceptualisations and practices of annotation” of digital 
objects with a critical focus on the limits of technical annotation standards and 
systems developed mainly to assist machine-based information processing or in-
teroperability on the Web (cf. Hui/Worthington 2015). Many who are not direct-
ly involved in creating or studying such annotation standards and systems will 
not be aware of the scope of this development. And the stakes are high when it 
comes to creating tools individuals can use to annotate and index text, audio and 
visual materials on the Web in ways that will harness the power of interoperabil-
ity; that is having the capacity for linking and sharing, being tracked back to ori-
gins, stored and searchable.2 Hui’s concept of digital objects draws on the think-
ing of philosophers of technology like Gilbert Simondon and Bernard Stiegler to 
elaborate on a new direction of investigation that is concerned with the “rela-
tionality between the object” which has been digitised and its programmable mi-
lieu comprised of data networks (cf. Hui 2012: 390). Materials such as YouTube 
videos and Flickr images, are the digital objects to which Hui refers, “composed 
                                                           
2  Organisations involved in developing annotation tools for users include venture capi-
tal supported start-ups such as Genius (http://genius.com/web-annotator) with an ini-
tial investment of $15 million dollars in 2012, higher education coalitions supporting 
interoperable web annotation like Hypothes.is (https://hypothes.is/annotating-all-
knowledge) and online scholarly publishing initiatives such as Scalar (http:// 
scalar.usc.edu/scalar), funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and National En-
dowment for the Humanities. Technology providers have sprung up around European 
research projects such as Europeana, a major digital platform for cultural heritage that 
uses PUNDIT, a web annotation tool developed by NET7.  
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of data and formalised by schemes or ontologies that one can generalise as 
metadata” (Hui 2012: 380). 
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), the main organisation developing 
open standards for ensuring “the long-term growth of the Web”3, first began its 
work on annotation soon following the advent of the Semantic Web in the late 
1990s. This included work on Annotea, a user focused project that appears to 
have run from 1999-2003 aiming to enhance collaboration by making it possible 
to attach comments to a Web document.4 Another project was the Open Annota-
tion Collaboration (OAC) project that ran in three phases from 2009-2013.5 In its 
Guiding Principles, the OAC states that its efforts are to “allow the sharing of 
annotations across clients, servers, and applications. It will not, in any way, pre-
scribe user interfaces” (OAC 2013). In other words, the OAC was set up to es-
tablish a standards framework for getting computers and programs to reliably 
talk to other computers and programs across the Internet, and many current pro-
jects base their systems in the OAC framework (see Footnote 2). Since 2014, it 
appears these two branches have merged as the World Wide Web Consortium 
(W3C) has a new working group dedicated to developing a specification for a 
decentralised and open annotation infrastructure “as a new layer of interactivity 
and linking on top of the Web. It will allow anyone to annotate anything any-
where” (W3C 2016).6 
 
 
CODING, OBSERVATION AND THEORY 
 
We turn briefly now to annotation software designed for the systematic study 
and annotation of audiovisual (audio-video) media for the purpose of scientific 
research. Specifically, we will look at multi-modal annotation tools designed to 
flexibly accommodate a range of various user-defined coding schemes used by 
researchers studying phenomena such as modes of human or animal communica-
tion, behaviour and social interaction.7 Coding in this context does not refer to 
computationally interacting with a corpus of digitised material, but to classifica-
                                                           
3  Cf. https://www.w3.org/  
4  Cf. https://www.w3.org/2001/Annotea 
5  Cf. http://www.openannotation.org/about.html 
6  Cf. https://www.w3.org/annotation 
7  Two of the more popular and widely used of these tools are ELAN and ANVIL: 
Cf. https://tla.mpi.nl/tools/tla-tools/elan/elan-description) and http://www.anvil-soft 
ware.org 
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tion systems derived from conceptual taxonomical frameworks corresponding to 
specialised theories and approaches, e.g. from studies of distributed cognition or 
psycholinguistics. This means the tools are designed as well as chosen accord-
ingly “against the background of specific theoretical assumptions” (Rohlfing et 
al 2006: 122). The tool’s designer optimises for a limited range of these theoreti-
cal possibilities by, for example, supporting two different annotation procedures 
referred to by Michael Kipp, the creator of ANVIL, one of the more popular ex-
isting tools, as top-down or bottom-up coding. This is a way of expressing the 
different approaches the researcher who might use for coding or annotating the 
recording of behavior in question in ANVIL. Top down refers to higher-level 
concepts with bottom-up referring to the annotating of smaller units, with both 
procedures usually meeting in the middle in practice. For example, a study of 
gestures might involve the researcher coding from bottom up the “so-called ges-
ture phases (preparation, stroke, hold, retraction) and then encode the actual ges-
ture” (Kipp 2014: 429). But this does not say much about the depth of 
knowledge and methodological approaches the expert researcher brings to the 
study. In 2006, a widely cited workshop report comparing multimodal annota-
tion tools made it clear that the choice for a specific software tool meant not only 
comparing the available programs. It also meant evaluating what the gain would 
be over low tech, perhaps more stable ‘traditional’ tools for data collection and 
analysis (cf. Rohlfing et al. 2006). 
These software tools have emerged from the field of study they are intended 
to be used for and are often developed by an individual or small team for non-
commercial research purposes (e.g. ANVIL is free to download and use). This is 
an extreme contrast with the efforts to ‘annotate the web’ described above, not 
only in terms of scale, but also technically. For example, a section on ‘interoper-
ability’ in a 2014 report by Kipp still refers mainly to the possibility of importing 
and exporting datasets in formats readable in other software (cf. Kipp 2014). 
However, these tools do correspond to the development of choreographic ob-
jects in that they focus on the documentation and analysis or coding of time-
based phenomena for the purpose of deepening understanding of a range of hu-
man activities. There are contrasts here with dance as an artistic practice, but it is 
not that an artistic practice does not come with a set of assumptions and meth-
ods, and it is not that process in the sciences is any more or less subjective than 
in the arts. But arts practice is not accustomed to nesting its assumptions in quite 
the same way in relation to what is valued as the outcome of its process. The par-
ticular kind of instability this gives rise to means that a more or less general cod-
ing scheme does not have the same status or value for arts practice as it might for 
science practice. Although a dance notation system like Laban or Benesh can be 
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used as a kind of coding scheme, in practice these existing systems are not in 
general use (as compared to music notation) for a variety of reasons. However, 
we can annotatively subject dance to the top down and bottom up encodings of 
science researchers, and some collaborative inter-disciplinary work has been 
done in this area, e.g. a linguistics analysis of the semiotics of dance perfor-
mance and a study of distributed cognition in the context of dance creation (cf. 
Kirsh et al. 2009; Fernandes/Jürgens 2013). In any case, what will become im-
portant for our discussion here is the process of annotation itself, the labour in-
volved in the close study of human activity, in our case in the context of choreo-
graphic and dance practice, and the nature of the coding involved. 
 
 
CHOREOGRAPHIC OBJECTS TO DIGITAL OBJECTS 
 
The examples that follow are drawn from three projects developed by or in close 
collaboration with the choreographers, William Forsythe and Deborah Hay. As a 
reminder, there are three perspectives on annotation to pay attention to; 1) as a 
means of communicating principles of movement or choreographic practice [an-
notation for representation]; 2) an approach to coding the audiovisual media 
[coding annotation]; and 3) to assist machine-based information processing 
[computable annotation]. 
Motivated by a need to quickly transmit principles of improvisation he had 
developed with his company Ballet Frankfurt in the 1980s, William Forsythe 
turned to digital multi-media. Beginning development in collaboration with the 
Center for Art and Media Karlsruhe (ZKM) in the early 1990s as a training plat-
form for the company, earlier versions included recordings of performance 
works from several angles alongside short lectures from Forsythe augmented by 
“graphic overlays” or video annotation (Ziegler 2007: 34). After several itera-
tions a version was published in 1999 as a CD-ROM under the title Improvisa-
tion Technologies: a tool for the analytical dance eye (Forsythe 1999). The an-
notations are drawn directly on top of a video image of Forsythe performing 
demonstrations of these principles for the camera (Figure 1). The result is a col-
lection of nearly 65 short demonstrations most using this form of annotation to 
show movement paths and map out “spatial relationships in and around his 
body” (Groves 2007: 92). This combination of movement demonstration, verbal 
description and annotation draws out movement ideas and makes them explicit. 
It also entangles the idea in a composite form of communication, which through 
simultaneous demarcation shows how conceptual or mental parameters can 
shape the force and trajectory of a movement. 
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Figure 1: Screenshots from Williams Forsythe's CD-ROM Improvisation 
Technologies 
Credit: William Forsythe, Nik Haffner, Christian Ziegler, Volker Kuchelmeister, Yvonne 
Mohr, Astrid Sommer, ZKM/Zentrum für Kunst und Medientechnologie, Karlsruhe, Deut-
sches Tanzarchiv Köln/SK Stiftung Kultur. 
 
At the time of its development, this choreographic object was not thought of in 
terms of computational data, even though some of Forsythe’s compositional ide-
as drew on the concept of “recursive algorithms […] fixed variations that we 
created through a long, painstaking process, not unlike that of computer pro-
gramming” (Forsythe/Kaiser 1999: 68). The naming and organisation of the 
principles of improvisation themselves would have occurred in the practice, in 
the rehearsal studio, some time before they were transposed to the multi-media 
environment of the CD-ROM. For the design and development of this environ-
ment, these names would become a fixed classification or coding system that en-
abled cross-referencing between Forsythe’s short demonstrations and video of 
three of his dancers using the principles. Watching one of these videos, the spe-
cific principle in use at any one time shows up on the timeline as an ‘clickable’ 
annotation. Here the background of assumptions and methods that bring the cod-
ing and annotations together into meaningful relationships correspond to a theo-
ry of movement generation associated with a single artist.  
While all the audiovisual material published on the CD-ROM was digitised 
and programmed in Macromedia Director, as already written this particular cho-
reographic object was not thought of in terms of computational data. In part this 
had to do with the time, the Web was in its relative infancy and it was the “mul-
ti-media era” according to Geert Lovink, Founder of The Institute of Networked 
Cultures. In an interview on the history of the CD-ROM in the arts, Lovink 
states that “the central desire of CD-ROMs was to blow up traditional forms of 
navigation”, but the weakness of the CD-ROM was that it was “a closed envi-
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ronment, a data monade” (Lovink 2015). Despite the definite limitations this 
presents for re-imagining this particular choreographic object as a digital object, 
the reason for including it in our discussions here, in addition to the observations 
on coding and annotation above, is because of the successful precedent it set in 
showing how a unique set of principles of movement in dance could be effec-
tively elucidated using computer-aided design. Improvisation Technologies was 
also the inspiration for the next example in our list.  
In 2005, Forsythe embarked on another project using video annotation this 
time to elucidate principles of choreography with the aim of helping audiences 
perceive the organisational structures in a dance he had choreographed in 2000 
titled One Flat Thing, reproduced. In collaboration with Norah Zuniga Shaw and 
Maria Palazzi from The Ohio University and a team of designers, animators and 
researchers, the project was developed over a period of four years eventually 
launching on-line in April 2009 with the title Synchronous Objects for One Flat 
Thing, reproduced.8 Video annotation for representation is used extensively 
throughout the website, not only to draw attention to two key choreographic 
structuring components, the cueing and alignment systems (Figures 2 & 3), but 
also as a part of instructional videos. This project embraced the concept of com-
putational data, largely through deriving calculable evidence from a close analy-
sis, coding and annotation of the high-definition digital video shot of the dance 
from the front and above. In an essay titled Dance, Data, Objects, Shaw and 
Palazzi explain this process of developing the ‘spatial’ and ‘attribute’ data that 
was used to generate the variety of Objects that exist on their website. Much of 
this work was manual, either “built from the dancers’ first hand accounts” of the 
choreographic structure, indexing their responses as attribute data into an Excel 
file or through the animators painstakingly selecting “pixel points on each dancer 
in both the top and front views of the source video” to generate the spatial data 
(Zuniga Shaw/Palazzi 2009). Zuniga Shaw writes, “The process of decoding 
OFTr was a creative dialog that dilated between insider accounts and outside ob-
servation, analytical needs and aesthetic interests” (ibid.: n. pag.). 
 
                                                           
8  Cf. http://synchronousobjects.osu.edu 
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Figure 2: Form Flow. Still from annotated video illustrating alignments, the 
way in which Forsythe designs relationships in space and time 
Credit: Synchronous Objects Project, The Ohio State University and The Forsythe  
Company. 
 
Figure 3 Cueing System. Still from annotated video illustrating the complex 
system of cueing in One Flat Thing, reproduced 
Credit: Synchronous Objects Project, The Ohio State University and The Forsythe  
Company. 
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This coding of audiovisual media involved close and extensive observation work 
by domain experts, dance practitioners, dance researchers and assorted animators 
and designers who themselves became expert observers over time. This is where 
the process of annotation itself, for the purposes of our discussion here, as ‘cod-
ing annotation’, focuses on the labour involved in the close study of human ac-
tivity and how this process produces computable data. And, in the case of Syn-
chronous Objects, this data when digitally re-materialised, for example as ab-
stract animations on the website, could be said to represent different aspects of 
the choreography while appearing in forms that no longer look like the dance en-
tity One Flat Thing, reproduced. As there are no longer dancers directly in-
volved, this becomes choreographic thinking or movement knowledge that exists 
in the absence of bodies, and Forsythe, Portanova and others have both proposed 
different kinds of arguments in this direction, suggesting something other than a 
translation or symbolic representation (as with dance notation) of information is 
going on (cf. Forsythe 2012; Portanova 2013).  
Synchronous Objects for One Flat Thing, reproduced certainly succeeds as a 
choreographic object. It has evidentially brought choreographic ideas and pro-
cesses into newly productive exchanges with both general audiences and other 
specialist knowledge areas. And because the provenance of these ideas, the 
body/ not the body, has been challenged through computation the results of this 
project start to take on the shape of something with the potential of Hui’s digital 
objects. But here is where we can apply the distinction Hui made between two 
processes, 1) the ‘datafication of objects’, which corresponds to the coding and 
data work done on the dance entity One Flat Thing, reproduced, and 2) the ‘ob-
jectification of data’, which refers to the corresponding computational entity, 
comprised of data and metadata, for which every move is ‘conditioned by its 
technical milieu’ (Hui 2012: 389). For the purposes of our discussion here and 
referring back to the above paragraph, this milieu is the network running be-
tween machines and other programmes, it is the Web. In this way, Synchronous 
Objects presents us with something that is not quite yet a digital object. But it is 
moving toward that possibility. 
In 2010, Motion Bank a research project of The Forsythe Company was in-
augurated in Frankfurt, Germany to explore further what computation could 
bring to the process of creating choreographic objects. With significant support 
from a variety of funders including the German Federal Cultural Foundation, the 
project was designed to run in its first phase for four years. The Motion Bank 
core team emphasized digitization as an “integral part of Motion Bank from the 
start” (Cramer et al. 2015) and designed recording setups to ensure that every-
thing captured could be available to computation. All recording situations were 
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installed and calibrated to allow for as little ‘noise’ as possible so software algo-
rithms might help extract features and recognize relevant patterns in the data. 
This was combined with the use of an annotation tool called Piecemaker, a soft-
ware that assists in scoring video recordings of dance and sharing this infor-
mation with others. Piecemaker was initiated as a research project by The For-
sythe Company member David Kern to support the organisation and recall of 
materials created by Forsythe and his performers in the rehearsal studio. Think-
ing back to the coding practices of scientists making close observations of hu-
man activity and using coding annotation software like ANVIL, Forsythe’s re-
hearsal constitutes an activity for which Kern was developing a tool correspond-
ing to ‘domain expertise’ in dance. 
In the context of Motion Bank, this software was reprogrammed for use in 
the development of its on-line digital scores with selected guest choreographers 
and as a standalone tool for use in the studio. (Figure 4) Using this software re-
named Piecemaker2 (PM2), annotation sets or markers could easily be related 
and provide access to multiple versions of the same event (e.g. video, audio, mo-
tion capture, scores, etc.). This enabled building connections that could generate 
useful representations both during and post-annotation. As with the Synchronous 
Objects project, the quantification of the dances of the Motion Bank guest artists 
into data involved a combination of computational and manual work. This meant 
often many hours of computer based video processing, for example to subtract 
the background of the image leaving only the silhouettes of the performers; 
alongside watching the same video for nearly as many hours in order to annotate 
and describe time based events the computer would not be able to recognize on 
its own.  
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Figure 4: Piecemaker2 (PM2) annotation software. Based on Piecemaker 
originally developed by David Kern, The Forsythe Company 
Credit: Reprogrammed by Motion Bank. Screenshot: Florian Jenett. On Video: Jeanine 
Durning performing her adaptation of No Time to Fly by Deborah Hay. 
 
The specific example of how this coding annotation was used in (Figure 5) is 
drawn from the Motion Bank project with the choreographer Deborah Hay from 
the website Using the Sky9, which is based on her existing solo No Time to Fly 
(2010). No Time to Fly has a written score, which the performers Jeanine Durn-
ing, Juliette Mapp and Ros Warby were each invited to adapt as an individual so-
lo. These solo adaptations were each filmed seven times and this material pro-
vides the main recorded data for the web publication. The site also takes the 
score for the website’s ‘tempo’, and the 29 sections of the score are aligned with 
the video recordings. One part of the website, visible in Figure 4, is based on 
Performer Insights. This gives the reader a chance to view a solo adaptation 
alongside the score and a running commentary of the performer; also functioning 
as ‘annotation for representation’. Hay’s score does not offer the performer pre-
cise movement instructions, so this commentary gives the reader insight into 
                                                           
9  Cf. http://scores.motionbank.org/dh 
MAKING DIGITAL CHOREOGRAPHIC OBJECTS INTERRELATE | 75 
how the written score is translated into movement by the performers. Hay would 
refer to this as when the “body encounters language” in her work (Hay 2013). 
 
Figure 5: Performer Insights. Using the Sky. An online score of Deborah Hay’s 
work No Time to Fly 
Credit: Motion Bank. On Video: Jeanine Durning performing her adaptation of No Time to 
Fly by Deborah Hay. 
 
This description of the Performer Insights screenshot indicates the ways in which 
the coding [annotation] of the audiovisual material was similar to the coding 
[annotation] work done on Synchronous Objects. It involved extensive observa-
tion work by domain experts, dance practitioners, researchers coming together 
with the acquired dance expertise of the creative coders and computer scientists 
working on the project. As with Synchronous Objects, this coding work was es-
sential for creating the website Using the Sky which aims to draw attention to 
and elucidate aspects of Deborah Hay’s choreographic approach. In this sense, 
the coding annotations themselves remain “hidden to the viewer” (Blades 2015: 
29); in the same way as the information in the Excel files in the archives of the 
Synchronous Objects project is hidden. It is worth mentioning that there are no 
annotations drawn on top of the recorded digital video because Deborah Hay’s 
specific choreographic approach resisted such visual representations. In this 
sense, the published result clearly strengthens the class of things we have been 
describing as choreographic objects, as it corresponds to the idea that what is 
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specific about Hay’s approach, her choreographic ideas and processes, can be 
communicated via a unique choreographic object. 
However, unlike the previous choreographic object projects, a cluster of new 
developments occurred with Motion Bank. Firstly, a new annotation tool, in 
ways similar to ANVIL, has emerged from the dance field. Secondly, a general 
set of annotation principles has been articulated that draws attention to time over 
the recording of image or sound (cf. Jenett 2015). Thirdly, this conception of 
time as the core axis of organisation has a uniquely digital dimension to it. It is 
part of both the data and the metadata of these objects and starts to clarify the 
transition from choreographic object to digital object. 
 
 
ANNOTATION FINDS ITS PLACE 
 
Our goal in writing this has been to work through some ideas about how annota-
tion in the creation of choreographic objects, as emergent from the artistic prac-
tice of dance, comes into contact with the kinds of annotation efforts demon-
strated not only by the W3C initiatives described above in our second paragraph, 
but also by projects such as Genius, Hypothes.is and PUNDIT (see Footnote 2) 
which were all in attendance at the fourth iAnnotate Symposium in May 2016 in 
Berlin.10 iAnnotate’s inaugural meeting in 2013 posted the following on their 
homepage: Building a community to enable the annotation of the world's 
knowledge. We can avoid this hyperbole, but we can’t avoid the changes brought 
about by digital technologies, and how we are increasingly woven into the “me-
dia-intensive milieu comprising networks, images, sounds, and text, which we 
generalise as data and metadata” (Hui 2012: 380). 
Hui and Worthington embed this phrase in the description of their 2015 
workshop Future for the Annotation of Digital Objects: 
 
“Annotation finds its place, not only in the sense of assisting information processing and 
enhancing the searchability of digital objects […], but also as interaction and concretisa-
tion of relations between the users and the objects with which they interact.” 
(Hui/Worthington 2015) 
 
We would make a further proposal for the practice of annotation as a way of 
thinking that builds relations with and extends upon a background of ‘domain 
                                                           
10  Cf. http://iannotate.org/2016/ 
MAKING DIGITAL CHOREOGRAPHIC OBJECTS INTERRELATE | 77 
expertise’, whether that is artistic, scientific or scholarly, in time-based phenom-
ena such as dance. 
So far, we have discussed three kinds of annotation that go into the creation 
of choreographic objects: ‘annotation for representation’ as in drawing on top of 
video, ‘coding annotation’ or the practice of analysing audiovisual media, and 
‘computable annotation’ to assist machine-based information processing. And 
we looked at the connection between our notion of choreographic objects and 
Hui’s notion of digital objects as a way of distinguishing and investigating these 
modes and their various potentials more philosophically. It was our intention 
here to start a discussion we expect to continue as more dance documentation 
and digitisation projects come on-line, and we build on our choreographic cod-
ing projects to make intersections with data-driven research with various other 
fields.11 One parting observation: as research becomes more “subsumed under 
calculation” (Hui 2012: 390) the expertise, skills and intuitions human activity 
researchers bring and use to recognise and code phenomena (annotation as a way 
of thinking) whether in dance or ethnographic work, will increasingly be fused 
with algorithmic procedures. 
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Speculation about 1:0 
On the productive difference of the interval 
MARIE-LUISE ANGERER 
 
 
In the film Strange Days (Bigelow 1995) a woman runs along the beach in Los 
Angeles while the man she meets – also running – is actually, ‘in reality’, sitting 
in a wheelchair and not only sees himself as running along the beach but above 
all ‘has the corresponding sensation of movement’. Thanks to Squid technology, 
the man in the wheelchair sees and feels himself as someone running along the 
beach whom the young woman smiles at and waves to as she runs past. In 
Strange Days, the Squids are not just extensions of the sensory apparatus – as 
described by McLuhan (1964) –, but also intensifications of and even substitutes 
for this apparatus (instead of the person’s own sensory input, those of others are 
‘implanted’) – Squids record audiovisual data and convert them into propriocep-
tory data for the user: one’s own sensations (and the associated visual material) 
are replaced by those of someone else.  
Squids demonstrate and foreshadow how digital technologies enable new af-
fective performances. Strange Days thus also calls upon scholars of media and 
performance to find a vocabulary and mode of thought that is able to reflect such 
affective performances and speculate about their implications. This chapter en-
lists affect theory and, more precisely, the notion of the ‘affective interval’ in or-
der to think the productive, performative effects that the digital ‘co-processing’ 
between media technology and human body enables. To do so, the chapter first 
traces the genealogy of what is here called ‘involuntary moments’ and how they 
measurable and ‘performable’ through technological experiments. It then moves 
on to show how affect theory reframed these involuntary moments as ‘missing 
half-seconds’. On this basis, the question of media technology can be posed as 
one of ‘affective media technologies’ or ‘cybernetic machines’ at work on even 
the smallest intervals. In conclusion, the chapter moves back to the ‘perceiving 
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in motion’ that is non- or pre-cognitively performed in, and through the affective 
interval.  
 
 
CONCERNING SMALL, INVOLUNTARY MOVEMENTS 
 
No longer ‘small’ but not yet ‘large’. 
HELLER-ROAZEN 2009: 209 
 
There is a long history of pre-forms of perception, sensation, and bodily reac-
tions. These various ‘old’ subject-less movements such as in Leibniz, Spinoza, 
and others are re-attracting attention in theories of digital environments and per-
formativity. 
In the following significant authors un-conscious and visceral movements are 
presented and their thoughts discussed in view of their influence of modelling 
the digital (time) gaps avant la lettre. Unlike Descartes, Leibniz denied that the 
mind was always active, insisting instead that there were moments and stretches 
of time during which consciousness registers (‘perception’), but without con-
scious perception (‘apperception’) of such overly small movements. According 
to Leibniz, consciousness as understood by Descartes and his followers always 
necessarily misses something, as something is always happening but not every-
thing passes the threshold of conscious perception. Spinoza, too, understood 
matter, movement and mind (in the sense of immaterial being) as a sliding scale, 
deriving the various degrees and densities of materiality as functions of move-
ment versus intensity. In his reading of Spinoza, Gilles Deleuze explains this by 
saying that each thing defines itself by its length and breadth, by its longitude 
and latitude. The length of a body here refers to ratios of rapidity and slowness, 
of rest and motion between its particles, and its width comprises the sum of its 
affects, all of its intensive states (cf. Deleuze 1988: 165). 
Leibniz used the monad as the smallest particle that represents a microcosm 
of the universe. This representation takes place via perceptions. Since every 
monad supposedly expresses the totality of the universe, it follows that they can 
only ever be excerpts or gradations. This means that not everything is expressed 
in the same way, but on a scale of conscious to unconscious, from large to small 
perceptions. One often-quoted example of this is Leibniz’s description of the 
sound of the sea, which he says we only hear because we hear each single wave, 
which we hear in turn only because we hear every single drop of water. But it is 
clear, Leibniz explains, that no ear can really hear this: 
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“The impressions (effects) made on our ear by the individual waves, but which we are un-
able to distinguish between (discern) (because they are such changes in the external world 
as are not accompanied by changes in our bodily organs), are a typical example of petites 
perceptions. All significant changes within our bodies are soon noticed, thus leading to 
contents of consciousness.” (Herbertz 1980 [1905]: 45) 
 
Leibniz distinguishes between three kinds of perceptions. Firstly, those that 
cause no changes to the organs, although it should be emphasized here, as Rich-
ard Herbertz writes, that they produce no “noticeable change” (ibid.: 45), but 
they certainly do produce changes, just ones that go unnoticed. Secondly, per-
ceptions that occur in too large numbers, thus not capable of being registered as 
separate by consciousness. And thirdly, those where weaker perceptions are ob-
scured by more powerful ones. 
Whereas Leibniz still viewed his monads as being driven by a creator God, 
Spinoza’s “impersonal uniform substance” is characterized by infinite modes 
that can be understood as affections. Both Spinoza and Leibniz refer to affection 
using terms such as force, perspective, imagination and time so as to define this 
substance as a oneness and a multiplicity (cf. Ott 2010). Around the same time in 
the 17th century, the concept of reflexes for involuntary movements of the body 
began to spread in the field of medicine and physiology. In this field too, then, 
we see an interest in such movements taking place without the mind, without 
conscious control or intention. Descartes is generally associated with the theory 
of reflexes as he defined body movements that were not controlled by the mind 
and which didn’t touch it either. But in the middle of the last century, in his 
analysis of the “emergence of the concept of reflexes”, George Canguilhem 
showed how a concept – in this case that of reflexes – may already exist, even 
making an appearance in terminological form, but only later, by the interaction 
of various forces, coming to denote a generally accepted fact. According to 
Canguilhem (2008), one can see that Descartes is not actually speaking about re-
flexes, but that he was able to choose in his discussion between heart and brain, 
basing his assumptions on a single movement from the inside (centre = gland) to 
the nerves at the outer end, but not also assuming a movement in the reverse di-
rection, although other medical theorists before him had done so. Before Des-
cartes’s time (referring back to Galen and Jean François Fernel), a distinction 
was made between three spirits, the so-called “vital functions” (Canguilhem 
2008: 32). A “natural spirit” (located in the liver and acting via the veins), a “vi-
tal spirit” (located in the heart and acting via the arteries) and an “animal spirit 
located in the brain acting via the nerves” (ibid.: 32). Descartes attempts to trace 
all muscle movements back to one mechanism in order to free it from any mental 
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control. In Canguilhem’s view, his theory of involuntary movement anticipates 
the notion of reflexes without establishing an actual reflexology. And this is be-
cause Descartes, unlike William Harvey and Thomas Willis, did not view the 
heart as a muscle, attributing the circulation of blood to its special warmth. As a 
result, Descartes remained attached to a mechanics by which animals and ma-
chines (automata) are placed alongside humankind in order to illustrate the arti-
ficial and thus natural quality of human muscle movement (cf. ibid.: 37-47). But 
as Canguilhem emphasizes, precisely this parallel opens up an “incomprehensi-
ble break” (between animal and human, as only the latter has a soul) which, as 
an “unfathomable secret” (ibid.: 72), in turn refers humankind back to God. 
With the hypothesis of an animal soul, a further step was taken in the direc-
tion of reflex by Thomas Willis, following on from Descartes, bringing chemis-
try into play against mechanics. In Willis’s theory of reflexes, the life force is as-
sociated with the force of light and, in contrast to Galen, he now assumed “the 
encephalic origin of all movement, without exception” (ibid.: 91). Accordingly, 
spontaneous or voluntary movements are controlled by the cerebral mind (cere-
brum), while the natural or involuntary movements are controlled by the cerebel-
lar mind (cerebellum) – two minds, then, one spiritual, sentient and rational, the 
other physical, sentient and lively. Humans and higher beasts share both minds. 
Against the Zeitgeist of the late 19th century, Henri Bergson picked up this 
notion, writing that “there is no perception that is not prolonged into movement” 
(Bergson 1991: 69). Canguilhem, too, mentions this link to Bergson and remarks 
that he even picked up the connection between the energy of movement and that 
of light, a link first made by Willis, twinning the latent energy of the animal spir-
it with cosmic light (cf. Canguilhem 2008: 94). And later still, parallel to the cy-
bernetic continuation of the Cartesian mechanistic view, Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
not only declared the primacy of movement, but also equated movement with 
meaning, naming it as that through which being reveals itself (cf. Kristen-
sen/Merleau-Ponty 2012: 23-36, here 29). But this equation of movement and 
meaning, as Stefan Kristensen points out, means “that [there is] no ontological 
difference between motor function and affectivity, between the physiological 
and the psychological, but only gradual differences, varying modalities of mean-
ing” (ibid.: 30). 
From the mid-19th century, small movements and reflexes started to be 
measured, produced under experimental conditions in laboratories, captured and 
recorded using early forms of photography. And then, with the advent of film 
around the turn of the century, it became possible not only to intervene in the re-
cording of movement (as life), but also to bring it to life as something existing in 
time, as a temporal sequence of images (cf. Kelty/Landecker 2002: 21-47). 
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These technical-media techniques (of recording and playback) convey the 
movement of the living as something living, presenting it as permanent delay, 
assomething always already deferred, although visually transparent. This is a 
procedure that can be mapped onto an existential life praxis that installs the de-
lay in time (of life) as the space of the now.  
Vital and temporal delays perform together the moment of the living now. 
Thus the most intimate moment of life is always a missed one, not yet, and al-
ready gone. This missing time will play an even more important role against the 
background of an encompassing cybernetic re-organization of the psychic and 
societal realm. 
 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE AFFECTIVE INTERVAL 
 
In the mid-1970s, students of media and communication studies in the German-
speaking world heard from Hertha Sturm and her team that they had discovered 
the ‘missing half-second’. Above all, Sturm wanted the results of her research to 
reach those responsible for making television, so that they could draw the neces-
sary consequences. In her view, television needed to broadcast slower image se-
quences, audio and video needed to be more congruent; the text or spoken lan-
guage should follow the images or vice versa, rather than supplying additional 
information. For as the researchers found, their test subjects (mainly children) 
were unable to process the excessive amount of information ‘properly’ and their 
reactions were quite simply too slow for the abundance of images. As a result, 
children reacted ‘happily’ to sad image sequences and ‘unhappily’ to cheerful 
ones. The test subject’s mood was gauged by measuring pulse, heartbeat and 
transpiration, giving a curve of physical arousal indicating mood – or rather al-
lowing it to be deduced – with low frequency pointing to a depressive basic 
mood and high frequency pointing to high spirits. Surprisingly, these findings 
correspond quite clearly with the cybernetic theory of affect developed by Silvan 
Tomkins, who also, as described above, equated lower-level activity with sad 
and higher-level activity with happy mood.1 The reason for the anomalous 
                                                           
1  Cf. Baruch Spinoza, on whose work Deleuze based much of his concept of affect, also 
mentions a correspondence between a lessened ability to act and sadness, and between 
happiness and heightened activity. He writes: “By emotion [affect] I mean the  
modifications of the body, whereby the active power of the said body is increased or 
diminished, aided or constrained, and also the ideas such modifications.” (Spinoza 
1883 [1677]: 130) 
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moods measured, according to Sturm and her team, was the ‘missing half-
second’ – an amount of time that passed between perception (signal, stimulus) 
and reaction without it being clear what occurred during this ‘lost time’. When 
her studies on the stressed television viewer (cf. Sturm 1984: 58-65; Sturm 2000) 
were (posthumously) published, however, they received little attention. Such an 
empirical approach to viewer research was scornfully dismissed (in the German-
speaking world) in favour of an ideology-critical, psychoanalytical theory of vis-
ual pleasure (cf. Angerer 1999: 74-99). With hindsight, one can say that Hertha 
Sturm tried at the wrong time (too early?), by the wrong means, to prove that 
media such as television have an emotional impact and that this is crucial to the 
way their verbal and visual content is perceived. What makes this emotional im-
pact so strong, Sturm argues, is a half-second between stimulus and response 
that makes the (viewer’s) response appear somehow ‘out of synch’. 
Twenty years later, however, this out of synch affect makes a comeback in 
Brian Massumi’s cultural theory of affect, contributing to a veritable ‘affective 
turn’ within cultural studies and media theory. “The skin is faster than the word” 
wrote Massumi (1996a: 217-239) in the mid-1990s, paraphrasing his definition 
of affect as an intensity belonging to a “different order”: “Intensity is embodied 
in purely autonomic reactions most directly manifested in the skin – at the sur-
face of the body, at its interface with things” (ibid.: 218-219). 
Besides the definition of affect proposed by Gilles Deleuze, which is based 
essentially on Spinoza and his life force (conatus) and which in turn forms the 
basis for Massumi’s work, something else was also at stake here – Massumi ac-
tually referred to Hertha Sturm’s “missing half-second”. For him, however, it 
became the terrain of affect. According to Massumi, affect is a virtuality which 
(as a dimension of the potential) facilitates actuality: “(P)astnesses opening onto 
a future, but with no present to speak of. For the present is lost with the missing 
half-second, passing too quickly to be perceived, too quickly, actually, to have 
happened” (1996a: 217-239). Unlike Hertha Sturm, Massumi sees the missing 
half-second not as empty time, but as a space of time in which too much happens 
to be perceived. 
In the mid-1980s, Deleuze’s two books on cinema, The Movement-Image 
and The-Time Image, initiated a major shift within film theory whose influence 
extends far beyond the discipline. In Deleuze’s theory, perception is the amodal, 
asubjective part, while memory is a movement which (following Kant) affects it-
self, performing a kind of self-touching. Image and movement coincide and can-
not really be separated. Besides Spinoza, what Deleuze was rediscovering for 
film and media theory here was above all Henri Bergson’s theory of image and 
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perception, a theory that has attained new importance in the context of more re-
cent developments in media technology (cf. Hansen 2004). 
With Bergson, we have arrived in the last years of the 19th century, whose 
second half was positively obsessed with missing time. In A Tenth of a Second 
(2010), Jimena Canales reconstructs the history of the search for and research in-
to this missing space of time, documenting a huge interest within the disciplines 
of experimental psychology, astronomy, physics and metrology. Sigmund Freud 
was taken with it, as was Wilhelm Wundt at his institute of psychology in Leip-
zig. Others like Frances Galton saw the study of the missing split-second as a 
continuation of craniometry on a different level: those who react slowly have a 
sensitive personality, those who react quickly are aggressive, more intelligent. 
Gradually, this interest in measuring individual reaction times, ‘personal equat-
ing’ or ‘personal error’, also began to appear in art, with noteworthy early exam-
ples including Marey’s chronophotography and Muybridge’s proto-cinema-
tography. As Canales writes:  
 
“The second half of the 19th century was marked by a burst of new research in these top-
ics. […] Many scientists in France and elsewhere publicised numbers for the speed of 
nerve transmissions not only in animals, but also in humans. […] Various instruments 
came into use: Pouillet’s chronoscope; Helmholtz’s rotating drums; Arago’s chronometers 
[…]; Donder’s noematachometer […], Marey’s drums; […] In the span of a few years, re-
action time experiments shifted from being largely criticized by the scientific community 
to becoming foundational for a new discipline.” (ibid.: 28) 
 
All this began with Hermann von Helmholtz, who wrote in 1850: 
 
“I have found that a measurable amount of time passes as the stimulus exerted by a mo-
mentary electrical current on the lumbar plexus of a frog is propagated to the place where 
the femoral nerve enters the calf muscle.” (Schmidgen 2009: 74) 
 
Helmholtz was a student of Johannes Müller who, in 1826, formulated the law of 
specific sensory energy which states that each sensory organ always reacts to 
stimuli in its own way, whatever their nature. The eye, for example, reacts to 
mechanical pressure with a sensation of light. From this, Müller concluded that 
objective reality cannot be recognized, and that perception is something highly 
subjective, based as it is on and in the body. In his Techniques of the Observer 
(1992), Jonathan Crary accords a prominent place to Müller because he defined 
the eye and sight as being dependent on physical stimuli, thus, as Crary empha-
sizes, overturning the hegemony of a neutral visual apparatus. 
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But what Helmholtz had discovered with his measurements was not only the dis-
appearance of time, but also and above all the delay of energy – the energy in a 
muscle is not exerted completely at the moment of the stimulus, “but to a large 
extent only after that stimulus has already ceased” (Schmidgen 2009: 93). Be-
tween stimulation and contraction, then, time (and energy) passes – not much, 
but enough to be clearly identifiable. The immediacy on which previous assump-
tions had been based turned out to be “an interval, a period, a space of time both 
circumscribed and empty – an interim, du temps perdu” (ibid.: 93). 
Now, the author of À la recherche du temps perdu (1922-1931 [1913-1927]), 
Marcel Proust, had family ties with Henri Bergson, who was married to a cousin 
of Proust’s. Lacking confidence in language, Bergson is said to have accepted 
only Proust as a writer, whose search for time went hand in hand with a search 
for its expression in words. At the height of his career, Bergson fought a never-
resolved battle with Einstein on the question of time. The philosopher of ‘elan 
vital’ never abandoned his position that time is subjective, whereas Einstein fa-
mously defined time as independent of individual perceptions. 
Henri Bergson understood the world as an image in which we move, our-
selves a special kind of image. “There is”, he writes, “no perception which is not 
prolonged into movement” (Bergson 1991: 111). But precisely this moment of 
not-yet-movement – the interval placed by Bergson between one movement and 
another – is described by Gilles Deleuze as the moment of affect, and then inter-
preted by Massumi as the missing half-second. 
 
 
AFFECTIVE MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES 
 
Up the present, technical and living processes have developed separately. Until 
far into the 20th century, life and technology trod separate paths and were also 
kept separate in the field of theory. But media analyses such as that delivered by 
Donna Haraway in the early 1980s, which have been developed on since by N. 
Katherine Hayles, Alexander Galloway/Eugene Thacker and others, agree that 
media can no longer be defined as prostheses which amplify the senses, but that 
instead, they have attained a new immersive dimension, that they replace our 
senses, that they also make our senses more intense and more subjective, more 
intimate and more technical, that perception, memory and affect become a matter 
of technical modalities. With the cyborg, Haraway introduced a notion intended 
to render life’s reliance on technology conceivable and theoretically graspable. 
Compared with the period of the Cyborg Manifesto in the mid-1980s, the ubiqui-
ty of technology has become many times greater: the net has, as Gallagher and 
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Thacker write, become something elementary – an invisible, all-encompassing 
precondition for societal, social and mental processes. 
Neo-cybernetic approaches today revolve around a question already ad-
dressed by George Canguilhem in his essay Machine and Organism, where he 
advocates an understanding of technology as a universal biological phenomenon. 
In 1946-47, when Canguilhem was giving his lecture, he concluded by saying 
that for some years now, tests had been underway – at MIT under the name bion-
ics – to research biological models and structures that could be used as models in 
technology. “Bionics is the extremely subtle art of information”, writes Canguil-
hem, “that has taken a leaf from natural life” (1992: 45-69). Today, media are 
put on a level with insects, rays, instincts, stimuli and reflexes (cf. Parikka 
2010), theories of imitation from the animal kingdom are transferred to the polit-
ical and social crowd and swarm formations by humans. Not that comparisons 
between the animal and human worlds are anything particularly novel; what is 
new is the fact that today they are meant seriously, that the anthropological su-
premacy of the human is no longer capable of upholding itself in the current 
technical-organic overall structure. 
When Canguilhem articulated his appeal immediately after World War II, 
warning against the reductionism of the rapidly expanding hegemony of cyber-
netics à la Norbert Wiener, it fell on deaf ears, not unlike Hertha Sturm’s ‘miss-
ing half-second’. Technology and biology, or technology as biology, was not a 
possible equation, for many reasons. Today, by contrast, one can observe a new 
liaison resulting from a linking of approaches in biology and information tech-
nology, a link established via time, life as time, and an original deferral. In this 
context, affect can be viewed as an interval that mediates between life and tech-
nology, or that facilitates life as technology.  
These themes refer to the process philosophy of Alfred N. Whitehead, which 
has acquired a topical significance, especially for Brian Massumi and other me-
dia theorists, as a way of theoretically tackling sensations and perceptions with-
out consciousness and subject. Whitehead defines physical perception as always 
emotional, calling it a “blind emotion” that is “received as felt elsewhere in an-
other occasion” (Whitehead 1979: 163). This involves not an accumulation of 
data but always a data relationship. The perceiving subject does not pre-exist the 
perceived world, but emerges through and in the process of perception: “feeling 
is subjectively rooted in the immediacy of the present occasion, it is what the 
present situation feels for itself, as derived from the past and as merging into the 
future” (ibid.: 163). 
The degree to which the philosophy of Whitehead and Deleuze influences 
current discussions of body, movement and affect is reflected in Erin Manning’s 
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book Relationscapes. Manning, who works with Brian Massumi at the Sense-
Lab in Montréal and publishes a series entitled Technologies of Lived Abstrac-
tions2, equates seeing with feeling, with feeling understood as movement-with:  
 
“Affect passes directly through the body, coupling with the nervous system, making the 
interval felt. This feltness is often experienced as a becoming-with. This becoming-with is 
transformative. It is a force out of which a microperceptual body begins to emerge. This 
microperceptual body is he body of relation. While affect can never be separated from a 
body, it never takes hold on an individual body. Affect passes through, leaving intensive 
traces on a collective body-becoming. This body-becoming is not necessarily a human 
body. It is a conglomeration of forces that express a movement-with through which a rela-
tional individuation begins to make itself felt.” (Manning 2009: 95) 
 
This passage describes the entire process from perception via affect through to 
the moving and moved body, also making clear that it is not about individual 
bodies, but bodies with other bodies, and that these must not necessarily be hu-
man bodies, or at least not exclusively. 
Manning, with reference to Deleuze and Whitehead, celebrates a body in 
movement and perpetual mutation whose reactions are controlled via intervals 
(ibid.: 95). Here, too, the missing half-second makes an appearance. According 
to Whitehead, subjectivity takes place in this zone of lost time; life “lurks in the 
interstices of every living cell, and in the interstices of the brain” (Whitehead 
1979: 105-106). 
Bergson, too, described the brain as the place where the interval resides. In 
contrast to the scientific wisdom of his time, he declared the brain a tabula rasa, 
a “centre” or “zone” of “indetermination” (Bergson 1991: 23, 28; Schmidgen 
2008b: 107-124, here 108). The brain is defined as a gap in time, as an “interval 
of varying length between stimulus and reaction” (Schmidgen 2008b: 109). 
A similar moment can be identified in the cybernetic debate of the mid-20th 
century, where the concept of reflexes is inserted as a vitalistic element of time 
into the gap between signal and movement of the machine/automaton. Norbert 
Wiener borrows Bergson’s concept of “duration” and applies it to both living 
humans and machines:  
 
  
                                                           
2  Cf. https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/series/technologies-lived-abstraction 
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“Thus the modern automaton exists in the same kind of Bergsonian time as the living  
organism, and hence there is no reason in Bergson’s considerations why the essential 
mode of functioning of the living organism should not be the same as that of the automa-
ton of this type.” (Wiener 1948: 44)  
 
In 1951, Max Bense elaborated on this, claiming the time interval as the basis of 
the commensurability of machine and man in general terms. Except that, unlike 
humans, computer machines are capable of using (and exploiting) even the 
smallest interval. The interval in the human organism, empty according to Her-
tha Sturm or too full according to Brian Massumi, is filled by cybernetic compu-
ting machines with a speed of task fulfilment that surpasses human comprehen-
sion: “Cybernetic machines exhaust the smallest interval. An addition takes 
place in five millionths of a second; in five minutes, it can perform ten million 
additions or subtractions of ten-figure numbers.” (Bense 1951: 429-446, here 
440) 
However, Bense explicitly associates this mechanistic-sounding operational 
capacity with Bergson’s “duration” and sets it apart from steady, Newtonian 
time. And finally, as Stefan Rieger explains in his cybernetic anthropology, 
Bense aligns Heidegger’s fundamental ontology with Norbert Wiener’s cyber-
netics (cf. Rieger 2003: 146).  
 
 
PERCEIVING IN MOTION/MOVING PERCEPTION 
 
As well as taking a cue from Bergson’s “duration”, however, Norbert Wiener 
was also familiar with reflex theory, especially as formulated by Pavlov. In his 
cybernetics, he even went so far as to attribute “conditioned reflexes” (Schmid-
gen 2008a: XXXII) to computing machines. In his eyes, technological and bio-
logical machines were capable of “rudimentary learning” (ibid.). The fascination 
of these machines capable of learning and possessing conditioned reflexes ex-
tended far beyond the technical world and was also referred to by Jacques Lacan 
in his seminar on the ego in Freud’s theory to show how far man and machine 
travelled a common path, diverging only at the last moment, at the point where 
the machine was supposed to add or subtract “itself as an element in a calcula-
tion” (Lacan 1988 [1978]: 52). Up to this point, however – in the grip of the mir-
ror stage – the ego occupies the position of the lame man frequently seen in 
15th-century visual art as a counterpart of the blind man. 
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“The subjective half of the pre-mirror experience”, Lacan writes, “is the paralytic who 
cannot move about by himself except in an uncoordinated and clumsy way. What masters 
him is the image of the ego, which is blind, and which carries him. […] And the paralytic, 
whose perspective this is, can only identify with his unity in a fascinated fashion, in the  
fundamental immobility whereby he finishes up corresponding to the gaze he is under, the 
blind gaze.” (ibid.: 50) 
 
What, then, is the relationship between this “blind gaze” and the “blind feeling” 
that is mentioned by Whitehead and that I have linked with affect? Very early on 
in his work on affect, Massumi found an example that illustrates this especially 
well, concerning Ronald Reagan and his experience as an actor. This experience 
made such a deep impression on Reagan that he chose the decisive phrase as the 
title for his autobiography. In the film Kings Row (Wood 1942), Reagan plays a 
tragic figure who wakes up after a car crash and stammers: “Where is the rest of 
me?” Returning from unconsciousness, he finds that both his legs are missing, 
amputated as revenge for the patient’s love affair with the surgeon’s daughter. 
So much for the plot. For his purposes, Massumi highlights another aspect, fo-
cussing not on the vengeful amputation but on the tipping point as the central 
moment when Reagan, the actor, stammers his line and this sentence suddenly – 
for a fraction of a second – becomes real. His legs are no longer there, half of his 
body is missing: “Where is the rest of me?” What Reagan describes here is the 
moment that cannot be grasped, but which, as Massumi explains, marks a space 
where the subject’s inability to see itself in motion ‘shows’ itself: “He is in the 
space of duration of an ungraspable event” (Massumi 1996b: 18-40, here 29). 
Defining his approach as “the skin is faster than the word”, Massumi began in 
the mid-1990s to elaborate a cultural theory of affect, introducing it as an inten-
sity that belongs to a ‘different order’: “Intensity is embodied in purely autonom-
ic reactions most directly manifested in the skin – at the surface of the body, at 
its interface with things” (Massumi 1996a: 218-239). 
Coincidentally or not, the subject here is amputation of the legs, described by 
Reagan as a real sensation that can easily be linked to the example from Strange 
Days. While Reagan has the momentary experience of having lost his legs, the 
man in the film experiences himself for the duration of the film (via the Squid) 
as having legs and running along the beach. Whereas for Massumi, the Reagan 
example confirms affect’s characteristic property of lacking graspable presence, 
in Strange Days this is inscribed onto the body as the experiential zone of the 
viewer, “at the surface of the body” – the moving images transfer a movement in 
action into an affective moment whose characteristic property is being not-yet-
movement. 
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With its Squid technology, the film Strange Days anticipated a debate that was 
to begin at the end of the 20th century and focus on the status of the image in 
general. In The Language of New Media, (2001) Lev Manovich put forward the 
theory that digital images always appear on the surface as framed pictures, while 
below the surface they have long since lost their frames and referential character. 
“[T]he image, in its traditional sense, no longer exists! And it is only by habit 
that we still refer to what we see on the real-time screen as ‘images’” (ibid.: 
100). A few years later, in his New Philosophy for New Media, Mark Hansen 
picked up this change in the nature of images, positing it as a fundamental shift 
with serious consequences for the viewer. Hansen’s approach took the body of 
the viewer as the new (old) focus: “In a very material sense the body is the ‘co-
processor’ of digital information” (Lenoir 2004: XIII-XXVI). This central task is 
explained by Hansen in terms of Bergson’s definition of the world as an image 
and the body within it as a special image. According to Bergson, the body’s task 
within the flow of perception is to filter, select, contrast and thus reduce this 
flow. For as Bergson remarks, the body is not a “mathematical point in space”, 
added to which its “virtual actions are complicated by and impregnated with ac-
tual actions”, leading to his unambiguous conclusion: “no perception without af-
fection” (Bergson 1991: 60). 
So when the body of the man in the wheelchair slips into the image of a man 
running along the beach past a smiling, waving women – or when his body af-
fectively frames this image – this matches Bergson’s description. This implies 
something that Merleau-Ponty called the “untouchable” (Heller-Roazen 2009: 
295): a felt moment that has lost what guarantees the unity of this feeling: an 
ego. Or in Pierre Janet’s description from the late 19th century, quoting Alexan-
dre Herzen on the heart and cerebral activity:  
 
“It is psychic nothingness, the total absence of consciousness; then one begins to have a 
vague, unlimited, infinite feeling, a feeling of existence in general, without any delimita-
tion of one’s own individuality, without the slightest trace of any distinction between the I 
and the non-I.” (Janet, quoted in Heller-Roazen 2009: 281)  
 
This means that in affect, the interval is radically delayed, a gap opens up whose 
emptiness or over-fullness touches me where I am not. The digitally pro-
duced/induced interval performs itself. 
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Trading 

 
 
The noisy motions of instruments 
The performative space of high-frequency trading 
ANN-CHRISTINA LANGE 
 
 
In a recent article in London Review of Books, Donald Mackenzie (2014a) de-
scribes the construction of fiber-optic cables and how micro wave technology is 
being developed at significant costs to facilitate high-speed financial trading ac-
tivities. What is being built is communication lines between different financial 
exchanges to achieve the shortest distance and thereby transmission time, when 
issuing an order. The newest fiber-optic cable was finished last year and crosses 
the Atlantic Ocean to cut off a few milliseconds in the transmission of data from 
New York to London. The cables are a symptom of a fundamental digital trans-
formation within the financial sector – one that might not best be described with 
reference to the notion of performativity as it has been presented from an actor-
network theory/ social studies of science field.1 
Michel Callon and Donald MacKenzie have been considered the founding 
fathers of this approach. They describe how models and calculative devices used 
by traders and financial experts to estimate the price of an instrument indeed co-
produce the very price they attempt to measure. More generally this means that 
the theory or model do not only describe a given phenomenon in an objective 
fashion but in some cases helps to create it. MacKenzie empirically investigates 
“the incorporation of economics (a theory, model, concept, procedure, data set 
etc.) into the infrastructures of markets” (2006: 19). In An Engine, Not a Camera 
he studies how certain financial theories and models became authoritative and 
indeed shape the financial markets in quite fundamental ways. Economic models 
                                                           
1 Research for this paper was supported by a ‘Crowd Dynamics in Financial  
Markets’ Sapere Aude Grant from the Danish Council for Independent Research 
(http://info.cbs.dk/crowds). 
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are, according to MacKenzie, an engine that produce empirical facts, rather than 
a camera representing such facts.  
This has been a highly important and valuable approach to make sense of fi-
nancial markets and what would at first sight seem to be an obvious choice when 
investigating digital finance and its performative aspects. Today around 30 per 
cent of the total trading volume is executed by high-speed algorithms in the UK 
and around 60 per cent in the US (cf. Foresight Final Report 2012: 19). One 
would expect to find that such material devices would have a range of assump-
tions written into them, which would affect how the financial markets function. 
In fact, MacKenzie states that the deepest kind of performativity is achieved 
when economics (concepts, models and assumptions) are incorporated into algo-
rithms, procedures, routines, and material devices (cf. 2006: 19). However, as I 
will show in this chapter, the algorithms used to process the financial orders via 
the high-speed cables and micro wave connections is not to be considered faith-
ful to such concepts, models or assumptions. Especially, in the sub-field formal-
ly known as high-frequency trading (HFT), algorithms are used to execute orders 
faster than human perception and seem to interact in quite unpredictable ways. 
Based on ethnographic observations and interviews inside the field of high-
frequency trading and algorithmic trading, I aim to demonstrate the more ‘noisy’ 
motions that determine the performativity of digital finance. In order to do so, I 
turn my focus towards the relational interaction and spatial formations that at 
once condition and create digital finance.  
This approach poses a methodological challenge as how to study the interac-
tion among algorithms without reference to a conscious human subject. In order 
to deal with this challenge, I propose to look at the topological formations at play 
as they have been defined by Lury et al. from a media studies perspective. The 
first section defines the notion of topology and explains its suitability to the field 
of HFT. Secondly, I describe the market microstructure and regulatory changes 
that gave rise to the development towards HFT. The third section investigates 
three features that condition the spatial relations of digital finance, namely, the 
exploitation of time-delay, the interaction order between algorithms and the use 
of special order-types (i.e. how orders are executed). The chapter ends with a 
brief conclusion. 
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NOTES ON A TOPOLOGICAL APPROACH TO HIGH-
FREQUENCY TRADING 
 
The financial technologies and infrastructures used to send orders and receive 
them, have been widely studied from an ANT/Callon-inspired approach of tech-
nical devices. Ethnographies have been conducted where scholars followed and 
described these devices, their history, and the institutions in which they are em-
bedded (cf. Muniesa 2008; Preda 2009; Lenglet 2011). However, the rise of al-
gorithms as an interacting agent in financial trading has implications for how to 
study their embeddedness. MacKenzie et al. (2012) describe trading strategies 
designed to identify and exploit other traders’ algorithms (algo-sniffing). As a 
consequence, sophisticated algorithms are designed to hide their intentions from 
the market. The performativity thesis does not suffice to explain the spatial rela-
tions that now perform or shape the interaction that plays out between adaptive 
algorithms. The human traders and their infrastructure that used to be the object 
of ANT-oriented research and which might be said to be embedded within a spe-
cific spatial setting, has disappeared. MacKenzie explains himself: 
 
“Clearly, Latour and Callon’s ‘actor network theory’ (e.g. Latour 2005) and Callon’s ac-
tor-network economic sociology (e.g. Çalişkan and Callon 2009 and 2010) are pertinent 
when most market participants are algorithms. Actor-network theory is prepared to use the 
term ‘actor’ to refer to non-human entities such as algorithms. While this usage remains 
controversial, it would plainly be a mistake to treat trading algorithms simply as the faith-
ful delegates of human beings. As Adrian Mackenzie notes, ‘[a]n algorithm selects and re-
inforces one ordering at the expense of others’ (2006: 44), but that ordering may not be the 
one its human programmers intended.” (MacKenzie 2014b: 3) 
 
This means that a study of the performativity of digital finance cannot be limited 
to a single-sided field study – like observing the behavior inside the trading room 
only. The spatial setting might simply not be taken for granted. Law (1999) has 
developed a topological approach to space, which he defines as post-ANT argu-
ing that objects cannot be studied without taking into account the production of 
the spaces in which these objects circulate. Celia and Moor (2010) developed a 
topological approach focusing on media-related issues. What these approaches 
share is the focus on spatial formations that go beyond networks and differ from 
what could be imagined as a place or physical (often urban) site (like the open 
outcry trading pit). However, what is specific about the approach developed by 
Lury and Moor is that it allows for what Hansen (2015: 34) refers to as an “oper-
ationality of media culture”, which he further defines as “the capacity of today’s 
104 | ANN-CHRISTINA LANGE 
 
media machines to generate appearances of worldly sensibilities, to directly 
manifest the world independently of any synthetic operation of a subject or a 
consciousness”. 
The present chapter extends and builds upon this inspiration with the aim of 
reapplying the concept in order to study spaces topologically different from that 
of the open outcry pit (i.e the space that once condition and is conditioned by the 
interaction between high-speed algorithms). Michael and Rosengarten (2012) 
identify a topological space as when points (entities or events) that are distant 
can also be proximal. Dispersed links might be drawn together (by contraction) 
as if they were in one place. Knorr Cetina and Bruegger have shown that “the 
screen brings that which is geographically distant and invisible near to partici-
pants, thus rendering it interactionally present […]” (2002: 909). The performa-
tive space of digital finance is defined by external parameters (such as the physi-
cal condition of locating computer servers close to or inside the exchange to 
minimize transaction time and to access data faster than other market partici-
pants) which gives rise to internally generated spatial relations between different 
kinds of financial actors (such as high-speed algorithms trading in front of slow-
er market participants).  
As I mentioned above, and as Ignacio Farias and Anders Blok (2016: 12) al-
so points out, investigating topological formations involves a methodological 
challenge: a study of the performativity of digital finance cannot be limited to 
one single-sided field site. In order to not only operationalize but also test the 
application and value of a topological approach to the study of finance, I use a 
combination of methods which compose a “multi-method” (Law 2004; 
Holmes/Marcus 2006). The methods include: qualitative interviews, observa-
tions and content analysis of documents. The data I draw upon here consist of 
ethnographic observations and interviews conducted inside a New York-based 
HFT firm near Wall Street. This data is supplemented with 50 interviews with a 
broad range of actors involved with HFT, including programmers, software de-
velopers, broker-dealers, exchange officials, investment bankers, and regulators 
(conducted in Copenhagen, London and New York since October 2013). The 
ethnographic work focused on the daily practices and conversations amongst HF 
traders, including how traders and programmers trade at their desk while moni-
toring preprogrammed algorithms, but the ethnographic work also followed their 
activities around designing and building high-frequency trading algorithms. The 
data offer insights into the ways in which traders reflect upon their own trading 
behavior and that of participants of other markets.  
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THE RISE OF HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING 
 
The transformation of the space of finance into fully automated systems started 
when the exchanges became electronic. Most literature dates the technological 
development toward fully automated trading back to the 1970s (cf. McGowan 
2010; Hanson/Hall 2012). In 1971, the NASDAQ became electronic and intro-
duced an electronic quotation system via which competing market makers could 
trade securities. In 1976, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) introduced its 
Designated Order Turnaround system, allowing for the electronic transmission 
of orders to buy and sell securities (cf. Burr 2014). This gave rise to what is 
called programme trading, which exploited the spread (the difference between 
the best offer to sell and the best bid to buy) between S&P 500 equity shares and 
the futures market. In the 1990s, with the introduction of Electronic Communica-
tions Networks (ECNs), this practice became widespread across different finan-
cial markets. The ECNs provided direct market access and eliminated the need 
for brokerage firms to facilitate trading inside the pit. In 1998, the SEC intro-
duced the Regulation Alternative Trading Systems, which authorized ECNs. The 
intention was to restrict the monopoly that the NYSE and NASDAQ had gained 
by automating their order-matching systems. As a result, more computer systems 
were developed to facilitate the entry and execution of orders electronically via 
the use of algorithms. 
However, HFT evolved more specifically as a response to both technological 
developments and regulatory changes. McGowan (2010), for instance, sees the 
rise of HFT as a direct result of the enactment of a set of US rules known as 
Regulation National Market System (Reg NMS). These were passed by the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2005 and fully enacted in 2007 
in order to strengthen the US equity markets. In part, Reg NMS was a direct re-
sponse to a problematization of the behavior of specialists and locals, who used 
to serve as market makers (meaning that if there are insufficient buyers or 
sellers, they maintain order flow by trading with their own capital). In 2004, 
however, a group of NYSE specialists were accused of not maintaining a fair 
market. Against this backdrop, Reg NMS aimed to secure fair competition and 
decrease the discretionary power of specialists (cf. Lewis 2014: 96). Among oth-
er things, this resulted in an updated rule prohibiting “trade-throughs”, i.e. the 
execution of trades at prices outside of the national best bid and offer (NBBO). 
By emphasizing the need for immediate and automatic order execution at the 
NBBO, Reg NMS not only targeted the discretionary power of specialists; in ef-
fect, it enabled ultra-fast market participants to exploit price discrepancies 
(caused by a time delay) between different exchanges.  
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More recent factors that have buttressed the rise of HFT include the narrowing of 
spreads. In 2001, US stock exchanges were permitted to quote prices in decimals 
instead of fractions in order to increase liquidity. This move is known as deci-
malization, and is widely acknowledged to have affected the overall functioning 
of all financial markets, as it reduced the minimum tick size or spread from one-
eighth of a dollar to one cent (cf. Jennings 2001; Chen/Chou/Chung 2009). This 
further decreased the importance of specialists on the exchanges and eventually 
led to a vast increase in algorithmic trading. In this new and more liquid market 
structure, the institutional traders were splitting up orders executed by algorithms 
in order to reduce their market impact and to execute trades faster and at better 
prices (cf. Burr 2014). 
These changes all acted as catalysts for the increase of very fast, ultra-low-
latency techniques, such as the use of high-speed computer programs for the ex-
ecution of orders with a high level of frequency. The increased use of high-speed 
algorithms and the trading strategies used has led the regulators to define this as 
a practice with its own definition. The US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) defines HF traders as “professional traders acting in a proprietary capacity 
that engage in strategies that generate a large number of trades on a daily basis” 
(Securities and Exchange Commission 2010: 45). A working group under anoth-
er US regulatory body, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), 
has proposed a broader definition that focuses more on the trading activity itself 
than on those engaged in it: 
 
High frequency trading is a form of automated trading that employs: 
(a)  algorithms for decision making, order initiation, generation, routing, or execu-
tion, for each individual transaction without human direction; 
(b) low-latency technology that is designed to minimize response times, including 
proximity and colocation services; 
(c)  high speed connections to markets for order entry; and 
(d) high rates of orders or quotes submitted. (CFTC 2012) 
 
HFT is both defined as a specific organizational practice, proprietary trading and 
as a specific use of technological tools to execute trading strategies. The later as-
pect is of great importance for the present chapter- low latency technology 
means that algorithms are designed as rather dumb and simple entities that are 
supposed to read the market in real-time. In order to be fast, they can only pro-
cess very limited information. This point supports the argument that the assump-
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tions, theories and concepts written into such devices might have a limited im-
pact on the financial markets in general.2  
 
 
EXPLOITATION OF TIME-DELAY 
 
The data I have collected demonstrate some common traits defining HFT strate-
gies. One key factor is that HF traders are able to exploit the price differences 
between exchanges. One HF trader explained that “we profit from correlation 
and hedge ourselves. We exploit securities that move in sync due to them being 
tightly hedged”. This means that the traders issue orders and when that order is 
“filled” – if it bought what it was asked – some of the traders’ other algorithms 
would react to the price information. Similarly, a programmer from a research 
firm specializing in HFT stated that “what [HF traders] do is to empirically 
measure the correlation between securities. Virtually every pair of securities in 
the market has a positive correlation”.  
So, in most cases HF traders speculate on the correlation between different 
financial products, which means that if the price of one stock moves up or down 
it is very likely that another stock will do the same. It might be that they are 
traded with the same index and have the same probability of following the price 
moves of the whole index or that they are dependent upon the same factor, such 
as oil prices or political initiatives etc. HF traders speculate on being faster than 
the price move between two highly correlated financial instruments. In the words 
of a CEO of a small HFT firm in New Jersey: 
 
“People are in the business of propagating that price impact to other securities […] So 
what we are doing, basically, is transferring the price impact of one security to a large set 
of other securities. That’s where liquidity comes from, we’re sourcing liquidity from other 
securities and transferring them to a specific future contract and then we’re taking the 
price impact from that future and spreading it to other securities.” 
 
What the CEO characterizes as spreading is exactly this idea about profiting 
from the time delay between different exchanges. This may materialize in vari-
ous ways. The algorithms used by HFT firms can be divided into three basic 
types.  
                                                           
2  For a more detailed description of the transition from the open outcry trading pit to 
high-frequency trading see Borch et al. (2015) and Borch and Lange (2016).  
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The first type is called a spreader. It buys one instrument and sells another with 
as little internal latency as possible. For instance, the algorithm buys shares trad-
ed at the NYSE and futures traded at the Security Futures Exchange in Chicago 
(OCX). There is a 13-millisecond delay in the transmission of data from New 
York City to Chicago. This delay creates arbitrage opportunities of exploiting 
the price discrepancies between Shares traded at the NYSE and futures traded at 
the OCX. When the price of a share on the NYSE and its corresponding futures 
contract at OCX are out of sync, the algorithm would buy the less expensive one 
and sell it on the more expensive market. 
The second type of algorithm is a scalper. This type of algorithm earns min-
imum incremental profits in a single instrument by buying and selling that same 
instrument many times a day across different trading venues.  
This type of strategy is described by a trader who designs his algorithms to 
exploit slower market actors:  
 
“What you do [in one HFT strategy] is making markets. So you are offering and bidding 
competitively on one exchange. That way when someone pays the spread, when someone 
buys the offer or sells the bid, they are first to know because they got filled. If they are 
part of that sell or buy, they find out immediately and that gives them the time-jump to go 
on to the next exchange and if they sold they can buy on that exchange and make profit on 
the difference.” 
 
So, here, HF traders act upon a specific price move and at the same time partici-
pate in the resulting price move. They do so by constantly issuing and cancelling 
orders to be in front of the price move that they aim to profit from (cf. Lange 
2016). Another trader, also acting CEO of a major HFT firm in Chicago, de-
scribed a similar strategy:  
 
“The fact that I am participating on the market gives me time to speed-jump because the 
information was a fill and that preempts market data significantly […] and when you re-
ceive that fill, that’s what triggers your hedge orders essentially, to these other exchang-
es.” 
 
As one trader explained: 
 
“We take advantage of the noisy motions on instruments where you’ll have price fluctua-
tions that are not linked to any meaningful information, and in that case you know you can 
profit from that noise”. This involves reading the depth of the order book (that display the 
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bid- and ask-prices) and taking advantage of the probability that “there’s a large resting 
size at a certain level.” 
 
The third type of algorithm is a market maker which seeks to quote bids and of-
fers in the same instrument and makes the market buy and sell according to cer-
tain basic rules to control the risk in the same way that a scalper seeks to take 
advantage of noise in a single instrument. This type is explained to be a rather 
passive strategy since the algorithms are in fact doing nothing but waiting for the 
order to come in and act upon that information. In this case the HF trader does 
not act as a buyer or seller but acts more like a middle man that makes the buyer 
and seller meet.  
 
 
INTERACTING ALGORITHMS 
 
However, the story of HFT is more complicated than the exploitation of time dif-
ferences between exchanges. As I explained previously, order execution works 
as messaging to the market and algorithms are designed to detect and counteract 
other order executions – so for example, if the algorithm puts in an order it 
would immediately react to the information that it gives to the market. However, 
if the market moves up, it waits instead of automatically executing a buy order 
not to get “spooked”. Similarly, larger investors with what the traders defined as 
“real money” (i.e. institutional investors, banks and pension funds) have devel-
oped randomization tools to hide their buy or sell intentions from the market and 
thereby prevent being read/predicted by HFTs. Normally they slice the order size 
in a way so only one-third of the order size would be revealed to the market eve-
ry other second. This type of executing is done with the use of what is called an 
iceberg order (cf. Lenglet 2011; Lange 2016).  
As a consequence, sophisticated tools are built by HF traders to detect such 
market moves initiated by larger investors in order to act upon or counteract ex-
pected price moves. A programmer explained his activity as “seeing if there are 
other people obscuring the signal, i.e. the edge that you are trying to capture, and 
part of that is doing constant market recognos [i.e. pattern recognition]”. Another 
trader offered a specific example of this kind of market recognos, the purpose of 
which is to detect the rhythms in buying and selling interests that the rest of the 
market is not aware of or does not know about: 
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“The shop that I started trading at, first thing they did – you know, I came from an auto-
mation background – was that they introduced me to markets and they immediately said, 
‘we know that banks are using iceberg orders’, you know, hidden size, and they wanted to 
be able to detect the hidden size, because they are market makers and hidden size changes 
the typology of the market in ways that they can’t readily identify. So the first thing I did 
when I entered this business was to build an iceberg detector. And that is very much that 
kind of recognos where you’re looking for patterns that indicate other high-frequency or 
micro-structure activity and base decisions on that.” 
 
What this means is that algorithms are designed to detect patterns of other algo-
rithms with the purpose of trading in front of them. Thus a hierarchy exists be-
tween different ‘species’ of trading algorithms – between the slower and the 
faster ones. Iceberg orders are a device that is both conditioned and conditions 
how financial interaction plays out in space and time.  
 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF ORDER-TYPES 
 
The last aspect that characterizes the transformation of the performance of finan-
cial space is the use of special order types. How traders send a message to the 
market (execute orders) is determined by which order types they use. The differ-
ent order types are offered by the exchanges. Up and until the implementation of 
rule mentioned above, the Reg NMS only limit orders and existing market or-
ders. A market order is an order that the trader uses to buy or sell an asset imme-
diately at the best available and current price. A market order is set to execute a 
trade immediately with no time restrictions or the price range within which the 
order can be executed. The risk is that the bid and ask prices are a lot higher or 
lower than the current price at which the order is executed because of the time 
delay. A limit order on the other hand is an order used by the trader to buy or sell 
a set number of financial instruments at a specified price range. This means that 
if the price range for the specific asset (the difference between the bid and ask 
price is too big) the order will not be executed – it will be cancelled (rejected). If 
it is executed within the price range the order “got filled”. Limit orders are also 
used to limit the length of time an order can be outstanding before being can-
celled. 
One aspect of the Reg MNS was that every order had to go to the exchange 
offering the best price. This effected a proliferation of more or less advanced or-
der types (execution commands) reaching far beyond basic market and limit or-
ders. More than 200 different order types now exist. Exchanges imitate and in-
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vent new and different order types in order to differentiate themselves and to 
serve and attract HF traders to trade at their exchange. HF traders are considered 
as the liquidity-providers and makes sure that the exchange always have some-
one to be on the other side of a given bid or offer (which means that the trade 
will be executed at their venue and they will earn the transaction fee).  
Direct Edge’s “hide-not-slide” order type is a good example. The basic prin-
ciple at US stock exchanges is that the trader who places the order first at the 
best current price is the one being allowed to execute his trade first. But in some 
cases the rule is difficult to maintain for instance in a situation where no seller is 
there to fill the buy order. To avoid this situation the order should be routed to 
the next exchange with a matching sell order. However, traders can place an or-
der to be executed only at one specific exchange, so in the case of no matching 
sell order, the offered price will slide to a lower level until it gets filled. The 
hide-not-slide order type offer traders to issue a trade that is not displayed in the 
order book so that the price will not slide, but it will wait until a matching sell 
order comes in and only then will it be displayed. This means that the hidden or-
der has a time advantage over other traders as that order will be executed before 
new incoming orders. HFTs can actually jump the queue. Apart from such spe-
cial order types, rebates are offered to HF traders by most exchanges – a reduc-
tion in the fees they would normally have to pay per order executed – a feature 
the HF traders are highly dependent upon as they execute a high level of orders 
every second.  
What is established here looks like a rather complex feedback structure 
where high-speed trading algorithms condition a specific market microstructure, 
without which it cannot exist. The trading algorithms that have been presented 
here in fact condition and shape the social structures in which they are also em-
bedded.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The models and theories that lay the ground for the performativity thesis pre-
sented by Callon and MacKenzie were designed with the purpose of represent-
ing, predicting or even forecasting the movements of the market. High-speed al-
gorithms on the other hand, are pre-programmed to read price moves directly as 
they appear in the order book. Based on a dynamic interaction with other finan-
cial actors, high-speed algorithms work by issuing an order to see how other ac-
tors (human traders and other algorithms) react to that order and is pre-
programmed to issue another quote based on that information. This means that 
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financial devices are not performative in the sense described by Mackenzie and 
Callon, as they do not work to increase its ‘predictive fit’ (cf. Stark 2011).  
Instead complex spatial relations are constituted where each financial actor 
(HFT-algorithms, execution algorithms, the exchanges matching engine etc.) ex-
ploit the inefficiencies of other species and in the process, creates new ineffi-
ciencies, again exploited by yet another kind of actor. A financial algorithm is 
not simply an automated rule but a device that is both conditioned and condi-
tions, which exploits inefficiencies and at the same time, creates the interde-
pendence of the different kinds of algorithms. It is from this background that the 
performative space of HFT is probably best understood as a topological one 
composed by interacting agents. Thus the feedback relation between interactive 
algorithms does not only apply to structurally correlated instruments but also to 
the interactional algorithmic responses between the exchanges’ matching algo-
rithms (and order types), institutional investors’ and broker-dealers’ executing 
algorithms and other HFT algorithms. 
What makes topology a distinctive approach to the study of social dynamics 
vis-à-vis other approaches to the study of finance is that it provides tools for the 
understanding of the financial markets that reach beyond the study of its actor-
networks or agent-based interaction within the trading room. What is offered in 
this chapter is a presentation of how the rise and function of algorithmic trading 
strategies and execution technologies contribute to the making and reshaping of 
financial markets. Algorithms both act within and outside the market; they are 
both ahead of the price move they aim to profit from while also creating it. Such 
deformation comes with and enacts a particular spatialization of finance, in 
which distances and temporalities are continuously redrawn or folded into each 
other, complicating notions of inside and outside, distance and proximity. The 
elementary component of physics and non-linear algebra might inspire the anal-
ysis of how dispersed actors create an economic pattern opposed to an Euclidean 
geometry, to which the prevailing economic system aspires (Deleuze/Guattari 
1980; Delanda 2002).  
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Encrypting 
 

 
 
Performing encryption 
SUSAN KOZEL 
 
 
A political, performative and affective landscape is revealed in this chapter as a 
way of approaching the topic of performing the digital: from the macro of the 
upheaval caused by Edward Snowden’s revelations of mass data surveillance to 
the micro of a phenomenological account of a crisis following an artistic perfor-
mance using mobile media. “Performing Encryption” is a response to working as 
a dancer and philosopher with mobile networked digital media that can be read 
as a part of a larger narrative of transitioning from one state to another. The state 
of viewing the fine interweaving of mobile technologies in our lives as a positive 
expression of social choreographies gives way to a state where it is impossible to 
regard the potential for surveillance and capture of daily activities as anything 
but provocative, troubling or even threatening. The risk is not just the “capture 
all” aspects of dataveillance, but of increasing control over gestural and affective 
exchanges in urban life. In saying networked technologies, I point not just to 
mobile phones but also to the Cloud and the Internet-of-Things which, in combi-
nation, are potentially devastating from the perspective of embodied agency. 
This narrative of questioning and transition is typical of others arising at the be-
ginning of a century, let alone a millennium. It is no longer possible to avoid 
asking what we have created. And how we can respond to the technological and 
cultural conditions of our world.  
Throughout these reflections performance is defined as emergent bodily 
practices, in the context of mobile networked media. The linking of performa-
tivity with emergence emphasises the generative potential of performance – an 
ontological dimension of bringing something into being that was not there previ-
ously. Performance is a play between the escape and re-containment of move-
ment or expression, the transformation of something that was previously virtual 
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into being.1 Emphasising the emergent qualities of performance can seem won-
derfully liberating and creative, but the reality is relational: we perform with dig-
ital media, at the same time as acts of watching and regulation are performed up-
on us by systems and by people. New expressive and relational ways of perform-
ing with and through the digital may emerge from the use of mobile media but 
simultaneously new forms of surveillance arrive. The Deleuzian term “luminosi-
ty” has been taken up by Angela McRobbie (2009) to replace surveillance, de-
scribing contemporary performances of gender within a wide range of technolo-
gies (from fertility manipulation to social media). She identifies how the “theat-
rical effect” of luminosity acts like “a moving spotlight”, softening, dramatising 
and disguising “the regulative dynamics” of media and politics (McRobbie 2009: 
54). Significantly, when one is in the luminous glow of such a moving spotlight, 
one sees and sees oneself as one is seen.2 Mapping this term further into digital 
cultures luminosity resonates on many levels: from moving images or data sus-
pended in digitally illuminated screens to the act of shedding light on what may 
have been obscured in shadow, it lends paradoxical qualities of both magic and 
pervasive watching to performance. Performances of encryption will be ex-
plained throughout this chapter, but for now it is possible to say that they are 
emergent counter practices for manipulating the degrees of luminosity, playing 
with focus and legibility, brightness and obscurity. Not confined to theatrical or 
dance practices, these are performances within digital cultures which intend to 
ambiguate or obfuscate bodily data that might otherwise be clearly transmitted 
by our devices.  
 
 
THREE WHISPERS 
 
Three whispers begin this chapter, three phenomena within digital cultures. 
Faithful to the affective qualities of the verb ‘to whisper,’ they circulate inner 
states or personal stories. These whispers radiate states of immanence and inti-
macy into political and social spheres.  
 
  
                                                           
1  For an extended discussion of performance defined in terms of emergence, see Kozel 
2012. 
2  This “seeing-seen” can be understood as a basic reflective loop or chiasm of phenom-
enology (Kozel 2007). 
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1. Whisper App (2012-2014) 
 
The Whisper app surged in popularity and then exploded dramatically. An appli-
cation running on mobile phones, it attached itself to the Twitter phenomenon by 
offering something its much bigger counterpart lacked: anonymity. It’s app store 
entry loudly promised “If you have ever had something too intimate to share on 
traditional networks, simply share it on Whisper!”3 Perhaps the shout should 
have been a clue to tensions between the poetics and politics of the app. Whisper 
asserted that the short messages, “sent by millions of people around the world 
and viewed by billions of people each month”, were anonymous and private 
(Ball 2014). It was as if the opening of a protected space, a bubble for sharing 
but not owning intimate thoughts, met a need within users of social media.4 Peo-
ple’s postings were personal, poetic, funny and at times tormented; these were 
thoughts and “confessions” that would normally be self-censored prior to posting 
on social media platforms (cf. Lewis/Rushe 2014a). Intensely felt, translated into 
words, released into the cloud, then circulating separately from the bodies that 
generated them: Whisper messages might seem like perfect examples of auton-
omous wisps of affect, more autonomous than tweets because of their supposed 
anonymity. Did these affective states really circulate freely from the people who 
generated them? Sadly no, the affects and their bodies were soon reunited.  
Two stages of deception enacted by Whisper were reported by journalists 
writing for The Guardian. The first was that despite claims to anonymity, the 
messages and their metadata (such as date, time, GPS coordinates, language) 
were recorded and stored indefinitely by the service provider. The metadata held 
by Whisper revealed geolocation within a “fuzzed” zone of approximately 500 
hundred metres which, when stored over time, tells a lot about the person using 
the app. Whisper also circumvented users who disabled their geolocation ser-
vices by extracting their approximate location information from IP data (cf. 
Lewis/Rushe 2014a). The second level of deception should not come as a sur-
prise, but it did because many social media users continue to separate the social 
applications they live with on a daily basis from the corporate ownership of these 
apps. Whisper adopted a standard Silicon Valley business model for digital start 
ups which is to “collect and package user data in the pursuit of more venture 
capital funding, with an eye to a multibillion-dollar exit” (Ball 2014). Soon after 
learning that their privacy abuses would be published, Whisper quietly changed 
its privacy terms of services to say that location can fairly easily be determined 
                                                           
3  Cf. https://whisper.sh/ 
4  Other confessional apps include Secret and Yik Yak. 
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and they might reveal this to others based on the law, safety, technical reasons 
and research studies and corporate transactions (cf. Lewis/Rushe 2014b).5 
A performance perspective on the Whisper phenomenon reveals a clash be-
tween expression and monetisation: a growing desire to translate inner states 
(‘secrets’) into images and texts, and to circulate these via mobile networked de-
vices, collides with the political reality of apps and platforms provided by multi-
national corporations that value the mass accumulation of such information.6 On 
a discrete level, post by post, such expressions may seem like intimate ephemera 
but once affective expression meets big data there can be massive implications 
for bodily, affective and social freedom. Jaron Lanier, in his book Who Owns the 
Future? (2014) asks us why we are surprised. What did we expect when multina-
tional corporations offered us services for free? (Gmail, Google, facebook, Twit-
ter, Whisper, etc).  
 
“The NSA forced its way into those private computers in secret, but why did anyone think 
that near unanimous consumer support of a titanic surveillance industry would not eventu-
ally morph into a surveillance state?” (Lanier 2014: xiii) 
 
2. The Whisper(s) Wearables Project (2002) 
 
The second whisper involves a little time travel. Just back to 2002, but the shifts 
in political and corporate practices relating to user generated digital media in the 
decade between these whispers was seismic, leaving embodied expression com-
pressed and vulnerable. The Whisper(s) garments were embedded with biometric 
sensors and haptic outputs to facilitate the exchange of non-verbal communica-
tion.7 In 2003, at an installation open to public participation, one participant ex-
pressed a concern that she did not want to have her heartbeat recorded because 
she feared what might be done with the data.8 At first I did not understand what 
she meant – “done” with the data? Then she explained: “if it reveals that I have a 
                                                           
5  There is some disagreement over exactly when the revised terms were drafted, prior to 
or after Rushe and Lewis threatened to publish. Whisper insists it was drafted a few 
months prior. See: http://whisper.sh/privacy 
6  SnapChat is another example of an app acting as a conduit for extraordinary amounts 
of intimate bodily communication, particularly amongst teenagers. See: http://www. 
snapchat.com 
7  See: http://whisper.iat.sfu.ca 
8  This was mentioned briefly in Closer in a chapter devoted to discussing wearables and 
the Whisper(s) research project (Kozel 2007: 304). 
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health defect and you record it, it might it end up in the hands of an insurance 
company and I might be denied coverage.” This seemed to me to be a fabric wo-
ven of quite a few “what ifs?”: if we recorded it (we did not); if the data was leg-
ible and intelligible (it was not); if it was stored (it was streamed live and never 
archived); if the storage was in the Cloud (we had no link to any Cloud); and if 
the data could be accessed by someone else (how could it?). I calmed her by as-
suring that we did not store data, and even if we did it would be meaningless be-
cause we poeticised it, transposed the bio data into visuals or haptic output, we 
amplified and remapped, in effect, we distorted and obscured the truthful bio-
data.  
 
3. The Whisperers, Interactive Installation (2013) 
 
The third whisper acts to ground the performance of intimate communication 
unequivocally within a social and political context. An installation called The 
Whisperers created by designer Christopher Koelsch (based on historian Orlando 
Figes book by the same name) delves into the devastating impact of wide scale 
surveillance in Stalinist Russia. While some of this was electronic, a large 
swathe of the snooping was done by people watching, listening to, and recording 
the actions and words of others. Often family members informed on each other, 
and neighbours could not be trusted. Koelsch designed and built a structure, 
roughly 4mX4m, resembling a mid 20th century Soviet tenement building with 
exposed pipes, windows, and vents. Set in a gallery space, when a visitor whis-
pered into any part of the structure they received information about those who 
dwelled inside. The visitor could not enter into the private space of the imagi-
nary inhabitants of the building but was able to speak and listen. Sensors and 
electronic recordings of sounds were used to animate the installation, giving the 
sense that “walls can have ears, the vents in your floor can have eyes, and the 
pipes in your bathroom are dark tunnels snaking through an atmosphere of con-
spiracy”.9 Viewing this installation from the perspective of performing encryp-
tion, attention shifts from those who listen to those who know they are being 
surveilled. What did they do? They whispered, played the radio, ran the tap, 
avoided having conversations near doors or windows, or refrained from talking 
at all. Linguistic, gestural and affective expression became subtle plays of ambi-
                                                           
9  See: http://christopherkoelsch.com/whisperers.html 
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guity and distortion, with the dismaying predominance of somatic10 and per-
formative practices of self-censorship.  
What can we extract from these three disparate but similarly named material-
isations of digital culture? From the Whisper app it is possible to read a large-
scale breach of trust and the need to protect ourselves without completely cen-
soring our digitally mediated expression. From whisper(s) the wearables project, 
we see how the poeticising of bio-data to obscure actual physiological infor-
mation is a play of ambiguity: this was a first glimpse of what I am now calling 
performing encryption. And from The Whisperers we see a picture of a society 
forced to rely almost exclusively on analogue, physical, verbal and somatic per-
formances of encryption. This last whisper is the cautionary tale: the desperate 
repression that can result from pervasive systemic surveillance. Together these 
three cultural events act as a prologue to this chapter, grounding the dilemma of 
how performers and researchers into performativity can preserve digital expres-
sion while maintaining affective privacy. In more politically straightforward 
terms, the dilemma is how to facilitate a cultural shift away from passive ac-
ceptance of dataveillance (data surveillance) in order to reclaim agency over our 
bodies and digital traces. This is ontological because it goes beyond ways of act-
ing or thinking, it relates to new materialisations that may take the form of hu-
man actions, political constructs or technological configurations. This is the ter-
rain for performing encryption. 
 
 
A POLITICAL ONTOLOGY 
 
This is not a manifesto or a call to action – at least not yet. It is too simple to 
identify a difficult political situation and point to solutions from the world of 
performance. It is important first to deepen and, in fact, to trouble the task a little 
further by revealing one of the most worrying and at the same time hopeful di-
mensions: how bodies performing with mobile media (assemblages of technolo-
gies and flesh) are both complicit in politically suspect digital practices and able 
to produce counter-practices. This can be understood if we look to the political 
ontology of dance proposed by Andre Lepecki in Exhausting Dance (2006), and 
                                                           
10  Somatic in this instance refers to internal bodily reactions, not to formalised systems 
of somatic therapies. A somatic level of knowledge and reaction is deeply embedded 
in the body, it is frequently pre-reflective and pre-conscious, and makes itself known 
in a range of ways that are difficult to clarify in words or standard medical mesure-
ments (cf. Kozel 2013). 
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then transpose his argument into performances, both artistic and social, with dig-
ital networked devices.  
Lepecki constructs a two-layered argument by describing how dance is not 
only related to politics but can be ontologically and politically embedded in the 
formation of repressive political events. In terms that are relevant to performing 
encryption, he witnesses rearrangements and refigurations of dance in relation to 
politics. “[R]earrangements of the very notion of dance” refer not only to “the 
position of dance in relation to politics, but of the ontological and political role 
of movement in the formation of those disturbing events” (Lepecki 2006: 16). 
Experimental self-critique in dance can act as a performative critique of wider 
political regimes, in particular the dancer’s “participation in the general economy 
of mobility that informs, supports and reproduces the ideological formations of 
late capitalist modernity” (ibid.). Mobility in Lepecki’s argument refers to an in-
terpretation of modernism as based on kinetic motion to the exclusion of still-
ness. I expand his argument from theatrical stage dance to a wider set of partici-
patory and performative practices, but also render it more specific by transposing 
it into a set of digital cultural practices: mobile networked media and the una-
voidable dark side of surveillance that underpins their use for artistic or personal 
expression. No longer dealing with the late capitalist modernity of Lepecki’s ar-
gument, we are squarely in what can be called neoliberal “surveillance capital-
ism” (Zuboff 2015: 75). The implication is that choreographic or performative 
experimentation with mobile media does not just document, critique or analyse 
the ideological and economic formation of the times, but also participates in its 
construction. The result is an unavoidable loss of innocence but also a potential 
upsurge in political agency.  
This shift in agency, still emerging, is contingent upon transformed attitudes 
toward performative experiments with technology, and toward mobility in gen-
eral. I have called this a shift from “closer to closure”, referring to my own 
stance in Closer: Performance, Technologies, Phenomenology (2007) which was 
much more optimistic regarding the potentials for corporeal expression and 
transformation when bodies became “close” to technologies.11 This is not to say 
that the premise of this book was apolitical or naive, but that the performative 
experiments in the 1990s and early 2000s upon which the philosophical discus-
sion was based were enacted in a far more utopian sense of the digital world. 
The affective cloud in which we lived at that time was still coloured by the feel-
ing that digital connectivity was inherently democratic and inclusive. The minia-
                                                           
11  The shift from closer to closure is the premise my forthcoming book, Social  
Choreographies (expected 2017). 
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turisation and wearability of technologies were, in particular, seen to be both 
fascinating and liberating, impacting not just communication or entertainment, 
but mobile modes of being. This is reflected in sociologist John Urry’s writing 
from that period in which he recasts the social sciences by developing the new 
mobilities paradigm. There are unavoidable performative or choreographic quali-
ties to his description of the convergence between mobile technologies and phys-
ical travel:  
 
“Physical changes appear to be ‘de-materializing’ connections, as people, machines, im-
ages, information, power, money, ideas and dangers are ‘on the move’, making and re-
making connections at often rapid speed around the world.” (Urry 2007: 5-6) 
 
The rapid play between materialization and de-materialisation, communication 
and connection, provided by mobile technologies in his writing is mostly “a 
positive category” with the exception of his critiques of hypermobility (ibid.: 7).  
Other notable instances of transformed attitudes towards digital cultures in-
clude Sherry Turkle, who describes her own turning point in her book Alone To-
gether (2011) and Jaron Lanier who refers to his own reversal of position, from 
being a of web pioneer to saying he was, in effect, mistaken and it has turned out 
quite differently from the heady utopian ideals of the 1970s (cf. Lanier 2014: 
xiv-xv). In an adjacent but related field, Angela McRobbie’s presents a “self-
critique” to her earlier stance that feminist subversive strategies could exist with-
in neoliberal consumer culture. With a strong emphasis on media production in 
the form of micro-publishing, she asks “Just how oppositional were these seem-
ingly subversive practices?” (McRobbie 2009: 2-3). These shifts reveal not just 
political transformations but are imbued with ontological dimensions captured 
by Lanier’s characterization of the time in which we now live as a moment 
where “humanity is deciding how to be as our technological abilities increase” 
(Lanier 2014: xviii; emphasis added). How to be is a fundamentally ontological 
category because it pertains to being, how to perform is the dynamic mode with-
in such an ontological state. The political ontology shaped by performative prac-
tices with networked technologies spans the thin membrane between artistic per-
formance and the mobile choreographies of daily life, and will gain a greater de-
gree of urgency with the expansion of the Internet-of-Things (IoT), promising 25 
billion connected devices by the year 2020 (or more, depending on which au-
thoritative prediction you choose to read). Ontologies are not fixed, of necessity 
they transform. The rest of this chapter is devoted to charting such a transfor-
mation. 
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AFFEXITY: PASSAGES & TUNNELS 
 
The artistic research that generated the ideas in this chapter is AffeXity, part of a 
larger research project addressing contemporary archiving practices called Liv-
ing Archives.12 A collaboration initiated by screen dance artist Jeannette Ginslov 
and myself in 2010, AffeXity began with a convergence of three questions: one 
political, one technological and one from dance. The dance question we set our-
selves was whether it is possible to improvise (with bodies and cameras) by at-
tending to affective sensibility rather than emotional states or formal patterns. 
The technological question was whether Augmented Reality (AR) browsers run-
ning on devices such as mobile phones and iPads could support the visual, affec-
tive, kinaesthetic and participatory qualities we desired. The political question 
was how to respond to the warning that we ignore affective manipulations in our 
cities “at our peril”.13 A beta version of a performance/installation, AffeXity: 
Passages & Tunnels, premiered in 2013 at the Re:New Festival in Copenha-
gen.14 
We used the AR browser Aurasma because it was at least free and very user 
friendly if not open source, and it used visual triggers to download media.15 The 
visual images (acting as QR codes) were frames from the video material, thus 
creating a play across stillness and motion because the video was suspended in 
the display of the device as a transparent layer through which the static trigger 
image could be viewed. These trigger images of various sizes and shapes were 
attached to the damp brick outside walls of the Nikolaj Kunsthal, formerly a 
church built in the 19th century but now a Contemporary Art Center in Copenha-
gen. When visitors held mobile devices up to the images, archival video imagery 
was downloaded onto their devices. This produced a multi-layered choreography 
across the still images, the video and the multiple devices of the group of people 
standing together. Added to this archival choreography was the presence of 
dancer Wubkje Kuindersma, performing live in the space between the still imag-
                                                           
12  Held at Malmö University, funded by the Swedish Research Council. See:http://liv 
ingarchives.mah.se 
13  The citation comes from Amin/Thrift (2002). It can be read in combination with their 
assertion that urban life offers “performative improvisations which are unforeseen and 
unforeseeable” (ibid.: 4). 
14  Artists/designers: Susan Kozel, Jeannette Ginslov, Daniel Spikol, Jacek Smolicki, 
Camilla Ryd. See: http://livingarchives.mah.se/affexity-passages-and-tunnels 
15  In 2015 Aurasma was purchased by Hewlitt Packard. See: https://www.aurasma.com 
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es, the devices and the people. Some of the archival imagery was of her impro-
vising in Copenhagen two years previously.16 
 
 
WHAT HAPPENED NEXT?  
(A PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERLUDE) 
 
Several events transpired immediately following this performance. 
 
1. I realized on a somatic level that surveillance is the dark side of archiving  
2. The implications of Edward Snowden’s revelations continued to  
reverberate though political and personal realms. 
3. I burnt out. 
 
Juxtaposed with the unexpected success of AffeXity: Passages & Tunnels was 
the unease I felt with our entire research programme. No longer just channeling 
affect into artistic content for the project and opening access to archival material, 
I was forced to recognize the wider affective cloud permeating the entire project. 
In short, mobile technologies felt like a beacon to inner states, making them vul-
nerable to detection, tracking, recording and analysis. By whom? I couldn’t say 
with any specificity, but the power dynamics were impossible to ignore and as a 
long time feminist (concerned with agency) and phenomenologist (concerned 
with corporeal experience) I found myself unwilling to peel away the last layers 
of unintelligibility, of protection, existing between inner bodily states and total 
transparency in the face of the ever expanding and complexifying network of 
connected devices and sensors. Slavoj Žižek (2013) explains the relocation of 
power behind the transparency of functionality:  
 
“Here are two telltale words: abstraction and control. To manage a cloud there needs to be 
a monitoring system that controls its functioning, and this system is by definition hidden 
from users. The more the small item (smartphone) I hold in my hand is personalised, easy 
to use, “transparent” in its functioning, the more the entire setup has to rely on the work 
                                                           
16  The description of AffeXity: Passages & Tunnels in this chapter is condensed to  
support this argument, but documentation exists on the Living Archvies website and 
the following scholarly articles discuss it from various perspectives: on affect and the 
devising process (Kozel 2012), on affect, phenomenology and somatics (Kozel 2013) 
on archives and participatory performance (Kozel/Spikol/Smolicki 2014). 
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being done elsewhere, in a vast circuit of machines that co-ordinate the user's experience. 
The more our experience is non-alienated, spontaneous, transparent, the more it is regulat-
ed by the invisible network controlled by state agencies and large private companies that 
follow their secret agendas.” (Žižek 2013) 
 
In terms of “rearrangements” of the ontological status of dance, I shifted square-
ly to the position where the political and ontological complicity of our artistic 
work had to be acknowledged. So I stopped. And I fell ill, suffering from the 
typical condition of the media-saturated, multi-tasking, always-connected life. I 
burnt out. And I dropped my mobile devices as if they had burnt my fingers. 
 
 
ENTER ENCRYPTION 
 
The Snowden leaks made people all over the 
world feel violated. We don’t know who has 
read our most tender emails. It feels bad, and if 
we ever get used to that feeling, that would feel 
even worse.  
LANIER 2014: XIII 
 
Here Lanier captures the beginnings of an affective approach to the politics of 
digital surveillance: it feels bad. Affect is more than feeling, but can begin with 
feeling, with an attention to body states. Then it ripples outwards to an exchange 
of forces and intensities between bodies of all sorts (organic and inorganic). 
Some affect theory points towards transcending physical corporeality, but much 
philosophical writing on affect is helpful to cultivate a sense of materiality that 
can reveal the ever more subtle and complex ways bodies exist and recombine in 
relation to technologies.17 That technological systems are in themselves perform-
ing bodies is no longer a fantastical metaphor. In Edward Snowden’s famous 
video statement from June of 2013, produced by filmmaker Laura Poitras, he re-
vealed the extent of the data-snooping impacting every digitally networked being 
on the planet and invoked a physical metaphor for the US National Security 
Agency: “the NSA targets the communications of everyone, it ingests them by 
default, collects them in its system, filters them, analyses them, stores them” 
                                                           
17  I do not have the space to expand upon affect here but have discussed it at length in 
Kozel (2012; 2013). 
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(Snowden 2013). The NSA is described as a body: digesting, remembering, so-
matic. The metaphor for the system is bodily, the data captured is of actions and 
attitudes. Both system and data are bodily performances. Yet, it is no longer 
enough to state in a general way that performativity exists practically and meta-
phorically across bodies and systems. Speaking with greater precision: the per-
formativity of capture is mirrored by a performativity of encryption.  
The call to encrypt echoes widely, I map it and transpose it into the discours-
es and practices of digital performance. When Snowden addressed the SXSW 
conference in 2014, appearing by videoconference through seven proxies, with 
heavily lagged visuals and audio he urged everyone to use encryption software: 
“Our networks have been designed with surveillance in mind” (Snowden 2014a). 
His many videoconferenced presentations have become his own telematic per-
formances of “From Russia with Love”, calmly clarifying the extent of the mess 
we are in. In this one he explained the threat of predetermination, reminding us 
that the NSA would “figure out uses for the data down the road”. From a per-
formance perspective this is future performance, not performance as a repetition 
of the past or revelation of the present, but the performance of predetermination. 
It is a sinister rehearsal of the future because we participate unknowingly. 
The political dimensions of encryption are by no means stable: neither rights 
nor practices are enshrined. The latest versions of Apple and Google’s mobile 
operating systems are now encrypted by default, while other popular messaging 
services, such as WhatsApp and Snapchat, also use encryption. This has prompt-
ed calls for action both for and against strong encryption from activists and gov-
ernment officials.18 Glenn Greenwald, the journalist and lawyer Snowden con-
tacted to release his story, urges everyone to encrypt. Indeed he almost missed 
out on connecting with Snowden entirely because it took him so long to install 
encryption software (cf. Greenwald 2014). Tim Berners-Lee, famously the 
founder/developer of the protocols that established the internet, asked Snowden 
at SXSW what he would do to design a new security system. An open question 
that invited either a technological or socio-political response, Snowden’s answer 
was “accountability” – about people not technology. He pointed to the soft side, 
the fleshy side: disruptive actions such as encryption and whistle-blowing. 
Meanwhile, British PM David Cameron and his government, notorious for at-
tacking personal data privacy, demanded in the wake of the 2015 shootings in 
Paris at Charlie Hebdo and the Jewish Deli: “In our country, do we want to allow 
                                                           
18  Since writing the first draft of this chapter, the Apple-FBI legal procedures have  
dominated news in the first part of 2016, with the FBI demanding that Apple provide 
‘backdoors’ or ways to hack into encrypted communication on iPhones.  
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a means of communication between people which we cannot read?” (Ball 2015). 
His words assume that communication is already readable and read, that encryp-
tion and ambiguity are not practiced in any materially significant way. Yet 
Snowden pointed out in his testimony to the EU on data security that the primary 
challenge of mass surveillance is not merely how you collect the communica-
tions but how you interpret, understand and analyse them (cf. Snowden 2014b). 
There is much noise in the system. 
 
 
AFFECT TO AMBIGUITY TO ENCRYPTION 
 
If there is much noise in the system, then what happens if we deliberately and, 
with full awareness of our political ontology, perform this noise? Returning once 
again to performance practices, I extract a stage of the AffeXity: Passages & 
Tunnels artistic process that was key to understanding the crucial link between 
affect and ambiguity. This moves us a little closer to understanding how encryp-
tion might be performed.  
As choreographers know, the use of archival dance material is as constrained 
by copyright as any archival project in cultural heritage – perhaps even more so 
because of the many layers of attribution (costumes, music, dance, choreogra-
phy, makeup, lighting, scenography). In conversation with Martin Larsen and 
Uffe Borgwart of the Royal Danish Theatre in Copenhagen we considered what 
material we could safely use. One of the archiving principles in the Living Ar-
chives project is that archives don’t have to be traces from the distant past. With 
pervasive, some might say chronic, documentation through social media a per-
formance perspective opens up the possibility of including what we call “the ar-
chive of 10minutes ago.” Borgwart, responding to this, suggested that we video 
rehearsals for a new piece being choreographed at that moment. He obtained the 
permission of Corpus, the young experimental ballet of the Royal Danish Thea-
tre, and the consent of dancer Oliver Starpov to video his solo. This became the 
basis of ‘The Oliver Series’. Borgwart did the original shoot of Oliver’s lyrical 
and very beautiful solo, performed to Satie-like music. He sent the raw video to 
Ginslov who produced a series of three edits which she called “Corpus Solo 01”, 
“Corpus Solo 02” and “Corpus Kelp Arms”.19 
                                                           
19  Oliver’s material can be found between minutes 2.31-2.57 in the documentation of  
AffeXity: Passages & Tunnels. Note the extended arms inviting the adjective “kelp” 
referring to rippling seaweed. See: http://livingarchives.mah.se/2013/10/affexity-
passages-tunnels-re-new-2013 
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The transformation of affect, movement and sound that occurred through these 
edits was striking. The affective choreographic and editing vocabulary Ginslov 
had been developing for two years manifested itself through the qualities of dis-
tortion and ambiguity to such an extent that the original dropped away and was 
replaced by iterations with substantially different affective tones. The point is 
not to raise the sticky question of the relation between archives and interpreta-
tion, far more significant from the perspective of this argument was the perfor-
mance of ambiguity through media manipulation. Ambiguity and affect were re-
vealed to be intimately entwined, and one way they played out was through dis-
tortion. The Oliver series helped me to understand, through artistic practice, the 
philosophical point that affect is already a play of ambiguity because it exists in 
liminal states. Affect is ambiguous because it is in a perpetual and dynamic state 
of exchange or transition, it is impossible to pin affect down to one person or one 
definable emotional state: it is an “inventory of shimmers, of nuances, of states, 
of changes […] of the borderline nature of human existence” (Barthes 2005: 77). 
The ambiguity of affect is due to its dynamic qualities but also due to an innate 
obscurity: an “opacity in transparency” (ibid.: 100). If we add to the qualities of 
shimmering and opacity the awareness that the ontological condition of affecting 
and being affected is not passive, it is possible to say that ambiguity can be per-
formed. 
The step from the performance of affect through ambiguity to the perfor-
mance of encryption was a simple one to make. Recalling the context of political 
surveillance captured by Koelsch’s installation based on Figes’ book The Whis-
perers, specific contemporary examples can ground what may seem like an ab-
stract aesthetic argument. In an interview with journalist Carole Cadwalladr, 
Laura Poitras makes explicit the parallels with contemporary digital surveillance, 
when each person’s Google search terms are a psychogram of their thoughts. 
“I’m so careful about that”, says Poitras, and she provides a small glimpse of her 
own practices: “I use different computers for different uses.” And throughout 
Berlin, the city where Poitras now lives in order to obtain a modicum of personal 
privacy, “there are people working on ways to fight the technology with technol-
ogy; who’ve devised the crypto equivalent of what, in the former German Dem-
ocratic Republic, was done by turning on the radio or running the tap.” (Cadwal-
ladr 2014: 8). 
Saying that affect is already a play of ambiguity means that it is imprecise, 
unintelligible or differently intelligible. This sense of creative or expressive un-
intelligibility, one might even say meaningful unintelligibility like running a tap 
of water to obscure one’s words, is a thread linking affect and ambiguity to en-
cryption. 
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PERFORMING NOISE 
 
Earlier I referred to the three whispers as a prologue, but this entire chapter can 
be seen as a prologue for a much wider research programme. This becomes 
clearer as I expand a working definition of encryption. Encryption is a set of 
practices that render confidential communication unintelligible, or intelligible 
only to those with whom we desire to communicate (Piper/Murphy 2002). Thus 
far, this is quite a standard definition but here it becomes more refined for per-
formance and affective exchanges: encryption is not a wall, it is a re-patterning, 
or a distortion, of a flow. There is a reason for using the expression performing 
encryption rather than performing cryptography: cryptography refers quite 
broadly to the history and science of keeping information or communication se-
cret, while encryption is a stage within this process. A plaintext (readable mes-
sage) is encrypted by means of an encryption algorithm (also called a key) into 
incomprehensible ciphertext, it is then decrypted by the designated recipient. 
Classic encryption systems were symmetrical, meaning the sender and the re-
ceiver had to know each other and use the same key, but the contemporary en-
cryption that underpins all confidential internet transactions (such as banking) is 
asymmetrical, meaning the sender and receiver do not need to know each other 
(cf. Piper/Murphy 2002: 4-8). Currently, the performance research being devel-
oped alongside further versions of AffeXity is a workshop series called Perform-
ing Encryption which aims to expand the poetic implications of asymmetric en-
cryption systems at the same time as trying to bridge the gulf between computa-
tional encryption processes and physical performance. Even the fairly open 
mode of a participatory performance felt too sealed to explore encryption. An 
exploration and development of the philosophical foundations, the politics and 
the performativity requires workshops conducted in a way that merges perfor-
mance and interaction design methodologies. We have begun by trying to break 
open what is essentially the black-box process of digital encryption, and to ad-
dress the psychological and technological hurdles to encryption.20 Of course this 
description in itself sounds cryptic, not just because of the early stages of the re-
search but due to the very nature of the topic. 
Matthew Fuller and Andrew Goffey, authors of Evil Media (2012) would say 
that this venture is entirely pointless because of the sophistication of dataveil-
lance algorithms and forensic computing technologies (cf. Fuller/Goffey 2012: 
31). Feeble, body-based attempts to obfuscate, loop, ambiguate or slide across 
                                                           
20  For a description of the workshop and an argument that closely follows the one in this 
chapter see Kozel (2016). 
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registers are futile in the face of big data capture, storage over time and data-
mining. No doubt this is true, and yet Snowdon reminds us:  
 
“Hey, we can spy on everybody in the world, all at once, it will be great we will know 
everything. […] But the reality is when the NSA did it they found out it didn’t work. […] 
The stored mass of all metadata […] two independent white house investigations revealed 
it has no value at all. It is never helpful.” (Snowden 2014a)  
 
So there is a fissure. A crack. In terms of affect this is enough. It may be a crack 
in the soil, or a ripple of dissonance in cultural discourse. It is a shimmer. A 
small opening for performing otherwise.  
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Mobile phone signals and  
protest crowds 
Performing an unstable post-media constellation 
OLIVER LEISTERT 
 
Only crowds have acted, only crowds have 
changed things.  
PIT SCHULTZ 
 
THE CAPTURE OF AFFECT AND HIGH  
FREQUENCY MODULATION 
 
Twenty years after Pit Schultz’ praise of the exclusive agency of the crowd,1 the 
relation between the individual and the crowd has become a matter of digital 
processing. New levels of affective production, captured by new levels of con-
tinuous over-coding of the resulting affective intensities into regimes of equiva-
lence and control, become the trajectories of our media-technological environ-
ment under the aegis of contemporary capitalism. Today, sociality amongst local 
peers passes through data silos on the other side of the planet. Never before have 
topologies of sociality been put under such a geo-spatial spreading.  
Prior to this spread routing, sociality undergoes multiple and rigid formatting 
procedures to fit into digitally viable regimes of expression. Contemporary sub-
jects, who are constantly mediating their modes and modalities of expression 
with the corporate social media platforms’ interfaces and their mobile devices, 
                                                           
1  “Techno: Psycho-Social Tumult” published in the archives of the 2nd next five 
minutes website, from 1996. See: http://www.tacticalmediafiles.net/n5m2/media/texts/ 
schultz.htm 
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are amassing and stratifying this dispersed and dissected socius as if it were a 
collective search for a new metastability. 
This reciprocal processing and production of affective signals between sub-
jects and machines indicates a new formation of techno-regimes of expressions 
that tap into previously uncharted sources for soft social engineering and control. 
Likewise the multi-faceted and complex dependencies that ultimately rest on 
such algorithmic processing of social relations are also important. One such de-
pendency is the availability of individually-modulated electromagnetic signals. 
The Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), the 3rd generation 
mobile cellular system based on GSM, operates in Europe somewhere in the 
range of 1900 MHz (uplink) and 2100 MHz (downlink). It is via such frequency 
modulations that contemporary subjects turn into physically isolated and anony-
mous, but bodily connected and personalized subjects.  
This split, where affective modulation takes place independently of physical 
co-presence, addressing the person by frequency modulation while enforcing the 
subjects’ physical isolation, effects the becoming of crowds today. Following 
Spinoza, affects support or diminish the agency of bodies. Affect modulates a 
body’s ability to relate and its spectrum of relationalities. The becoming of 
crowds used to rely on affective relations between physically co-present bodies; 
yet in the paradigm of digital connectivity, affect seems to have abandoned the 
necessity of physically-bodily co-presence.  
Its translatability into computable vectors of individual control, deterritorial-
ized by pulsed modulations of high frequencies, asks for a new investigation into 
the problem of the crowd. What is the effect of multiple physical-bodily co-
presences in combination with individualizing mobile media circuits of affect? 
How can a highly individualizing media technology be turned into a crowd (war) 
machine? This text is my first exploration of such complex mobile media assem-
blages, whose functionalities install both harsh limits and new paths for collec-
tive enunciations as presented by the problem of the crowd.  
My aim is to investigate if and how, ‘post-media’, a concept that Félix Guat-
tari coined somewhere in the late 1970s after his Radio Alice pirate radio experi-
ences, is applicable to the emergence of crowds in the age of ubiquitous mobile 
data. Guattari was rather optimistic in regard to new media constellations after or 
in parallel with the era of centralized mass media. In his intense search for de-
vices that would help the individuated subject of enunciation to become a collec-
tive assemblage of enunciation with others, he regarded emerging media tech-
nologies, such as the Minitel in France, as at least promising candidates for “a 
site of desire driven by dissensus yet composing a collective diagram of com-
monalities” (Genosko 2013: 15). Post-media for Guattari, then incorporates the 
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possibilities for “innovative forms of dialogue and collective interactivity” that 
finally would lead to “[t]he multiplication to infinity of ‘existential operators’, 
permitting access to mutant creative universes” (Guattari 2009: 299). Post-media 
assemblages, in other words, can provide means for existential reconfigurations 
opening new universes of references for the affected subjects via dissensual col-
lective problematizations. 
Working with the notion of post-media today means to transpose and rework 
it into the contemporary media-technological situation. It is obvious that the pre-
calculated pseudo-individual ‘choices’ that corporate social media or other so-
phisticated platforms offer, have nothing in common with Guattari's post-media 
concept. The search for post-media devices for the production of collective as-
semblages of enunciation certainly has not become easier since ubiquitous mo-
bile data connectivity and corporate data silos have inscribed themselves into the 
very core of contemporary post-fordist subjectivities, as instigators of a govern-
mental soft-imperative of participation (cf. Wiedemann 2011; Bröckling et al. 
2011). 
But as I will show, a new perspective, a decentering of perspectives, be-
comes possible once different components of the mobile phone infrastructure are 
taken into account, such as the frequency modulation components, and concep-
tually understood as possible post-media devices. While this certainly seems to 
be an odd change of view of mobile phones and their infrastructures, it nonethe-
less follows the idea that an escape, a line of flight, in Guattari’s terminology, 
from the perpetual over-coding of desire by the capitalist production of subjec-
tivity, involves a destabilization of the dominant signifying regimes that capture 
affect for algorithmic modulations. 
 
 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF PROTEST CROWDS INTO  
MEDIA ASSEMBLAGES: PROTEST CULTURES BETWEEN 
CONJUNCTION AND CONNECTION 
 
Much has already been written about the new protest cultures that are saturated 
with digital and mobile communication technologies and how these are changing 
the very nature of activism and protests (cf. Dencik/Leistert 2015; Milan 2015; 
Renzi 2015; specifically for mobile phones and protest cf. Leistert 2013). New 
temporalities, modes and models of protest and its (non-)organizational struc-
tures have emerged, intensifying the crisis of the old institutional models and 
producing tensions with those of established large social movements. This cul-
ture of new new media activism has embraced networked mobile digital devices 
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without hesitation. It has integrated all kinds of digital tools into its workshop ar-
senal and employs the vast corporate database empires it relies on as scattered, 
voluminous containers, to be filled with all kinds of jabber, desires and aspira-
tions. In addition, this new mobile media protest culture frequently occupies cen-
tral urban plazas, thereby temporarily overthrowing the order of consumerism 
and installing a new public. 
This around-the-clock, week-long presence of thousands of protesters on the 
occupied squares show and emblematize their societal situation of joblessness or 
precariousness and their yearning for a new collectivity. Nonetheless, such en-
during presences of large crowds in urban centers, not long ago an exceptional 
situation for most European cities, soon lost their evening TV news-value and 
were degraded into just another snapshot of young people without jobs.  
This recurrent attraction of central squares for these new protest cultures in-
dicates that at their dissensual core, they are very much imbued by a rather tradi-
tional political imaginary, which materializes through its traditional concept of 
hierarchic territories: to seek out the central squares as incubators of (non-/anti-) 
politics echoes a modern idea of power as locatable and centralized. This loca-
tional expression of modernity manifested itself at many recent and enduring 
protests in Europe and North America.  
Such a choice of territorialization stands in odd contrast to a second emblem 
of the new protest cultures: the negation of representation, or at least a tremen-
dous doubt, and often refusal of the installed representational or authoritarian re-
gimes along with their configuration of discourses.  
It is interesting to look at these two elements combined – the magnetism of 
central urban squares and the denial of the classical modern model of representa-
tion – because together they mirror the current and devastating conditions of 
habitat and the miserable and demeaning quality of political discourse for the 
population: while it has become altogether impossible for most younger individ-
uals to live in centrally-located (shared) flats, the hegemonic discourse distribut-
ed permanently through all media channels has nothing to offer but the old zom-
bie tales of happiness through consumption and thus continues to poison and al-
ienate language, perception and empathy. In short, it cuts the young people off 
from pragmatic experiments of collective enunciations.  
In this sense, the agglomeration of bodies – sitting, singing, lying, sleeping, 
moving and slacking on central urban places, while they shuffle data around the 
globe with wiping digit gestures – echoes a desire to escape the confinements of 
solitary apartments and mini-flats in the urban outskirts, and become re-affected 
by the proximity and intensity of a public multiplicity. At the same time, the 
dominant signifying regimes that adhere to the capitalist mode of semiotization – 
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naturalizing capitalism’s hold over life – have lost their addressees. One could 
say that the newly-built territory (square) is primarily constituted by an inversion 
of quality and quantity: the production of a new space, made of and for proxi-
mate bodies and affective resonance, overcomes the scarcity of inhabitable 
room, imposed by capitalist gentrification and displacement, while a language 
that is able to resonate with the emerging collectivity of bodies, that invites new 
experimental modes of expression, such as collective polymodal uttering, begins 
to be pragmatically invented within the duration of the protest.  
 
 
BODILY CONJUNCTION VERSUS BODILY CONNECTION 
 
Guattari relates the emergence of the body to the possibility of a process of sin-
gularization:  
 
“When the body emerges as such […] it’s because we find ourselves at a certain cross-
roads of articulation between, on the one hand, assemblages that are potentially productive 
of a singular possible and, on the other hand, social assemblages, collective facilities that 
expect a certain normalizing adaptation.” (Guattari/Rolnik 2008: 409-410) 
 
The emergence and endurance of unordered bodies thus correlates with an oscil-
lation, a shift from ordered, structured and normalized signifying semiologies to 
a-signifying semiotics. ‘A-signifying semiotics’ is the most radical element of 
Guattari's reconception of semiotics (cf. 2013), since it “works flush with the re-
al” and has “direct purchase on the continuum of material flows in the purport’” 
(Bosteels 2001: 899). Because they (re-)open the possibility of new diagramatic 
pathways for an encoding and decoding of the material flux, they are strategic 
elements for the machinic production of new universes of reference and their ar-
ticulation within collective assemblages of enunciation. During such processes, 
individuated subjects delocalize and deprivatize, while at the same time, deterri-
torialize into new machinic conjunctions which construct new modes of sensibil-
ity and relation to the other through problematic interactions and changes in per-
ception, expression (e.g. polyvocality, gestures) and affect.  
The important operator at work in such a cycle of transformation is conjunc-
tive. Conjunctions of abstract machines and material fluxes free and singularize 
the production of desire from the tyranny of the signifiers, from the rule of the 
law, from “national, familial, personal, racial, humanist, and transcendent val-
ues” (Genosko 2002: 170).  
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While a conjunction provides lines of flight from the representational regimes of 
signification and self-identification through new diagrammatic pathways, a dif-
ferent operator is at work in contemporary media-technological environments by 
default - connectivity along with its governmentally linked companion participa-
tion. This powerful duo has brought the subjectivities of self-governance to an 
unforeseen level of productivity and established a frame of reference. Function-
ally integrating networked devices in the subjectivities’ milieu, that continually 
produce, monitor and replay a quasi unalterable feed of pseudo-individual inten-
sities (affects) and their modulations, connectivity has become the main modal 
operator of self-identification and capitalism’s production of subjectivity. Invest-
ed with captures of affect through current media-technologies, connectivity or-
ganizes a discrete continuum of redundancies with small deviations that calibrate 
such subjectivity according to the empty networked world time of flat infinity, 
while it strategically mobilizes its creativity and self-control for capitalist modes 
of exploitation (cf. Lazzarato 2014).  
By constantly producing affective intensities, delivered from a physically-
absent social network, connectivity effectively splits the physical and bodily uni-
verses of individuals. Connectivity, as continued and productive sociality, dislo-
cates the individual from its physicality, which now turns into a reservoir of ten-
sions rather than a foundation. The new milieu of body and dislocated, algorith-
mically-processed, but connected sociality subdues the physical proximities of 
the body as an impossible, incompatible alterity. The body becomes quasi absent 
from its physical locality and proximities as its affection is organized by packets 
of data that are wireless, hidden and ephemeral. The physicality of the body and 
its conjunctive capacity is hereby depreciated and degraded. This split of the 
body, as I call it, is a pragmatic solution on the conceptual level for the descrip-
tion of a body that is situated locally in the physical sense, but claimed socially 
through affect modulation by a mobile device. Tensions occur because the body 
has to negotiate two distinct temporalities and two distinct kinds of durations, 
one as a body within its local milieu, and one as a body within its networked mi-
lieu. 
 
 
FROM FREQUENCY MODULATION TO DISSENSUAL  
POST-MEDIA ASSEMBLAGES 
 
This unprecedented roll-out of technologies of affective capture and modulation 
rests on a combination of cellular and wired networking infrastructure that man-
ages the populations’ connectivity – its sensing and probing. In Europe today, 
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wireless communication infrastructures cover most of the urban and suburban 
terrain, effectively becoming environmental to city dwellers, and sinking into the 
collective unconscious.  
But ubiquitous mobile data connectivity for the masses had to be engineered 
and designed under complex and demanding conditions of frequency scarcity 
and heavy competition. The 1st and 2nd generation mobile telephony standards of-
fered far too slow and not enough mobile data connectivity for the deterritorial-
izing forces of neoliberalism’s restructuring of capital accumulation. The 3rd 
generation of mobile telephony standards, such as UMTS, flushed open the gates 
to total connectivity for the individualized mass and thus supported and brought 
new powers to the fully pseudo-individuated production of contemporary subjec-
tivity, a kind of mass template individualization. 
The engineering task to provide data rates which would allow for an affect 
modulation of as many bodies as simultaneously present within the range of the 
cell, was solved via a micro-fragmentation of the signal on the level of two or-
ders: time division and code division. By combining these channel access meth-
ods into the Time Division Code Division Multiple Access (TD-CDMA) meth-
od, essentially two things happen: within increments of 5 MHz (spread spectrum, 
code division) a radio frame with a duration of 10 milliseconds is divided into 15 
time slots (time division, 1500 per second) (cf. Forkel/Jin 2002).  
Code division offers temporarily predetermined slices of frequency to each 
receiving body: an operation of allocation by division. It basically allocates 
pockets for temporary use within the frequencies of UMTS. Time division fur-
ther folds and discriminates the signal, allowing multiple passageways for affec-
tive transportation within bursts of 10 milliseconds divided by 15 slots.  
A UMTS connection therefore oscillates within the range of 5 MHz and 
modulates time down to steady units of 10 milliseconds, offering 15 slots. This is 
one of the ontological foundations for the affective mobilization of the individu-
ally discriminated population. Bursts of 10 milliseconds divided by 15 within a 
range of 5 MHz are its material-energetic layer and thus its ‘onto-pacer’. 
This hyper-nervous electromagnetic signal pulsating far beyond human ca-
pacities to register, has become the carrier system for large parts of today’s soci-
ality. Whatever other layers or protocols it modulates with, it does so within an 
extraordinarily fast and jumpy time-frame. In addition, all of this perfectly syn-
chronized and coordinated time and code shifting is happening at a frequency 
rate around 1900 MHz and 2100 MHz.  
Such electromagnetic manipulations, where “[s]ignal is energetic and its 
force and matter persist outside our attempts to encode and decode it” (Munster 
2014: 154) effectively provide “the nexus between a-signifying and signifying 
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flows in contemporary regimes governed by real time media”, as Anna Munster 
(ibid.: 158) suggests, following Maurizio Lazzarato’s philosophy of the video 
signal (cf. Lazzarato 2002). Indeed, the signaletic qualities of wireless transmis-
sions offer a bridge between different regimes of a-signifying and signifying 
processes.  
 
“The difference between a signal, a hormonal signal for example, and a linguistic sign, lies 
in the fact that the former produces no signification, engenders no stable system of redun-
dancy that would make it possible for anyone to see it as identical to any representation.” 
(Guattari 1984: 167) 
 
Accordingly, Munster proposes to focus on transmateriality as “matter in move-
ment, matter as relations of forces, matter as an energetics” (2014: 158) to un-
derstand the technological modulation of time as an unbecoming of time (cf. 
ibid.: 160) while it entails possibilities for modulations that are “aesthetico-
political and offer new possibilities for the signaletic” (ibid.: 160). Referring to 
Gilbert Simondon, Munster sketches transmateriality as “a metastable process 
that ontogenetically precedes a given material individuation. It denotes the po-
tential to become some individuated material as a result of differentiation trans-
forming this potentiality in the direction of a structuration” (ibid.: 159). And fur-
ther: “Transmaterial relations, then, are both the metastable, virtual ones of pure 
difference and the processual actualising ones of a singular materiality assem-
bling” (ibid.: 159). 
Taking up this proposal and applying it to the electromagnetic UMTS mobile 
phone signals that permeate protest crowds, the full spectrum of de- and reterri-
torializing processes which control the becoming of crowds and their disintegra-
tion into individualized subjects, becomes perceivable, because the subject “in 
contact with desiring machines in a-signifying semiotics oscillates between reter-
ritorializations on signification and deterritorializations into new machinic con-
junctions” (Genosko 2002: 171). 
In other words: by situating signaletic energies as ontological relation from 
which processes of individuation (Simondon) or machinic conjunctions (Guat-
tari) actualize, the problem of significational semiotic regimes presents itself on-
ly as a particular phasing of the material-energetic modulations, calling into 
question what other phasings the modulation virtually entails and what is needed 
to bring them into actualization. Situating signifying semiotical processes as par-
ticular phasings of a larger repertoire of a-signifying and signifying regimes, 
whereby each establishes circuits between the actual possibilities, the actual real, 
the virtual possibilities and the virtual real (depending on the degrees of machin-
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ic integration) shows how the becoming of crowds as an a-signifying deterritori-
alization process and processes of capture and control provided by signifying 
semiotic registers of messaging, together belong to a dissensual post-media as-
semblage. As a precarious and unstable multiplicity of actual and virtual func-
tions, the tensions within such an assemblage are becoming apparent only after 
actualization, or rephasing.  
Inseparable from these couplings and decouplings within post-media assem-
blages of protest crowds and mobile phones, are affective pathways of bodily 
resonances, to which I turn now. 
 
 
AFFECT AS HETEROGENESIS AND SOCIAL SERIALIZATION 
 
So far, I have only vaguely indicated the concept of affect used here. In order to 
connect the becoming of crowds with the ultra-fast modulated material energetic 
layers of mobile data connectivity, the concept of affect needs some clarification.  
From Spinoza (2002) to Gilles Deleuze (1990), from William James (1884) 
to Brian Massumi (2002), affect is characterized as an intensity relating to bodily 
activities in movement that register in pre-individual strata, whereas emotion is 
delegated to the reflexivity of individualized subjects. Advocates of the affective 
turn, such as Patricia Clough, tend to install affect as the base of all sociality: 
“sociality is a matter of affective transmissions across bodies in a machinic as-
semblage with technology and technical arrangements” (2010: 225).  
This resonates with Guattari, for whom “[a]ffect is thus essentially a pre-
personal category, installed ‘before’ the circumscription of identities, and mani-
fested by unlocatable transferences, unlocatable with regard to their origin as 
well as with regard to their destination” (1996: 158). The power of this category 
resides in its “process of existential appropriation through the continual creation 
of heterogeneous durations of being” (ibid.: 159) and thus “is an instance of the 
engendering of the complex, a processuality in the throes of birth, a place for 
mutational becomings”, arising “from intensive and intentional categories, which 
correspond to an existential self-positioning” (ibid.: 160). Clough suggests that 
the “temporality of affect is to be understood in terms of thresholds, bifurcation, 
and emergence” (Clough 2009: 50), invoking rhetorics from complexity theory, 
another link to Guattari’s conceptual language. 
But Guattari, who developed his concepts and theories vis-à-vis his clinical 
and political activities, distinguishes affects according to their onto-relationality: 
sensory affects may effect feelings of being, whereas problematic affects effect 
active ways of being (cf. Guattari 1996: 167). In addition, “affect is not a mas-
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sively elementary energy but the deterritorialized matter of enunciation” (ibid.: 
174). By subsuming affect into his modes of enunciation, Guattari can provide a 
scheme of affect functors that operates “just as well in the sense of an individua-
tion as of a social serialization” (ibid.: 174). He proposes the concept of the ri-
tornello as mediator of affect, working as  
 
“[…] reiterative discursive sequences that are closed in upon themselves and whose func-
tion is an extrinsic catalyzing of existential affects. Ritornellos can find substance in 
rhythmic and plastic forms, in prosodic segments, in facial traits, in the emblems of recog-
nition, in leitmotifs, signatures, proper names or their invocational between equivalents.” 
(ibid.: 162) 
 
As the list of substantiations shows, for Guattari, affect as pure intensity, a 
common phrase used by protagonists of the affective turn, would be beyond the 
scope of his pragmatism. Affect needs mediation (or it remains “proto-
enunciation” (ibid.: 166) and depending on the kind of mediation it may effect 
radically different enunciations. Ritornellos mediate affects: problematic affects 
adhere to content ritornellos (relating enunciation and the form of the content), 
whereas sensory affects adhere to ritornellos of expression (relating enunciation 
and the form of the expression).2 Guattari thus manages to deploy a pragmatic 
rather than speculative use of the problem of affect. I will return to this pragmat-
ics at the end when I try to show how crowd becomings and mobile phone sig-
nals can be described as alterations within different fields of enunciations. But to 
get there, the problem of the crowd needs to be addressed. 
 
 
THE PRECARIOUS ONTOGENESIS OF THE CROWD  
AND ITS ACCOUNTS 
 
By turning to the problem of the crowd, the first step is to conceptualize crowds 
as situated, historically and locally specific and ontologically unstable. Thus, the 
works of Le Bon (2001), Canetti (1981), or Tarde (1903), which come to mind 
first, have little to offer in terms of an analysis of contemporary crowds (cf. Kø-
lvraa 2015). To regain insights from their accounts, one would first have to dis-
assemble, deconstruct and subtract the many layers of bourgeois resentments 
against the imagined destabilizing forces of crowds they are impregnated with. 
                                                           
2  Indeed, Guattaris deployment of affect is much more complex than it can be sketched 
here (cf. Guattari 1996).  
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Becoming crowd, the machinic singularization as conjunctions of bodies that de-
velop their own temporalities, durations, rhythms and so forth, relate to these 
classic descriptions of crowds (whether openly pejorative as with Le Bon, eso-
teric as with Tarde, or agonizing as with Canetti) much like early ethnographic 
descriptions to their other (the primitive). It is the same cosmological and onto-
logical disjunction between researcher and researched. 
Much the same applies to contemporary descriptions of crowds in social psy-
chology. Of course, “[t]he energy of the crowd invests it with a transformatory 
potential” (Reicher 2001: 213). But to model a crowd by proposing that “crowd 
members seek to construe a contextual identity by reference to and within the 
limits set by the superordinate categorical identity” (ibid.: 195) only shows the 
continuing modernist fixation on identity in this discourse, which necessarily 
leads to the fatal misconception of crowds as made up by crowd members that 
are occupied with identity formation. Quite the contrary, the crowd is naturally 
indiscriminate. Bodies of a crowd, as seen from the outside, constitute it, but 
they are undergoing an ontogenetic process of becoming, that precisely subtracts 
identity and self-reference from them. 
Christian Borch investigates the precarious state of the crowd within sociol-
ogy and seeks “to trace the evolution of sociological crowd semantics” (ibid.: 4). 
He argues that a problematization of crowds is “essentially a problematization of 
modern society and its social and political set-up” (ibid.: 15). Thus, he investi-
gates, amongst other themes, how the problem of the crowd has been instrumen-
tal in designating disciplinary boundaries between sociology and psychology, or 
as a means “to define proper approaches, methodologies, conceptual frame-
works, etc. within sociology” (ibid.: 300). The crowd thus served as a medium 
and mirror for the constitution and development of sociology. I would add that, 
given the crowd’s dynamics and ontological finitude, it has a tendency to escape 
all Western modes of thought that ground themselves in stasis and being, and 
thus the crowd consequently must remain at the margins of analysis. 
In more general terms, which suffice for the portrait presented here, it is 
enough to understand that if bodies are socially and culturally produced, and if 
media-technologies play a key part in their formation, crowds, too, are subjected 
to socially and culturally-specific historical structuration. 
In addition, as the ontogenetic principle of a crowd’s becoming is relational, 
they offer varying vectors for capture, colonization and serialization, provided 
by their historical milieus. Fascism, to name just one example, learned to serial-
ize crowds into disciplined masses of bodies without triggering their refragmen-
tation into individuals.  
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The capture of the war machine by the state, in many ways resembles this pro-
cess on a larger scale (cf. Deleuze/Guattari 1987: 351-422).  
The becoming crowd unfolds on a spatial plane, which it tries to colonize 
(square) as milieu. It relies on affective modulations with and within its envi-
ronment through a multitude of perceptive pathways. Crowds resonate within 
their environmental conditions which are never under the control of the crowd, 
forcing the crowd to continually reinvent their becoming according to environ-
mental factors. For example, darkness at night affects a crowd in its becoming, 
because it diminishes the visual as the primary affective gate to the body, while 
it increases affective capacities of spatial hearing. A crowd in open daylight is 
exposed to the individualizing visual senses that infer a separate tendency from 
their continuous rendering of discrete objects. If, on the other hand, it is spatial 
hearing that leads the orientation, a continuous multiplicity of sounds and echoes 
enforces a process of singularization.  
The problem of the visual for crowds is common knowledge and led to the 
invention of strategic devices to mitigate it. Amongst such devices are the Black 
Bloc’s monochromatism which weakens identificational trajectories. This is not 
only a strategy to decrease identification by police. It serves the becoming crowd 
fundamentally by weakening capacities to visually discriminate altogether. 
Many more such devices have been invented, ranging from strategic applica-
tions of sound and music, to the emergence of bodily movements freed from in-
dividualized pacing. Alterations in the body’s chemical composition show that a 
crowd’s becoming takes place even on the molecular level of neurotransmitters 
such as serotonin and dopamine. 
Since temporal and rhythmic alterations are amongst the most powerful rela-
tional affective registers for crowds, the most common means to bring about the 
death of a crowd is to withdraw its access to the temporal or to movement in 
general. Within an instant, a crowd falls apart if it is submitted to a standstill 
from outside, as crowd control police knows very well. But it would be wrong to 
infer from this a shortcoming or weakness of the crowd.  
Crowds, as opposed to individuals, assume their finite nature and thus in-
crease the value of their becoming (cf. Guattari/Rolnik 2008: 430). Their capaci-
ty to disintegrate under hostile environmental conditions is their necessary con-
dition to become again, but of course differently, since each becoming is singu-
lar.  
Unstable and precarious processes of crowd becoming hint towards the eth-
ics of crowds, one that the individual occupied by capitalist subjectivity lacks, 
since death is barred within the void of self-referential identities. By producing 
temporalities that are intrinsically linked to its becoming and occupying bodily 
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conjunct territories as milieus, the deadly passage towards transcendental refer-
ences is blocked. The crowd has established “devices that can articulate living 
processes” (ibid.: 216) from within, including its own universe of reference. 
 
 
THE PHASE-SHIFTING VECTORS OF MOBILE PHONES:  
A SCENARIO  
 
As I have outlined, current protest cultures have embraced the governmental as-
semblages of connectivity and participation, manifested in a split of bodily pres-
ence: digital networking organizes and modulates bodily affect from a distance 
while the physical-bodily presence depends on its surrounding and proximate 
milieu. As such, mobile phone use is the antidote of crowds: it addresses the in-
dividual and thus reinvokes it each time it interferes with the development of 
dispersed, but resonating bodily temporalities and movements, and finally, with 
collective assemblages of enunciation. In the context of crowds, mobile phones 
are first of all a disruptive vector, interfering with the powers and on the level of 
individualizing affects and semiotic regimes of subjugation. 
But it would be wrong to understand this as a necessarily total rupture. Three 
considerations have to be taken into account here: in contrast to a forced stand-
still, as executed by the police, such an interference is soft and it retains a degree 
of openness towards a-signifying processes. Second, critical data that ultimately 
may prolong the becoming of crowd can inform it through messaging channels. 
And third, the signifying phase of mobile devices is only one of many phases 
that such high-frequency modulation constantly emits into the environment. The 
a-signifying matter-energy modulation itself needs to be accounted for in this 
context as a nexus of machinic assemblages. To illustrate all three considera-
tions, what follows is an example of a very common situation for protest crowds, 
from where each consideration becomes clear. 
In this scenario, all of a sudden a mass sending of text messages to the crowd 
begins, that provides logistical information. This sending has to actualize the re-
lay of individual “nodes”, and in this very moment, the affective distributions of 
the crowd are reorganizing themselves. They organize according to a split of the 
body into a bodily-message-receiving milieu and physical-bodily remnant of 
proximity on which the relational ontogenesis of the crowd continues to depend. 
But before the reading of the message finalizes the individual’s actualization, it 
is the phone that articulates its presence through vibrations or sounds. So, first, 
the crowd vibrates and rings within a small time-frame that, transposed onto the 
spatial dimensions of the crowd, jumps from here to there within the occupied 
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space. The signalling is distributed within the spatial plane of the crowd and ac-
tualizes the individuals non-synchronously, because each phone receives the 
message slightly de-phased in relation to any other. The interfering vector does 
not attack the crowd at once, but only segments or dispersed, physically unor-
dered blocks, patches. The becoming of crowd thus continues as such, but it has 
to endure local conflicts between the two affective orderings of connection and 
conjunction that are signalled through ring tones or vibration. But there is more 
to this signalling phase: in the course of locally jumping signalling within the 
crowd, the redundancy of the message is expressed. This in itself informs the be-
coming of the crowd, since the signal can be ignored by large blocks of the 
crowd without any loss of information.  
Second, how much bodily split is effectuated by the phone’s intervention? 
Effectively, not much consciousness is needed for building a path between a de-
vice and the eyes, rather non-conscious bodily gestures, such as setting up the 
device for use. Thus, plenty of local phone–body machinic assemblages emerge 
within the crowd. 
The next bit of the signalling path is complicated for the crowd: the message 
has to be read, which means a completely different register, one of semiotic sig-
nification, is invoked. Such an invocation and its outcome highly depends on the 
message received. In the context of this scenario, the message contains traffic in-
formation, relating to activities by the police who are installing a capturing 
blockade ahead of the crowd. This is a message of ultra affective intensity in 
such a situation and since its value is intrinsically linked to the physical-bodily 
other of the split body, it translates from connection to conjunction within in-
stance. The invocation of the semiotic registers can resonate intensively with the 
a-signifying machinic singularization of the crowd. Or, put otherwise, the 
crowd's information by the message, in Simondon’s sense, actualizes its individ-
uation, and without further hesitation, the crowd knows in which direction to 
proceed (cf. Simondon 2007). Once a critical saturation of this affection within 
the crowd has been reached, this mutual, common knowledge can not be sepa-
rated from action anymore, it invokes a new ontogenetical structuration of the 
crowd. The crowd has been altered in that this information is now redirecting the 
crowd. The message received was in its fullest sense a proceed signal, not a stop 
signal.  
Finally, the signalling path of matter-energy modulation in high frequencies 
not only provides this particular phasing of semiotic signification, but is com-
prised of bursts of milliseconds jumping within a code-controlled oscillation 
range. This means that each mobile device’s signal path is de-phased in relation 
to the path of every other mobile device addressed by the cell. The matter-energy 
MOBILE PHONE SIGNALS AND PROTEST CROWDS | 151 
 
modulation at one moment thus may contain hundreds, if not thousands, of phase 
shifts and time bursts that ontologically integrate into the assemblage of crowd 
and phones, as expressed by a de-phased and locally unordered ringing and vi-
brating. The infra-allocation of one phase for each individual signal corresponds 
to the inference caused by each signal within the crowd. And the signal stream in 
its totality that emanates from the cell tower, turns into a multiplicity of redun-
dancies. This stream depends on the powers of at least 3rd generation mobile 
networking technologies, as I have explained above. By solving the addressabil-
ity of crowds with multiple time-shifting bursts, connectivity regains conjunctive 
qualities. This is most certainly news to the telecom providers.  
 
 
CONCLUSION: MOBILES AND CROWDS  
AS POST-MEDIA ASSEMBLAGES  
 
If “post-media emphasize the modular and open process of the production of 
subjectivity at the heart of each media-inflected process” (Brunner/Nigro/Raunig 
2013: 13), it is important to consider the whole spectrum that is at work in such a 
process. If semiotic signification is separated from the flux of other semiotics, as 
so forcefully and repeatedly criticized by Guattari (cf. Guattari 2013), machinic 
becoming oscillates towards re-serialization. I have shown that only if the com-
plete multi-phased material-energetic modulation of UMTS is made explicit and 
its operative functors within the assemblage of crowds and mobile devices as a 
redundancy of locally shifting signalling paths shown, it is only then that an in-
dividualizing media technology such as mobile devices, may itself transform into 
a tool to prolong the alterity of the crowd, supporting conjunctions. 
For Guattari “the shift from mass into post-media would not be sequential 
and definitive but coexistent, contestatory, and messy” (Genosko 2013: 15). Yet, 
there is more to it, if we want to use the notion of post-media: this contribution 
situates this shift along the axis of individualizing media technologies and shows 
how co-existent the problem of post-media remains in a post-mass media assem-
blage. But if media here relates to “the production of a completely different mid-
dle”, one that “take[s] part in the production of sociality and become in a new 
sense social media” (Raunig 2012: n. pag.), it is because the bodily split en-
forced by mobile data connectivity becomes transformed into conjunctive multi-
ple bodily processes. Such a performative agency adheres to the transformative 
powers of becoming crowd while successfully integrating the powers of mobile 
data connectivity. This coupling of two predominantly distinct ontological 
spheres exhibits a performativity that spans from the high frequency modulation 
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of digital signals to the indiscriminable multiple bodies of the crowd. To show 
the performativity of this post-media assemblage with its two modal operators, 
connection and conjunction, it was necessary to interrogate the media technology 
in operation, down to its material-energetic layer. Each media technology oper-
ates under specific time modulations (cf. Ernst 2013) and each wireless media 
technology provides specific modes of frequency distribution which have critical 
effects on machinic becomings and singularizations, such as the problem of the 
crowd.  
In addition, a more comprehensive account of effecting vectors safeguards 
the analysis from a blunt speculative thrust. Such a speculative programmatic, as 
provided by Nigel Thrift (2008), or partly by Clough, which indeed helps to map 
the conceptual landscape of affect studies, often has an open flank towards, if not 
mysticism, then at least analytical opacity. Or, to put it otherwise: the “what it 
effects” question, which was necessary to establish affect as a promising and 
challenging theoretical horizon and tool, needs to be supplemented with the 
question of “how it effects”– just like semiotic signification must be extended 
towards a-signifying semiotics to sense its potentials. 
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Mapping

 
 
Mapping invisibility 
Surveillance art and the potential of performative cartography 
SIGRID MERX 
 
 
A man guides us through Amsterdam. We follow him. He stops at every traffic 
light, carefully waiting for it to turn green, even if there is no traffic to be seen. 
During our four-hour walk, he tells us about his life in Africa and why he decid-
ed to leave his country to try to build a life in Europe. We ask him questions. He 
replies. After a while we stand in front of the public library. The man says he 
loves the library. The calm atmosphere of people reading and studying. The 
knowledge that is piled up in there. The fact that there is free internet. And that it 
is one of the few places in the city where it is quiet, no one bothers you and you 
can take a short nap. The man explains how entering this public building without 
a library card has become increasingly difficult. A card you can only obtain with 
a Dutch passport or other identity papers. Documents he doesn’t possess.  
The group is carrying a recording device documenting the conversation and a 
mobile phone with a mapping application that traces our walk in real-time. 
Somewhere else in a cultural venue in the city centre, people look at a projection 
screen that shows a map of the city centre of Amsterdam. A blue line crawls 
through the streets. That’s us. The longer we stand still at a certain location, such 
as the library, the more the line thickens, transforming into a dot. Other lines 
trace other groups that are simultaneously walking through the city with their 
guides, jointly creating a collective map. When our tour ends, our conversation is 
made available online as an audio download. People can only ‘unlock’ the story 
on their mobile phone by physically standing on the exact starting point of the 
walk and following the exact same route. Deviating from the route results in the 
voices fading out. In order to engage with the story, the audience is required to 
literally and carefully retrace the steps of the undocumented person and his or 
her movements.  
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Figure 1: Screenshot Map from ‘Mapping Invisibility’ 
© Naomi Bueno de Mesquita 
 
I have been participating in ‘Mapping Invisibility’, a workshop on performative 
digital mapping designed by spatial designer Naomi Bueno de Mesquita 
(TRADERS)1 in collaboration with Platform-Scenography.2 The workshop is 
part of Out of State, a four-day cultural program with performances and public 
debates about the practical consequences of Dutch immigration policies for im-
migrants. Based on my experience as a participant, this short text aims to reflect 
on the potential of such a performative cartography to produce a space for civic 
engagement. To do so, I will pay particular attention to practices of walking as 
acts of both social engagement and co-producing the city, and I will position the 
workshop within the framework of surveillance art. The framework of surveil-
lance art helps to point out the critical and subversive nature of the project and 
                                                           
1  TRADERS (short for ‘Training Art and Design Researchers in Participation for Public 
Space’) researches the ways in which art and design researchers can ‘trade’ or ex-
change with multiple participants and disciplines in public space projects and – at the 
same time – trains them in doing so. Naomi Bueno de Mesquita is one of TRADERS’ 
PhD researchers. 
2  Platform Scenography, based in Rotterdam in the Netherlands, is an analogue and dig-
ital network by and for scenographers dedicated to scenographic thinking and working 
(cf. http://www.platform-scenography.nl/). 
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how digital surveillance technologies can be used to create alternative regimes of 
visibility and participation.  
 
 
WALKING AS A WAY OF PRODUCING THE CITY 
 
The act of walking the city lies at the heart of the project ‘Mapping Invisibility’. 
Walking functions both as method and content, both in terms of the workshop 
where participants walk the city collectively with a guide, and in terms of the 
audio tour where the participant walks the city individually. 
For most participants, walking the city is usually a matter of logistics (getting 
from A to B) and/or consumerism (shopping, culture, dining, tourism etc.) For 
the guides, however, the largest part of their day consists of walking around the 
city out of necessity. The so-called ‘bed, bath, bread policy’ ensures that undoc-
umented immigrants are entitled to a place to sleep during the night, where they 
can wash up in the morning and have a meal in the evening. During the day they 
are required to leave the shelter and to live on the streets, regardless of the 
weather. Since working is not an option for these people, they don’t have money 
to buy anything, and since standing still is potentially dangerous because it might 
identify them as ‘illegal’ immigrants, they are forced to pretty much just walk 
around all day. 
According to Michel de Certeau, to walk is to compose a path. What makes 
up the city is the collection of an innumerable amount of these intersecting paths 
(Certeau 1984: 97). The city space, Certeau suggests, is “actuated by the ensem-
ble of movements deployed within it” (ibid.: 117). Through their spatial practic-
es, the undocumented citizens participate as much in the production of the city as 
their documented counterparts. The idea that urban space is socially produced in 
and through our collective movements – an idea that has been theorized in most 
detail by Henri Lefebvre (1991, 1996) – has a distinct emancipatory potential. It 
suggests that the production of space is not limited to planners, bureaucrats and 
administrators, but takes place in the everyday activities of inhabitants and users. 
This is not to say, however, that our movements in the city are free and sponta-
neous. They are characterized by repetition and dictated by state and market-
modelled patterns of behaving and being. 
Lavrinec (2013: 25) describes this repetition of movement by urban citizens 
as the performance of a “routine choreography”. It might seem that the undocu-
mented somehow escapes these urban routines, wandering all day through the 
city, not working, not consuming, just being there, creating their own alternative 
paths. However, not following the predesignated paths, not performing the dom-
160 | SIGRID MERX 
 
inant choreography and not adopting to the rhythms of capitalist society is of 
course not a radical choice, but the ultimate and inevitable consequence of not 
being recognized and acknowledged as a citizen and therefore as a co-producer 
of the city. In a way, the urban trajectories performed by the undocumented are 
as much a form of routine choreography as are those of the other citizens. Most 
of them, as becomes clear in the conversations during the walk, have developed 
a set of routes and routines that they repeatedly use depending on their personal 
needs and desires. For example, if they want to be able to sit down for a while 
without calling attention to themselves they go to Central Station and mingle 
with the people who are waiting for a train. Or, as already indicated in the intro-
duction, if they need free Wi-Fi or take a nap, they can try to get into the public 
library and find themselves a reading booth. If they need God, they can go to a 
church. Their day ends by returning to their shelter. They wake up the next 
morning and continue with their daily routine. In this respect they are, to use a 
term by Certeau, ‘blind walkers’, strolling along predetermined paths without 
self-control and agency. 
 
 Figure 2: Workshop Mapping Invisibility 
 © Naomi Bueno de Mesquita 
 
Opposed to the figure of the blind walker we often find the ‘flâneur’, the urban 
stroller that counters the monotonous routines of everyday life in a capitalist so-
ciety. The Situationists believed the ‘flâneur’ to be critical and subversive in the 
sense that he wandered around without a specific aim or plan, adopting to anoth-
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er rhythm, allowing him to perceive and experience the city in a ‘new’ way (Sad-
ler 1999). We could consider the walk in this project as an urban drift in the tra-
dition of the Situationists; an unplanned urban journey that allows one to per-
ceive and experience the city in a new way and according to an alternative logic 
and to make a connection between urban settings and bodily-emotional experi-
ences of the city (Lavrinec 2013: 56). For the undocumented guide, not only is 
the city revealed as a social space, a place where you can encounter people in-
stead of hiding from them, but also as a public space in which you have the right 
to appear and to act. Walking others through the city becomes a political act. The 
participant of the workshop or the audio tour is invited to an alternative city tour 
with an unlikely guide and is thus confronted with a parallel and often unknown 
reality of exclusion, invisibility and oppression, and with an other that inhabits 
and lives this reality on a day to day basis. Co-performing these trajectories 
through the city thus disrupts the daily routines of both undocumented guides 
and documented participants; and it opens up a space of encounter between 
them. 
 
 
SURVEILLANCE ART 
 
Using strategies and technologies of digital mapping, tracing and tracking the 
project aimed at bringing undocumented and documented citizens together by 
making the everyday practice of walking in the city as an undocumented citizen 
visible and perceptible. Considering the particular use of surveillance tools and 
strategies, I propose to understand this project as an example of so-called ‘sur-
veillance art’.  
According to performance scholar Elise Morrison, surveillance art can be 
considered a particular genre of political activism and performance in which 
(digital) surveillance technologies, such as CCTV cameras and GPS devices, are 
used and appropriated to create “an array of technologically savvy, politically 
conscious and aesthetically innovative alternatives to the current structures of 
power and participation within surveillance society” (Morrison 2015: 126-127). 
Within the broad field of surveillance art and performance, Morrison (2015) 
distinguishes three ways in which surveillance art can interrupt and counter our 
contemporary surveillance society. First, through physical intervention in habit-
ual patterns of movement and usership as conditioned by state, military and cor-
porate design of surveillance interfaces. Secondly, through the appropriation of 
surveillance technologies for subversive ends. Thirdly, through critically high-
lighting blind spots in surveillance society. 
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Morrison’s examples of surveillance art range from performances like Tracking 
Transcience in which Hasan Elahi, having been spied on by the FBI on a regular 
basis, develops a website that updates his whereabouts every hour of the day on 
a world map; the Surveillance Camera Players, who develop plays for CCTV 
cameras; the Transborder Immigrant Tool, a tweaked cell phone that is rede-
signed to function as a GPS mobile device that helps Mexican immigrants safely 
cross the border; the iSee software developed by the activist-engineer collective, 
Institute for Applied Autonomy, that allows users to interactively map ‘the path 
of least surveillance’ through cities around the world. 
As Morrison stresses, surveillance not only entails a top-down process of 
discipline. In our everyday lives, using credit cards, webcams, tagging our pic-
tures on Facebook, navigating through a city with our smartphones, we constant-
ly participate as citizens in the surveillance society (Morrison 2013). In this re-
spect, surveillance is by design participatory. However, in surveillance art and 
performance, “participation becomes a tactic of political critique and subversive 
action” (ibid.: 7). This is certainly the case in State of Shelter where surveillance 
technology is appropriated to allow for alternative models of participation, agen-
cy and subjecthood. 
In any other context, following an undocumented immigrant through the 
streets of Amsterdam, checking and mapping his whereabouts, documenting his 
life story and exposing it to others, could be considered a rather problematic and 
even unethical act of control and surveillance. Moreover, it is quite paradoxical 
to make visible the urban trajectories of people who have no legal right to be 
there, considering that much of their daily life and fate is about being invisible, 
staying off the grid and under the radar. Nonetheless, it is precisely this fact that 
motivated these immigrants to participate in the event. They are all part of We 
Are Here,3 a group of refugees in Amsterdam who are not entitled to housing, 
not permitted to work and as a result, are forced to live on the streets. Not want-
ing to hide any longer and claiming a place in society, they decided to actively 
start making visible the inhumane conditions they have to deal with. Participat-
ing in this workshop has been just one of many ways the group has called atten-
tion to their situation. In doing so, they both critique and subvert the structures of 
power that keep them from participating in society and forces them to live off 
the grid. The project is political in the Rancièrean sense, in that it entails a redis-
tribution of the senses, of what is visible and sayable, and produces an alterna-
tive politics of vision (Rancière 2004). It restages bodies that have been disem-
                                                           
3  See http://wijzijnhier.org/ (accessed July 23, 2016) 
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powered and made invisible through government policies. In a very literal sense, 
as we will see later, it puts people back on the map. 
With respect to the people guided through the city by the undocumented both 
during the workshop and the audio tour, the participants were invited to navigate 
through public space in an alternative way, experiencing the city – if only for 
some hours – through the eyes and stories of their guides. Stopping for each traf-
fic light, even without any traffic around, does make sense when your guide tells 
you that being caught while crossing the street with a red light might lead to his 
arrest and eviction from the country. Perceiving the public library predominantly 
as a great place to take a nap is perfectly understandable when you learn that the 
shelters are crowded and full of noise. According to Morrison, surveillance art 
and performance can “expose audiences to their own habits of watching and be-
ing watched” (2015: 127). Participating in this walk revealed different under-
standings and possible meanings of public space, of being and acting in public 
space, of alternative subjectivities in public space and also of the participants’ 
own presence and behavior in public space. Such temporary aligning with the 
movements of the undocumented also highlights in an embodied way the tension 
between hiding and making public – a daily recurrent theme for the undocu-
mented. 
 
 
PERFORMATIVE MAPPING 
 
A particularly interesting aspect of the workshop, is how the map for this sub-
versive city tour was created through collaboration. Not only were the different 
trajectories of different groups mapped in real time on one digital map, but the 
legend of the map had been generated prior to the walk by the participants (not 
the guides) and decided upon collectively. The map’s legend consisted of emo-
tions, which the participants thought the undocumented might experience while 
walking through the city, such as despair or fear. Every hour, the guide would 
respond to a particular emotion by bringing his group to places and locations he 
personally associated with this emotion. While walking, the group had the 
chance to evaluate their preconceived ideas in direct dialogue with the undocu-
mented. Each emotion would be marked by a color on the map, making visible 
the specific trajectory connected with that emotion. Moreover, every time the 
guide decided to stop at a certain location, the line on the map would turn into a 
dot, growing bigger depending on how long one would stay at that particular lo-
cation, revealing the importance of the location in relation to the emotion. The 
workshop therefore also experimented with the genre of emotional maps, which 
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chart human feelings onto a cartographical landscape (Perkins 2009). The maps 
that were produced not only depicted the actual trajectories of walking but 
charged them with affective and subjective meaning. This is what Katherine 
Harmon (2003) refers to as ‘personal geographies’. Such personal geographies 
reveal how a map is never an objective representation of reality, but always im-
plies a particular perspective. Normally this perspective is obscured, allowing us 
to use the map without any further questioning. However, by bringing the sub-
jectivity of the map to the foreground, we are invited to look beyond its func-
tionality and ask ourselves what these trajectories actually mean. What narratives 
do they perform? For example, what is this huge blue dot, connected to the emo-
tion ‘hopeful’, that appears on all the maps on the exact same spot? It turns out 
to be ‘Het Wereldhuis’, a centre for information, counselling, education and cul-
ture for undocumented migrants and one of the few places in Amsterdam where 
the undocumented can go to find advice, comfort, food and most importantly fel-
low migrants. Through the strategy of real-time digital visualization, then, the 
map invites reflection, understanding and engagement.  
In order to understand how the workshop not only subverts dominant struc-
tures of participation but also produces a particular space of engagement, it 
might be helpful, then, to not only position the project within the context of sur-
veillance art, but to also approach the work from the perspective of cartography 
and in particular as an example of performative and collaborative mapping. 
(Verhoeff 2012) Performative mapping is part of the so-called ‘performative 
turn’ in cartography in the late 20th century, which shifted the attention from 
maps as representations to the process of mapping. Not only are maps under-
stood as a product of co-creative relationships between maps and users, they are 
also considered to have agency. Maps can ‘do’ things and produce certain ef-
fects. According to James Corner, mapping produces a particular understanding 
and experience of the world that is being mapped. As Corner argues, mapping is 
never neutral or without consequences, but instead a creative act “first disclosing 
and then staging the conditions for the emergence of new realities” (1999: 216). 
This quote also points to the performative and creative potential of maps to con-
stitute and produce (new) worlds. Corner foregrounds the notion of imagination 
in relation to mapping: “Its agency lies in neither reconstruction nor imposition 
but rather in uncovering realities previously unseen or unimagined, even across 
seemingly exhausted grounds. Thus mapping unfolds potential” (ibid.: 213; orig. 
emphasis). 
Returning to the workshop, we see how the conditions are indeed staged to 
facilitate a different understanding of the city and to reveal the harsh reality of 
‘illegal’ immigrants. In this particular case, it is precisely the act of collaborative 
MAPPING INVISIBILITY | 165 
 
mapping that allows for the emergence of a new perspective. It is only through 
an encounter between undocumented and documented that this shift in perspec-
tive can occur. The space for this encounter is produced in and through the pro-
cess of collaborative mapping.   
In digital cultures, networked technology-led interactive mapping is facilitat-
ing new forms of collaborative mapping. According to media scholar Nanna 
Verhoeff (2012: 13), one of the most striking characteristics of screen-based in-
terfaces is “the possibility for people in transit to co-create the map of the spatial 
arrangement in which they are operating”. With increasing interactive qualities, 
mapping has allowed users to also become producers.  
It is precisely this emancipatory potential that explains why collaborative 
mapping as a strategy is so appealing to activists and socially engaged artists and 
designers. Co-producing its maps entails co-producing the city. It allows for re-
claiming the city. In the case of the undocumented, this project is not only about 
being a subject that can actually be put on a map, but more importantly about be-
ing part of the map, being in a position to co-create the map and being acknowl-
edged as a co-producer of the city and therefore as a citizen.  
Even if this agency only can exist within the temporary framework of the 
workshop and people are forced back into invisibility, the marks they have left 
on the city while mapping it remain and are there to stay. Or as Corner (1999: 
225) puts it: “The map ‘gathers’ and ‘shows’ things presently (and always) invis-
ible, things which may appear incongruous or untimely but which may also har-
bour enormous potential for the unfolding of alternative events”. 
I would like to suggest that this potential is located in the downloadable au-
dio tour. Through this app, the stories of the undocumented will be forever 
linked to the locations where they were shared; stored metadata can be retrieved 
whenever someone takes the time and makes the effort to revive them by activat-
ing the app and retracing the steps of the people who went before them. Because 
of this element of geotagging, something has been added to the city. It is charged 
with the potential of new encounters, ready to unfold in other instances, hopeful-
ly leading to other, more humane futures. In this respect the project functions as 
an open and lasting invitation, and as a call to engage. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Surveillance technology, such as GPS and other mapping devices, is a tool for 
(self)control and oppression. As I hope to have demonstrated, however, the 
mapping performances it supports can also encourage emancipation and individ-
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ual and collaborative agency. In the case of ‘Mapping Invisibility’, the act of try-
ing to understand through mapping helped to make visible – and to engage with 
– the undocumented and their performances in a world that is constantly being 
mapped, and where they are normally forced to remain invisible. Here, cartog-
raphy became performative, in that the map was not a mere digital representa-
tion, but something that was produced in a co-creative relationship between the 
map and its different users. Through producing different modes of encounter and 
interaction between documented and undocumented that would normally not 
meet each other in public space, the project opened up an understanding of per-
formative cartography as enabling, or perhaps provoking, a space for civic en-
gagement. 
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The big urban game, re-play and full city tags 
Art game conceptions in activism and performance 
MARGARETE JAHRMANN 
 
 
The practice of technological tagging of locations in contemporary urban spaces 
can be seen in relation to the concept of the ‘Re-Play’ of urban space and urban 
life using performance practices. The performance of technological play with 
mobile technologies in everyday life serves as the starting point for a new inter-
pretation of modern cities as a positive utopia. Re-Play is introduced in this pa-
per as an idea of staging knowledge. In my approach to performance, I consider 
play a method to identify topographies of cultural or historic interest in urban 
spaces and to frame potential inter-action on such sites. Play consequently ena-
bles the extraction of new stories and new knowledge concerning narratives of 
the urban. The idea of Re-Play draws on the Situationist principle developed in 
the 1960s (Constant 1972), of a playful and open society living in a ‘New Baby-
lon’ that offers zones of play and relaxation as a basis for creativity and a self-
determined life – in relation to and through the constructivist use of technolo-
gies.  
Contemporary activist play and performative urban games have to deal with 
a specific precondition: the electronic, electromagnetic and logic topography of 
the modern city, which is marked through ‘tags’. Tagging can be understood in 
two ways, first as an expression of an urban sub-culture of graffiti arts and sec-
ondly as a technological term to indicate a virtual-reality marker in physical 
space. My own work as an artist deals with technologies of ubiquitous topogra-
phies in the city – in relation to the individual – in order to raise questions 
around the cultural implications of tagging technologies. 
The ambiguity of the term ‘tagging’ best expresses the general parallels be-
tween practices of performing data and performing the city. The increasing use 
of smart phones and the technological possibilities of navigation in urban space 
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that they present, and electronic and visual urban markers – commonly called 
‘tags’ – have become a leitmotif of urban life.  
Building on the investigation of technological evidence and its theoretical 
analysis, the practice of using such technologies to track individuals demon-
strates new requirements for political agency through play in electronically net-
worked cities. Games and play dealing with these technologies can be explained 
theoretically by the concepts of perceived, conceived and lived space – or the 
‘spatial trialectics’ – developed by Henri Lefebvre (1991). 
 
 
THE TRIALECTICS OF URBAN SPACE, AGENCY  
AND TECHNO-PLAY  
 
The bourgeoisie and the capitalist system thus experience great difficulty in mas-
tering what is at once their product and the tool of their mastery, namely space. 
They find themselves unable to reduce practice (the practice sensory realm, the 
body, socio-spatial practice) to their abstract space, and hence new, spatial, con-
tradictions arise and make themselves felt (Lefebvre 1991: 63). 
Lefebvre’s theory of ‘trialectics’ of common social spaces can inform con-
temporary urban play performances in the city. In technologically enhanced 
kinds of play in urban spaces, topographies can be simultaneously perceived, 
conceived and lived. As a consequence of the technological information ex-
changed through contemporary mobile devices, and the personal use of the de-
vices in relation to geographical traces stored via the networks, city spaces are 
understood by players as a cultural history of changes. In contemporary cities, 
Lefebvre’s seminal theory about sociality in urban environments is radicalized 
through the technological condition of ubiquitous computing devices – like mo-
bile phones and tablets. To the same degree as their use has become an everyday 
reality, they affect the experience of a space gradually perceived through a con-
stant stream of information, they alter conceived space through the images and 
texts uploaded to particular sites, and they reconfigure lived urbanity experi-
enced through the communication aspects offered by devices as an everyday 
practice of a playful use of technology.  
The question of privacy has become pressing with the continual use of these 
technologies. A critical view of these practices in modern life must inform and 
shape the conditions of urban games and performances. Only through the critical 
potential of arts performances can the technologically lived city be addressed as 
a space where we express ourselves as self-determined citizens. The ability to 
build new worlds can be enabled by a slightly modified use of technologies. 
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With a gentle twist, introduced through playful arts experiments, current devices 
can become a platform for meaningful physical intervention – in contrast to the 
perceived urban space being experienced as a predefined space. Technologically 
defined spaces familiar from online mapping systems such as Google Maps can 
be experienced as a tool of control by industry, yet this control of personal 
movement can be re-interpreted as a conceived, deliberated, technically re-
written and overwritten space of critical consciousness.  
 
 
BIG DATA IN THE CITY: AN INVISIBLE  
PERFORMANCE PLAYGROUND 
 
The necessity for a political awareness about the role of electronic topographies 
in relation to Big Data and its role in economies, surveillance, and espionage is 
seminal for our contemporary societies of techno-fetishism. Accordingly, the use 
of mobile devices in urban gaming can be identified as everyday performance 
practice that enhances the critical use of technologies in a subliminal way. Virtu-
al and physical tags are increasingly used in a way that was not necessarily fore-
seen by industry. Geographical caching games tend to make visible the combina-
tion of storage of individual data about activities, movement patterns, geograph-
ical location and network traces, all of which is invisible with ordinary use of the 
devices. Through their game mechanic, new hybrid urban games support – inten-
tionally or not – the inherent surveillance capabilities of mobile devices and 
demonstrate how the industry exploits players.  
For example, the commercial urban game, Ingress. The Game (2014), builds 
on user image uploads, texts, and on the human ability to identify sites of rele-
vance in geographical space. It constantly collects all available navigation data 
and exploits the conceived space as well as the space that is generated by a sites’ 
narratives, which are generated in Ingress by the players. After a closer look into 
its game mechanics, it becomes evident that the long-term aim for its release was 
a consolidation of the Google Maps system as a high-quality content database of 
lived urban spaces. The game's aim, evidently, is to collect the performance data 
of players for the increasing development of quality content for sites on Google 
Maps. In this sense, the game builds on unpaid user work to generate geograph-
ical data. This demonstrates an exploitation of user labor based on the joy of play 
in the mapping geographical data to a perceived space in the city. Ingress un-
folds as a hybrid game melding technology and reality in urban space. But an 
analysis of the macro mechanics of the game makes clear that it not only in-
cludes the storage of data traces with the purpose of generating a publicly acces-
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sible, collectively built map but also tries to achieve a deeper monetization of 
play performance through user surveillance. Tourist apps hold the promise of be-
ing data mines, especially if the content is user centered and combined with 
playful narrations, as it is in the case of data generated through Ingress. The mi-
cro mechanics of the game focuses on public sights like monuments and sculp-
tures. In the game narrative, such objects of art become play objects, they are de-
fined as star-gates to another reality, because the game reality is only made ac-
cessible by the technological definition of such sights as 'natural markers' read 
through a mobile phone camera in urban space. The functionality and viability of 
such natural-marker technologies depend on the density and size of the related 
marker databases, consisting of images of the marker objects. At the end of the 
day, the technology can only function with the help of smart phones and human 
labor. In this case, the urban performance of players targets the generation of a 
new unpaid mapping of cities, which can be used later by Google as an alterna-
tive city guide mapped by user movements.  
As a side effect of conditioning users to constant use of a device in-game, the 
game play establishes the use of electronic tablets as a user interface for city 
walks. This effect stems from an advantageous main feature of computer games, 
which historically was to establish the use of certain, often user-unfriendly, inter-
faces. Evidence for this dates back to early graphic computers from the 1960s 
like the Programmed Data Processor-1 (PDP-1), up to the use of laser guns for 
Spacewar games and the modern use of the mouse and touchscreen in personal 
computer gaming (Pias 2002).  
Thirdly, the Ingress Online news channel psychologically motivates a com-
munity of worldwide players to upload their video data. This takes advantage of 
practices established by social networks such as Facebook or video channels like 
YouTube. The Ingress news channel uses elements of a social network, elements 
of real-time news channels and, not least, of featuring the new tags at urban sites 
uploaded by players.  
In the example of Ingress. The Game, Google targets the establishment of 
user habits to get them to accept a monopoly of mapping. A side effect of the 
game is establishing social acceptance of user tracking as an everyday practice 
and forces users to playfully absorb a parallel view of the world we live in on a 
smart phone or tablet while moving through the real world. The players act as 
unpaid agents for Google, exercising play within the city as a playground and 
becoming notorious tagging masters for commercial purposes.  
Summing up the ‘Ingress experience’, it can be said that contemporary play 
and performative urban games have to deal with a shared precondition: the elec-
tronic, electromagnetic and logical topography of the modern city. Everyday life 
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and urban games involve technological sensations and fictions. On closer inspec-
tion, they also inherently contain the possibility to raise public awareness about 
the political dimensions of ubiquitous computing technologies. Being part of a 
preconceived intervention through electronic artifacts enables players to discover 
the invisible network and surveillance dimension of common objects in urban 
space. Urban games can support the uncovering of the mystery of the tools in 
everyday life. The following art piece description opens the black box of our 
mobile devices in a very distinct way. 
 
 
WARDIVE: A DATA TRANSPARENCY  
STREET PERFORMANCE 
 
The urban game wardive 1.o created for iPhone & iPod touch was rejected from 
Apple’s iTunes Store. The official explanation for the ban by Apple, sent to the 
artist developers, was that the app should not publicly display names of user's 
personal hotspots, which the game intentionally does, during a physical city 
walk. The obvious reason for a ‘too dangerous’ classification can be identified in 
the app’s potential of showing data insecurity and data transparency to casual 
gamers.  
 
Figure 1: wardive, Augmented Reality Screen  
 Urban game by andor.ch 
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According to the artists’ description, wardive is an adaptive game with locative 
levels. It converts WLANwaves into game objects and levels, displays the names 
of the hotspots in the players’ immediate area and turns them into enemies in an 
urban battlefield scenario. As a consequence, the individual perceived space of 
electronic access points – and its linkage to individual information – influences 
the behaviour of players in a city. The walking routes chosen by players are se-
lected according to the expected density of individual WLAN access points. The 
play experience makes no difference to the technical functionality of such indi-
vidual access points in urban space, but by indicating them dynamically, the app 
makes a big difference in how the reality of the electromagnetic topography of 
the city is brought to the consciousness of the individual player on the street, 
how it is reflected, and how the individual mobile device in the player’s hand is 
used. The interface instructs the player to ‘walk through e-toxic streets’, to de-
feat hotspots and WLANs as private property. This game rules the extent to 
which invisible urban data is present in a technical sense, and which information 
is given about the accessibility of individual data streams.  
Essentially, wardive is informed by strategies of a historic electronic subcul-
ture, called ‘wardiving’. Hacker activists have been players in urban space for 
years. They perceived the invisible city of the ‘electrosphere’ as their environ-
ment by scanning it technologically and analysing its value systematically. They 
were trying to find and indicate insecure electronic access points in the city. Us-
ing a ‘throw-back’ practice of tagging a house in the city with chalk, they opened 
the hermetic space of limited access and privacy. In a world of data streams that 
are like new streets of a city, insecure access points mean easier surveillance, 
and can be indicated by an app instead of chalk on the walls. Tagging symbols in 
general were inspired by chalk tags used by beggars to mark houses in the 19th 
century. Learning from practices of rejected groups of society in digital perfor-
mance practice implies a number of associations. Firstly, it expresses solidarity. 
Secondly, it compares the data poor and data rich to social hierarchies of earlier 
times. Thirdly, it builds a bridge between the city-dwelling tramp and urban 
hacker as independent figures in society. 
The game also exemplifies the massive accumulation of data as value: each 
time you play, wardive captures different data and creates a new level. This can 
be translated into the fact that collecting data about access points and users gen-
erates a merit. In that sense, metro wardive is not only an adaptive game with 
locative levels. It also changes according to its real-life location as much as it 
does according to its virtual data world and mutates the player into a wardive ac-
tivist and critical data performer – who experiences the urban space as his or her 
perceived, conceived and, most importantly, lived space.  
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Comparably, a related work entitled ‘sniff_jazzbox’ creates an audible city.1 It 
converts the ‘electronic ether’ waves into sound waves. Technically, the mobile 
app captures the WLANs in the immediate area and produces a stream of WLAN 
names. This stream of words might be understood as a subconscious expression 
of the existing communication networks. The game renders private data visible, 
translates it and makes it audible as a melody of yearning for contact and ex-
change. In relation to the number and names of access points the game generates 
an individual soundtrack of the city that indicates different layers of data. Such a 
multi-layered concept can be perceived as urban performance, which each player 
enacts in a hybrid state of physical walking through the city and drifting through 
an audible data world.  
 
Figure 2: Augmented Reality Screen 
  Urban game by andor.ch 
 
The third work of this urban game series associated with the ‘and/or group’ is of 
particular interest for theater and performance. The piece andorDada is a road 
poem.2 The player, also known as the/a performer, strolls through town while the 
game renders a poem according to the location. It reads, writes out and interprets 
                                                           
1  Cf. http://www.and-or.ch/sniff_jazzbox_audible_city 
2  Cf. http://www.and-or.ch/andordada 
178 | MARGARETE JAHRMANN 
 
the subconscious social structure of a town. The result is an endless poem in an 
emerging digital performance art genre: I would call it ‘adaptive locative Dada’.  
Such urban games experiment with the concept of agency through the func-
tioning of a technological system, or in other words, the game mechanics. The 
power of game mechanics is critically questioned in plays more oriented towards 
theater performance, such as by machina eX3 or Invisible Playground. The latter 
define their games as play in public spaces in order to explore a gray area be-
tween game design and participatory art: 
 
“By referencing playful traditions like video games and sports, we connect to something 
known and remix it to something new and one-of-a-kind. Our games are post-digital. They 
use technology, but know of the power of bodies in shared spaces and at a specific site. By 
creating games that make stories and histories of places playable, we aspire to contribute 
to the development of play as a cultural technique and an art.” (Invisible Playground n.d.)  
 
The contemporary experimental Urban Gaming scene, introduced by Katie Salen 
(2003) in the Big Urban Game,4 builds on the deliberating power of game me-
chanics. In the act of urban performances in the city, hidden stories are revealed 
and activated, and potentialities for transformation are explored. Each situation 
is considered to reveal something unique about urban space, yet with connection 
points to a bigger narrative. I see such a play setting as a method of immersive 
research: it requires the full immersion of the researcher in a play situation, 
which is carefully accompanied by self-observation and context observation. The 
research gets so close to ‘the subject researched’ that it can then be brought into 
a critical debate, which stems conceptually from the art movement of Situation-
ism. Urban game evidence links to Situationism as a source of inspiration for the 
digital performances in the city in general. 
 
 
  
                                                           
3  Cf. http://machinaex.de 
4 The Big Urban Game was commissioned by the Design Institute of the University of 
Minnesota as a part of its Twin Cities Design Celebration with the goal of encourag-
ing the residents of Minneapolis and St. Paul a way to see their surroundings in a 
whole new way, and to think about the design of urban space.  
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SITUATIONISM, REPLAYED 
 
The tactical questioning of everyday-life technologies by game mechanics was 
already expressed in earlier forms of urban games and play, in the Situationist art 
of the 20th century. In the 1950s, the Situationists understood performance and 
play as a means of reordering social and economic relations and to evaluate new 
systems of thought (Debord 1958). Through the means of urban intervention, a 
political and social utopia was outlined in which new technologies and arts were 
considered as the main vehicles of the creation of society. Guy Debord (1958) 
expressed a general interest in play as political practice in his essay, A Situation-
ist Definition of Play, in the magazine L’Internationale situationniste. Here, play 
was introduced as a method and vehicle to radically reclaim urban spaces, to ap-
propriate hegemonic power and to overcome social restrictions of love and life 
in contemporary societies through ‘ludic’ time and space. This kind of free play 
time was supposed to be achieved through technology. Further Situationist writ-
ing described the city of the future as a site of total interaction enhanced through 
mechanisation, in which the need to work is replaced with forms of creative 
play. 
 
Figure 3: New Babylon  
© Constant Nieuwenhuys, 1958 
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The idea of a technologically informed city was originally introduced by the 
Dutch artist and architect Constant Nieuwenhuys (1959). He suggested a techno-
logical utopia as playfully experienced, perceived and lived spaces. In regard to 
the role of technology and mechanization, he also spoke about an emerging new 
society, the playful Ludic Society. This form of life is based on creativity as a 
process of public play, enabled by the technology of a machine-like city: a 
moveable and toy-like gamified city, wherein mechanization would liberate the 
individual from the domination of time and labor. His fictional model was based 
on an idea of social design triggered and enhanced by intelligent architecture, 
where mechanisation offers a positive chance to overcome capitalist demands of 
work. Social interaction, artistic performance and technology were considered to 
be the main vehicles for creating an open society. Contemporary activist play 
systems and performance-based urban games about the electronic, electromag-
netic cities seem to increasingly appropriate these ideas of a Ludic Society, 
based on performances in real space, paired with the subversive use of techno-
logical objects of everyday life.  
In the magazine Potlatch (1959), Constant positioned another related idea of 
a mechanically liberated homo ludens in the new Ludic Society:  
 
“The opposite of utilitarian society is Ludic Society, where the human being, freed by au-
tomation from productive work, is at least in a position to develop his creativity. […] He 
learns by playing. […] Such play is possible due to the integral technical control of all 
those elements, which thus become a conscious creation of the environment.” (Constant 
1959: 6) 
 
Today the role of the homo ludens is key in order to develop practices of creative 
resistance against the hegemonic control of communication technologies. Unfor-
tunately, the new homo ludens of Big Data society is not liberated by play, but 
controlled and forced into individual self-exploitation and unpaid labor, dis-
guised as casual gaming. The following section introduces dystopian evidence of 
how technological framing of the everyday has shaped everyday performance in 
urban space into such exploitative forms. The examples discussed include the 
visualization of data traces we leave in public spaces, which serves as a counter 
strategy to dealing with the omnipresence of data as a marker of individual con-
sumer behavior and/or misbehavior. 
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URBAN MARKS THAT MAKE A DIFFERENCE 
 
Meta information for digital data is usually called a tag. To tag means to mark a 
place with an individual sign. Tagging is also used for images on Flickr and oth-
er social networks. It can also be understood in the sense of a technological 
marker suitable for Alternate Reality apps, calling up data and layering it over 
the image of reality, which is reminiscent of the original meaning of tag used in 
street cultures. On murals, tags are usually linked to an artist’s ‘street name’ and 
are an attempt to reclaim an urban site through a personal marker. Such artworks 
indicate the potential of a particular, often devastated urban location, as public 
space in order to animate urban life. Nowadays, in networked cultures, the con-
nection of physical commodities to electronic networks is increasingly made 
possible by ubiquitous computing devices.  
 
Figure 4: RFID world tag, 2006, used in the Plymouth RFID Performance 
 © Mike Lang, UK  
 
In 2006, the Fraunhofer Institute had already defined Radio Frequency Identifi-
cation (RFID) tags, which are currently used in many mobile phones under the 
name ‘Near Field Communications (NFC)’. It is one of the most influential hy-
brid technologies to connect materiality and immaterial databases. The technolo-
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gy was developed to make the location and history of goods electronically de-
tectable. It functions based on an electric induction principle: a radio wave is 
sent to a transponder, which consumes the energy of the initial radio wave and 
sends data back to the sender/receiver unit. When public awareness of this tech-
nology first emerged, artist and activist Rob van Kranenburg (2008) crticically 
investigated the digital tagging and tracking of objects. He saw such technolo-
gies as enhanced states of public surveillance. The sensual dimensions were the 
subjects of his inquiry. The worlds of electronically tagged things change the 
role of the subject/object dualism, highlighting the way electronically marked 
things influence and shape society. 
In modern, RFID-equipped stores, customers are under permanent suspicion. 
Control of the subject by ubiquitous traceability is established by the networking 
ability of this technology. Furthermore, the possibilities of drawing conclusions 
from patterns of movements of both objects and people give another meaning to 
the idea of ‘leaving a mark’. The aim to produce a smart supply chain that 
thinks, responds and adapts has today become a tool of public control. The alter-
nate realities accessed through these markers usually claim a virtual space for 
commercial reasons. However, urban games of activists and artists have ap-
peared as a counter-reaction to this trend of digitally supported surveillance in 
urban space – a subculture of art activism dealing with the subversive use of 
such technologies as a tool for urban performances is increasingly visible. Only 
critical practice and discourse achieved through a playful approach to technolo-
gies can alter the given conditions of technological objects in public spaces. 
Through this observation, we can draw the conclusion that only creative play 
with technologies can change the commercial object into a public object, which 
redirects suspicions. Most promisingly, performance with electronic toys on the 
street critically questions technology and power structures.  
 
 
CRITICAL URBAN TAGGING GAMES 
 
A decade ago I introduced, in reference to Constant’s ideas of a deliberating 
technological space, the label of Ludic Society.5 We designed street games that 
paved the way for a potential everyday-life subversion of electronic tags and ge-
ographical positioning systems. The LS games embraced play, technologies, dis-
course, and live urban plays. With the help of modified interfaces and stage per-
                                                           
5  Cf. http://www.ludic-society.net 
THE BIG URBAN GAME, RE-PLAY AND FULL CITY TAGS | 183 
 
formances we tried to educate audiences, as expressed in public workshops we 
held in relation to each street game.  
 
Figure 5: Plymouth Road Runner Superbird, car used in the Plymouth RFID 
Performance 
© Mike Lang, UK 
 
The urban game RFID Judgement Day for 1st Life Game Figures performed in 
Plymouth in 2007 consisted of electronic tagging and an implant session. As 
‘spectacle’ in the sense of Situationism, we used a 1970 Plymouth Road Runner 
Superbird, a sports car, to perform reverse gear races as a game opener on the 
common English roundabouts. On the original games website, I describe the 
concept as follows: 
This Tagged City Play for Real Players in Real Cities uses a Plymouth [car] 
for the Plymouth Play. A local shop serves as a pit stop/workshop location: Be-
ing Tagged! Tagging! To tag the city, real world objects, subjectively chosen 
things, are tagged with working but useless RFID-Tags, so called ZeroNull Tags. 
To achieve that, Real Players get a flexible tool-kit suitcase, containing spray 
cans, stencils and stickers, which are part of each Real Player’s inventory. Each 
Real Player is personally tagged by a RFID implant, to generate an individual 
street art graph, displayed over a satellite online map. The goal is to find and 
overwrite tags with zero information. A specially designed toy gadget sniffs and 
alters the state of RFID-Tags, the refreshing electronic little tree. Tagging The 
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City is played in the real cities with RFID over-clocked Plymouth cars, equipped 
with self-designed and etched electronic Wunderbaeumchens. 
 
Figure 6: Human Tagging Performance, 2006, Plymouth Art Centre, UK 
© Mike Lang, UK 
 
A RFID implant session was also performed publicly, as a spectacle. While 
watching this provocative act of public harm, the audience could perceive the 
concept of a change of status of the individual by technology being applied to 
the body in a very direct way. Through their tags, which emitted waves, the 
players were turned into electronic objects. In the course of the urban game, the 
players experienced the absurdity of being tagged; of being put on the same level 
as a semi-synthetic object.6 In that sense, the game created public awareness of 
                                                           
6 Ludic workshop, Wednesday 21-24 March 2007, Plymouth Art Centre, UK. Work-
shop topics were tag teams, game play development, last man standing, tool kit box, 
being tagged, tagging cities. Workshop exercises: Tag and de-valuate objects, re-
programme tags and toy gadgets, adding the value Zero. Tag the city with stencil graf-
fiti to achieve a Full City Tag (=the complete city is systematically tagged). Fully sub-
jectively and collectively, every player can pass judgement by tagging objects, build-
ings, vehicles, persons and is judged by wearing a RFID Tag under the skin. Second: 
scan tags with the Wunderbäumchens and change the Internet of things into the value 
Zero. Third: take souvenir photographs of Plymouth tags and the Plymouth. The Real 
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hybrid technologies as invaders of privacy; even of the most intimate space of 
the body. While watching this provocative act of public harm, the audience 
could perceive the concept of a change of status of the individual by technology, 
which is applied to the body in a very direct way. It created public awareness of 
hybrid technologies as invaders of privacy; even of the most intimate space of 
the body. Accordingly, we gave performance lectures explaining that anonymity 
no longer exists if the individual is marked under the skin and becomes a perma-
nent emitter of electromagnetic waves. In the map of the piece, each player’s 
number is rendered in an individual graph online. This movement pattern is dis-
played on an individual map for every player as a layer over Google Maps. All 
player uploads were layered, and when automatically cycled through, the result 
was a movie of player movements. The film was shown in the Plymouth Arts 
Gallery as an online-generated ‘performance-map movie’. 
 
Figure 7: we sell play no games! RFID workshop in the Plymouth 
shopping center, UK  
  © Mike Lang, UK 
  
                                                           
Play extends the game zone into a situated locative play in a real city. Come and judge 
with your tag! See: http://www2.kurator.org/wiki/main/read/workshops 
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Figure 8: Plymouth Play, 2007. Online Interface of map of RFID 
implants 
  © Mike Lang, UK 
 
With the help of combinatory interfaces of serious information, storytelling and, 
most importantly, play, a seed of doubt is sewn in the enjoyment of technologi-
cal everyday-life tools. Such critical urban game concepts can be best developed 
through the observation of players in commercial urban games and the inversion 
of their introduced logics and game mechanics.  
Reviewed from the perspective of agency potentials in play with technolo-
gies, the theoretical framework of trialectics can be applied to an analysis of per-
formance works in urban space, which are consequently produced as a reaction 
to a social history of technological changes. According to this logic, the urban 
tagging games in this paper are categorized into three distinct types of perfor-
mance play. They are perceived as applications of concepts of data performance 
in a perceived agency. This means that the model of agency is demonstrated by 
the urban game, in order to make agency perceivable to the public. Referring to 
Lefebvre’s concept, conceived conceptual performance made out of urban data 
appears as conceived agency. The construction of a situation in an urban space – 
the performance, so to say – is the basis for the conceived space. In the course of 
the performance and based on the experience from the performance in raising 
awareness about the wealth of data collected about the individual player, a new 
form of agency is opened up, one which combines play and activism in one. 
Lived interventions of principles are finally fully experienced by the players of 
urban games – a category of lived agency as a strategy against Big Data surveil-
lance through performative digital play.  
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From flâneur to co-producer 
The performative spectator 
IMANUEL SCHIPPER  
 
 
In the 1842 drawing, Le Flâneur, we see modern man1 – well dressed, standing2 
with his hands in the pockets of the long, baggy but still elegant trousers, shirt 
and coat, a stick under his left arm, a hat on his head, his face tilted towards the 
sun. Much ink has been spilled over this strolling figure, this aimless walker of 
19th-century Parisian streets, as he was a central figure in literary works by Poe, 
Joyce, Baudelaire, Döblin, and Proust. This romantic figure takes us – the read-
ers – by the hand for a stroll into the city and shares all that he discovers with us. 
But the flâneur does much more than just discover secrets in the arcades of early 
modernity and cultivate his idleness. He is the prototype of the modern urbanist, 
a new sort of city goer as there were and are many types around. The flâneur 
dwells in the streets with “cool but curious eyes” (Rignall 1989: 112); he is the 
constant observer of the ever-changing spectacle that emerges around him. 
“Have we seen enough of the flâneur, the Parisian idler who sampled the sights 
and sounds of the city as he strolled with no destination in mind?” asks Gregory 
Shaya (2004: 46) in his essay: 
  
  
                                                           
1  In most images and stories, flâneurs are male, as is echoed by the male form adopted 
or cited in this text. Most theories on flâneurship are in this sense problematic; see the 
feminist crique on this discourse (cf. Wolff 1985; Van Godsendthoven 2005; Scalway 
et al. 2006).  
2  Paul Gavarni: Le Flâneur, 1842. 
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“He was a common figure of the nineteenth century, essential to any picture of the streets 
of Paris. The flâneur was the man of leisure who went into the street in search of some sat-
isfaction for his overdeveloped sensibilities. He was, by various accounts, a gastronome, a 
connoisseur, an idler, an artist […].” (Shaya 2004: 47) 
 
The later attribution is the one that might be interesting in contemporary dis-
courses: the flâneur as an artist, an actor, and a writer. Let us go back to Garvin’s 
little image.  
 
Figure 1: Le Flâneur 
    © Paul Garvarni, 1842 
 
The elegant man with his stick, standing still for a moment and looking up in the 
air – where is he looking and what is he seeing? A bird, a tree in blossom, a lady 
behind a window? Or is he just enjoying the sun as hinted at by the shadow be-
hind him? We do not know and actually it is not of importance WHAT he is 
looking at but how that looking-at-whatever-it-is constitutes his specific experi-
ence and makes him important enough to become a sujet for the painter. In other 
words: this flâneur is both a spectator and an actor in a play called ‘the flâneur’. 
As Cees Noteboom notes (1995), flâneurs are artists even if they do not 
write, because they are witnessing that what is going on in the city, “they are the 
eye, the protocol, the memory, the judgement, the archive, in flâneurs the city 
becomes aware of itself” (Noteboom 1995: n. pag.; my translation). 
It is this double action of flâneurship that is of interest. By walking through 
the streets and collecting impressions, the flâneur is constantly producing a story 
FROM FLÂNEUR TO CO-PRODUCER | 193 
 
of his lived experiences while being an acteur in the play he is currently watch-
ing. Although Rancière is not voting for theatrical actions that force the audience 
to become physically active, he describes the constant activity of the spectator 
even in a classical setting of theater: 
 
“The spectator also acts […]. She observes, selects, compares, interprets. She links what 
she sees to a host or other things that she has seen on other stages, in other kinds of place. 
She composes her own poem with the elements of the poem before her. She participates in 
the performance by refashioning it in her own way – by drawing back, for example, from 
the vital energy that it is supposed to transmit in order to make it a pure image and associ-
ate this image with a story which she has read or dreamt, experienced or invented. […] 
This is a crucial point: spectators see, feel and understand something in as much as they 
compose their own poem, as, in their way, do actors or playwrights, directors, dancers or 
performers.” (Rancière 2009: 13) 
 
I agree with Rancière that bringing the audience out of theater buildings would 
not necessarily mean an emancipation of the spectator, but I would argue that a 
specific mode of walking in the city (the flâneur-mode) comes very close to what 
Rancière would call emancipated spectatorship. The flâneur is not just an ob-
server or passive spectator of a finished play, he is more a coproducer of that 
very city life. He is in a mode that is described as “a historically specific mode of 
experiencing the spectacle of the city in which the viewer assumes the position 
of being able to observe, command, and participate in this spectacle all at the 
same time” (Schwartz 2001: 1733). It was Walter Benjamin who introduced the 
concept of the flâneur into academia in 1929 with Die Wiederkehr des Flâneur 
(1991[1929]: 194-199), reviewing Hessel’s Spazieren in Berlin and later in 1935 
sketches of The Arcades Project (1999[1935]), where he pointed out that the flâ-
neur is an active producer of the urban scenery he lives in: “It [the city] opens up 
to him as a landscape, even as it closes around him as a room” (Benjamin 
1999[1935]: 417). For Benjamin, the city not a fixed thing anymore but a space 
that changes its appearance and functionality constantly depending on the action 
and choices of its visitor, user, inhabitant, actor. And the city even becomes a 
strange and unknown place: “To the flâneur, his city is – even if […] he hap-
pened to be born here – no longer native ground. It represents for him a theatri-
cal display, an arena” (Benjamin 1999[1935]: 347). Benjamin, reflecting Baude-
laire here, propose to see the city as theater that is set up and used by actors, 
which in this case are flâneurs, but are increasingly all members of urban society 
in general.  
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In other words: in the city that works here as a medium (cf. Kittler 1996) it is the 
citygoer, the passant, the active and emancipated spectator (cf. Rancière 2009) 
that turns the urban landscape into a “theatre of social action” (Mumford 2015: 
93), a “theatre whose setting is the street” (Brecht 1987[1930]: 176)3 or a per-
formance (cf. Schipper 2014a). The assemblage of collected impressions are 
merged into a texture of experiences, a storyboard of the film that we live at the 
same time. Or more generally and in the words of the human geographer Doreen 
Massey: “We are constantly making and re-making the time-spaces through 
which we live our lives” (Massey 1999: 23). Massey not only discusses the in-
separable relations of space and time but in her core argument points to the pro-
duction of identities through the concept of relational aspects of space: “We can-
not ‘become’, in other words, without others. And it is space that provides the 
necessary condition for that possibility” (Massey 2005: 56). The very performa-
tive notion of space – that it is not a fixed thing to walk through but more a mean 
or medium in which things and settings become possible – has been discussed by 
many scholars such as Lefebvre (1974), Certeau (1980), Merleau-Ponty (1945), 
Deleuze and Guattari (1980). I do not intend to dig deeper into relational space 
theories or the politics of space. However, it is obvious that these approaches to 
space and space production have an effect not only on how we receive space as 
such, but actually form the way we behave in that space and even what and how 
we see and understand things, objects, situations and actions in that space. In 
other words – the space we produce will structure the life-time we spend in it.  
This is a highly performative approach to describing space and its narrative – 
the relational space production gets a kind of dramaturgical agency for the play 
that is called “my life”. Recalling our flâneur as a starting point and heading to 
questions of theatrical performances that use digital technologies and urban 
space, it seems to be useful to remember the dramaturgical importance that space 
production has. (cf. Schmidt 2010, Schipper 2014, Fischer-Lichte/Wihstutz 2013 
and Merx this volume) Now – I do agree that the flâneurs, the dwellers, the 
strolling figures, are not in completely the same role as a member of a classic 
theater audience, as this is mostly sitting on a given seat in a dark indoor space, 
staring at the illuminated stage. Theater producers have employed these condi-
tions to concentrate the attention of spectators towards hot spots of action and 
debate since the late 18th century. This primacy of emphasizing the event may 
                                                           
3  In his 1930 poem “On Everyday Theatre”, Brecht invites the actors (“[…] you artists 
who perform plays / In great houses under electric suns […]“) to step down from the 
stage and visit the city and its theater in the streets. (cf. Brecht 1987: 176–179, Rokem 
2010: 158-160) 
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be the crucial point that has changed in contemporary performances investing in 
the use of digital technologies.  
 
 
DIGITALITY 
 
What makes a theater production that belongs to digital culture different from 
one that does not? Of course, that raises the question of what digital cultures are 
at all, and engenders many possible answers4. In this essay, I closely follow the 
concept of Felix Stalder in his recent publication on the culture of digitality, 
where he proposes three quite general qualities that together constitute together 
of what could be called digital culture: referentiality – the use of existing cultural 
material that has to be selected and merged, communality – the autonomous or 
heteronomous collective actions in networks, and algorithmicity – automatic 
processes that make data sets visible and usable for human beings. Stalder’s 
tryptichon is very helpful for the analysis of performances as it addresses ques-
tions of materiality (text, actors), structure (dramaturgy), and reception (audi-
ence), yet it lacks one important aspect of the latter: the multiple, strong and 
completely changed position and responsibility of the individual member of the 
audience.  
In this paper, I discuss this issue by arguing that a focus on audience experi-
ence is of utmost importance. More specifically, I will look at the mode of par-
ticipation and coproduction the audience is given and how much this will trans-
form the simple spectator to a coproducer of the performance that he/she is at-
tending. Following the example of the flâneur in the city, I will discuss two ex-
amples of how digital technologies emphasize the changed concept of spectator-
ship. Both examples need an audience that works as a coproducer; both move the 
spectators around and ask them to perform actions. And although in neither ex-
ample is the audience seated in a theater, but has to move around in space, nor is 
the plot presented by actors, but the content delivered by an audio stream over 
headphones, the kinds of approach to spectatorship are quite different in each of 
the two performances. Walking the City by LIGNA is a site-specific audio-
guided tour in an urban landscape and Situation Rooms is more a multiplayer 
video game in a labyrinth-like installation. In both performances the composi-
tions of the experiences are related to the choices of the spectator, although there 
                                                           
4  See the video interviews DCRL Questions: What are digital cultures?: http:// 
www.leuphana.de/en/research-centers/cdc/digital-cultures-researchlab/projects/dcrl-
questions.html 
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does exist a stream of rules and hints delivered to the audience through an audio 
voice or video clips. In these cases, the digital devices do not mainly replace the 
stage or deliver the content but serve as a hand that guides the user through the 
experience. I chose these examples in order to discuss the ways the role of the 
audience is formed by the specific use of digital devices.  
In an essay on new media dramaturgy, the authors ask the question: “What 
job can or does the spectator do?” (Eckersall/Grehan/Scheer 2015: 376), stating 
that the digital cultures are not just an additive to that which happens on stage 
but are a radical change to every aspect of performance, and especially the spec-
tator. They argue that performances working under the paradigm of new media 
dramaturgy change “everything for the spectator. The landscapes of production 
and reception are unrecognizable in the sense that the use of space and the de-
mands on our attention as spectators are radically different than they have been 
up until now.” (ibid.) Even while a huge change has been brought about, there 
remains a situation where there is an attention produced by the production and 
demanded of the spectator. But what about performances where the demand is 
not produced by the artistic team but by the users-spectators, or the attention has 
to be given by the so called actors and not the audience? What about productions 
that will only take place if the audience is much more active than the production 
team? There are performances that evoke computer games more strongly than 
dramatic plays, and sometimes, there is literally nothing more for an audience to 
see than what you would see as a flâneur. The state of coproduction is already 
beyond that what Bishop discusses in her conclusion of Artificial Hells: 
 
“From the audience’s perspective, we can chart this as a shift from an audience that de-
mands a role […], to an audience that enjoys its subordination to strange experiences de-
vised for them by an artist, to an audience that is encouraged to be a co-producer of the 
work.” (Bishop 2012: 277) 
 
 
WALKING THE CITY 
 
In 2013-14, the Hamburg-based performance collective, LIGNA, invited the au-
dience to an audio-guided stroll through eight different cities in Walking the 
City. LIGNA consists of three media- and performance artists who describe their 
work as “creating temporary situations that employ their audience as a collective 
of producers” (LIGNA n.d.), they are the inventors of the RadioBallet (2002), 
that “provides radio listeners with a choreography of excluded and forbidden 
gestures in formerly public, now controlled spaces like train stations or shopping 
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malls. […] More recent works like Secret Radio (2014) or The Great Refusal in-
vite the participants to stage a complex interaction in public space or on stage, 
which discloses itself to them only gradually.” With Walking the City LIGNA 
asks different questions about walking, inspired by the one strong question from 
Balzac (2011 [1833]: 33):  
 
“Is it not truly extraordinary to realise that ever since men have walked, no-one has ever 
asked why they walk, how they walk, whether they walk, whether they might walk better, 
what they achieve by walking, whether they might not have the means to regulate, change 
or analyse their walk: questions that bear on all the systems of philosophy, psychology and 
politics with which the world is preoccupied?” 
 
Walking the City is a performance without actors that invites the audience to 
stroll through a pre-existing ready-made urban space and experiment with it in 
particular ways and, in doing so, read it afresh. Of course, there are constant, 
well-composed and registered acoustic invitations to perform actions. They are 
sent by a radio transmitter to a personal radio receiver, which are handed out at 
the beginning of the show. Nevertheless, the audience would only get half the 
experience if they didn’t set themselves into action and actually – walk: 
 
“At the starting point, I am handed a small radio receiver with headphones. A voice tells 
me to walk toward the Spalenberg district in the old town. On the way, my acoustic guide 
repeatedly draws my attention to my gait, the steps my companions and I are taking. The 
voice instructs me to move closer to my fellow peripatetic researchers, link arms with 
them and walk down the alley in coordinated rhythm. Our steps echo off the narrow house 
fronts like those of marching soldiers; bemused passers-by stop and stare at our proces-
sion. You can see them asking themselves: what on earth are they up to? What’s the 
demonstration all about? Altered by the visual and acoustic intervention, the space be-
comes unsettling. For a brief moment, Spalenberg is transformed from a charming and 
sleepy little shopping street that can feel somewhat lonely even on the busiest days, into 
the walkway for a potentially violent corps of loudly marching people. The group takes 
possession of the space, pushing pedestrians towards its edge; and suddenly the street 
seems to close in. One is reminded of the Morgenstraich – the parade that forms part of 
Basel’s carnival celebrations – or a troop of soldiers returning to barracks after a march-
past. I am right in the middle of it, part of it. I too am causing this change. Later I am 
alone once again with the voice in my ear instructing me to conduct various investigations 
into the act of walking. The scene changes yet again; the street is at once a laboratory and 
an object of inquiry. I read the asphalt and flagstones as a map for future paths, the holes 
and dirt in them as the traces of past activities. I walk on, staring down at the ground, then 
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gazing only at the sky and interpreting the clouds; finally, I advance with my eyes closed. 
As I walk, I link the locations I have passed through – the places of the past – into a net-
work that potentially contains future places. I experience this space and the way the past 
flows through the present moment into a future. A space defined by temporal and social 
coordinates takes shape. Led and guided by the voice from the radio, my body and my 
movements, evidently less smooth and more halting that just a couple of years ago, be-
come an instrument for measuring this space-time experience. Finally, the voice leads me 
zigzagging from one side of the road to another. I rebound through the streetscape marked 
out by my experience like a rubber ball, until I am instructed to bring my solitary excur-
sion to an end. Filled with my newly-detailed knowledge of the streets of Spalenberg, I re-
turn the radio receiver.” (Schipper 2014b: 27)5 
 
 Figure 2: Walking the City, Poitiers  
       © Arthur Pequin for LIGNA, 2013 
 
“The City Is a Medium” stated Kittler and Griffin in 1996, actually pointing to 
the functions of information, data and networks that the built infrastructure in-
habits. But in Walking the City, it was exactly not the buildings, the streets or the 
pavement that was constructed there years ago. The essentials of that experience 
were the traces of past lives, the echo of walkers from many hours ago, the imag-
ined possibilities of the multilayered spaces. These experiences were not told 
through the written text that was played directly into my ears. What was pre-
produced had very little to do with what I, as one individual member of the audi-
ence, was producing during the show: dancing, standing, running, searching, 
                                                           
5  This quote and the one in the later section are borrowed from an article on scenogra-
phy I wrote for the Swiss Culture Foundation Pro Helvetia (Schipper 2014b). 
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jumping, marching… and of course walking – these were actions that I was 
asked to do – but the text (or texture) of what I lived and lived through was not 
given to me. And obviously the own biography, the own taste, they own interests 
are strong guides of your individual experience. How does the experience of a 
spectator participating o the performance differ from that one could have if we 
would just walk through the city in a different manner? Or in other words: what 
is the distinction from a spectator to a flâneur?  
Both made the choice to walk through the city in a way that is not only dedi-
cated to the fastest way to get your body from point A to point B. Both have the 
privilege to spend time to experience themselves in that specific mixture of 
spaces called the city and to collect and assemble impressions after their own 
rules. But besides to some similarities there is still some important differences: 
While the flâneur is completely driven by no specific interests and no specific 
aim to reach - the LIGNA-walker has a kind of a temporal and also spatial struc-
ture that works like a set of rules of a sport game or the invisible agenda of a 
wedding ceremony. And not unlike a sport game that looks every time complete-
ly different even though the rules are exactly the same, this performance is not 
only different on every show every single day and in every single city but also 
for every single audience member. The set of rules that we know from sports but 
of course even more from all games is the stable structure for all shows that in-
corporates as the two sides of a medal: stay exactly the same and allows only the 
multiplicity of experiences.  
This is a fundamental shift in the history of theater and the concept of the 
theater audience: where an architecturally designed focus of a theater guided all 
senses to the stage, now there are radio receiver earphones, so close to your 
brain. Because they are stuck literally in your ears, earphones are no longer even 
visible; they are so light, awareness of the technical intervention fades after just 
a few minutes. A technical infrastructure is voluntarily adopted. This kind of 
‘cyborg light’ makes auditory sense very sensitive to the messages that come out 
of the radio transmitter. But the optical sensorium and the infinite possibilities 
for movement are completely free of the limitations of theatrical infrastructures.  
In other words: in this case the voice and the body of one actor (or many ac-
tors) is divided in this digital-spatial performative network into two actors (at 
least): One is the technological device that incorporates the set of rules of that in-
teractive encounter by delivering acoustic invitations or framing actions in the 
given borders of time and space. This representative of the digital world also 
suggests at one moment to take an individual tour and at another to team up with 
some fellow city-walkers to march in formation. The voice is the leader and 
guide through the game. Dramaturgically, it is a structural voice but not a voice 
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that conveys content. It is voice that answers more the question of ‘how’ (the 
play looks) than the question of ‘what’ (the play is about).  
Another aspect of normal theater that is played by the actor is that of provid-
ing the body for the performance. In Walking the City, this role completely dele-
gated to the audience. Each participant embodies the actor that will act in the 
show he is attending. Theatrical events like this – walks, audio guided tours – of-
ten work with this theater-historical game-changer – there is no actor to do all 
the work; no audience to sit and passively witness. In this production there is 
nothing to see unless the spectator puts himself into action. This play goes a step 
further than just presenting an invitation to participate – it gives clear instruc-
tions to follow in order to see the play. Already in the title – Walking the City – it 
says what is expected from you. Some may decide not to follow the invitation or 
prefer not to accept the rules of the game. Their decision would only effect their 
own experience and would not have any impact on others who decide individual-
ly to follow the instructions.  
This radio play works in very sophisticated way with the possibilities of 
grouping and separating players as it starts with a collective body of walkers in 
the street, followed at some point by separation from the group to follow indi-
vidual paths. And again: the actions that you decide to perform dictate what kind 
of experience you have. In addition to the rules and invitations from the device 
and the physical and sensual experiences derived from your actions, there is a 
third kind of agency in the game that is quite important: the unpredictable. Other 
people, action on the street, buildings, traces of previous city goers – these are all 
random elements that are neither in the hands of the production of theater pieces 
nor really selectable for the recipient. It is an agency of chance that is staged 
here along with a technological agency (that of the devices and the voices) and a 
human agency (that of individual choices). 
The audio stream that is broadcast to the audience as a radio emission has the 
function of a master of ceremony, an ‘acteur’ that sets rules, decides and controls 
the timeframes and invites guests (the audience) to investigate the topic (walking 
the city) by proposing different actions. It also delivers some extra historical and 
site-specific information, plays music and reminds you to get back on time. Even 
while the hands of the users/players/spectators are free and the guiding voice sits 
in the ears, this set-up still produces a strange feeling of being taken by the hand.  
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SITUATION ROOMS 
 
Let’s change the scenery. We are going back into a closed venue, not really a 
theater space, but one of the many industrial-era factories repurposed into cultur-
al spaces. In the middle of a hall stands a huge installation that looks like the 
back side of a film set, dark panels and a dozen yellow doors, each with a big 
number on it. It is the installation of Situation Rooms made by the German/Swiss 
collective Rimini Protokoll in collaboration with the scenographer Dominic Hu-
ber.  
 
Figure 3: Model and draft for Situation Rooms A & B 
© Dominic Huber, 2013 
 
Situation Rooms is a production about war, the international network of arms 
trades, the uses of arms and the impact of what the use of arms could have. 
Viewers are led to consider what the content and the aesthetics of that play could 
have been. (cf: Schipper (2014), Oberender (2015), Birgfeld/Garde et al. (2015), 
Whistutz (2015) In this paper I am interested in the way the concept of augment-
ed reality is used and how that impacts the mode of spectatorship. But first, an-
other subjective impression:  
 
“In the space of three short hours, I am twenty different people. On one occasion I am nine 
years old; on another I am in my late sixties. I hail from thirteen different countries and 
find myself in as many different theaters of action. Each time I follow my hand, which 
holds an iPad on which short film sequences are replayed. The films were made using the 
same device, carried by a protagonist in the arms and war trade. I watch the screen and at-
tempt to replicate the movements previously made by the person behind the camera. When 
the film shows me a hand opening a door, I open that actual door in front of me. Every 
seven minutes the screen goes dark, and the journey into the world of the absent protago-
nist is interrupted. I am myself once again overwhelmed by the stranger’s life in which I 
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was just immersed, and disconcerted by the momentary duplication of the present. I am 
aware that I am standing on a stage set made up of separate, interlinked rooms, all of 
which are depictions of a reality. As a former helicopter pilot in the Indian army, I ascend 
to a lookout point affording views over the wide expanses of Kashmir with unmanned 
drones keeping watch for terrorists. At the same time, this imaginary tactical lookout 
opens up a real view of the complex set design. Spotlights hang from the ceiling, flicker-
ing in choreographed pattern. Here I can make out the photographic mural of the oriental 
city, there the huddle of tents making up the field hospital, artfully illuminated from out-
side. I can also see the black stage wall sections, professionally assembled in sequence to 
divide up the space. I look down from above on the intermingled, superimposed spaces 
and worlds below: a sight that conveys peace and order but at the same time makes clear 
that this peace exists only outside the system. It is a glance behind the scenes of this ma-
chinery of war and weapons. I meet possible arms buyers, take aim at potential terrorists, 
shake hands with politicians, examine wounded patients and put on a bulletproof vest. I 
experience first hand how a weapon manufactured in peaceful Europe causes me life-
threatening injuries in the space next door. With the voices of the absent protagonists in 
my ears and their fields of view on the iPad in my hand, I move in their stead through hy-
per-realistically recreated copies of their worlds. […] I travel through countries, places, 
spaces and times, before finally I am disgorged once again into the auditorium. What re-
mains are the stories, the images and the physical experiences such as a handshake, lying 
in the field hospital, the smell of borscht – and the disquieting feeling that so many things 
are linked to other things, and that behind local theaters of conflict there is a global space 
of responsibility and consequences.” (Schipper 2014b: 28) 
 
There are a number of similarities in the way the audience is addressed in Walk-
ing the City and Situation Rooms – and some important differences. Here too, the 
visitor is equipped with a digital gear, in this case with headphones that are con-
nected to an iPad mini that is installed in landscape mode on a wooden holder. 
This installation lets you hold the display in a way reminiscent of the use of 
selfie sticks, but actually the spectator is asked to use it in a way familiar from 
some augmented reality apps, where you hold the image of your device in visual 
coordination with the real world in front of you. It is a performative gesture that 
is broadly known from situations where we compare a materialized image (paint-
ing, photo prints, sketches, …) with the original sujet.  
Once the user has understood this main rule of the game, he is taken into that 
multilayered installation of 20 characters and their stories and 15 highly real in-
teriors. All the Spaces look like film settings, which is what they actually are. On 
the devices you see film clips that were shot with the camera of the very iPod 
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that the audience holds in their hands in that very film set / installation.6 This is 
an interesting transfer: Though the user only sees a pre-produced video clip on 
the screen of the iPad, he behaves as if it were an augmented reality application 
by constantly overlying the devices image with the real world. Using AR in ur-
ban surrounds you get an overlay of actual (and reproduced) information a live 
camera image that you have to transfer to the actual real world. In Situation 
Rooms, the medially material is all pre produced – the image on the device, the 
information you get and even the ‘real world’ is only a pre-produced film set. 
Though some documentary material is included, the main function of the film 
clips is guiding visitors through the labyrinth of the installation, bringing them to 
a previously foreseen position in the room and directing their field of vision to-
wards the director’s proposition.  
This complete set of visual instructions that moves bodies, faces and eyes is 
superimposed with the voice of the protagonist (which changes every seven 
minutes) that tells his/her story in a way that addresses you directly, like the be-
ginning of the clip of Amir Yagel, Israel Defense Forces, 50th Batallion, 2007-
2010: 
 
“I just finished high school. I was 18. My dream in this age was to have sex already with a 
girl. I didn’t know back then that the south, the north, the east and the west, the railways, 
the buses and the junctions of Israel will all look totally different to me from now on. [A 
video clip is showed on the] This is in Hebron 2009 five AM and the Muezzin is calling. 
This video was shot by soldiers I knew during the time I was in the army. How was the 
army for me? At first, I had to get used to speak with plural and not in singular form. We 
were always together. […]” (Rimini Protokoll: 2013) 
 
Or Andreas Geikowski’s, a sport shooter in Germany: 
 
“This is the shooting range in Wannsee, Berlin. I work between 8-10 hours here every 
day. And train the police and competitive shooting athletes. That’s me 22 years ago, train-
ing for the Berlin police force. That was the first time I came into contact with a live fire-
arm. And that’s me today: Andreas Geikowski, 45 years old, active shooting athlete for 23 
years. I’m the sponsored marksman for the companies Heckler & Koch, H&N Geschosse 
and Triebel Berlin.” (Rimini Protokoll: 2013) 
 
In other words: the way the spoken text is written and spoken by the protagonist 
invites or actually forces the visitor to play the lives of the protagonists for seven 
                                                           
6  The filming was done simultaneously with all 20 protagonists. 
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minutes. This is supported with the visual field of a subjective camera that was 
shot by the protagonist and the hyper-realistic reconstructed copy of the protago-
nist’s space. The combination of text, voice, film clip and physical space pro-
duces an immersive experience that visitors almost cannot escape from. 
 
Figure 4: In the role of Irina Panibratowa, a Russian nutrional  
engineer in a weapons factory  
 © Jörg Baumann, 2013, for Ruhrtriennale & Rimini Protokoll 
 
Digital technology here affords a closer taking-by-the-hand than in Walking the 
City. The System of the game works like a clock. It does not stop. Either you are 
following the trace and the pace or you are out. The grade of freedom in the offer 
to participate is small here – it is more an invitation to step into a pre-produced 
role than to explore different possibilities. The devices help the visitor to take the 
position of the protagonist – like a prompter guides an actor through the perfor-
mance.  
While the user/gamer/visitor/spectator follows the visual instructions on the 
device, they listen to the stories of the protagonists and enter one room after the 
other. They sometimes meet other visitors, also equipped with iPad and ear-
phones. On the screen, however, they see the another protagonist filming their 
own tour. For this reason, a single space can be for one visitor the canteen of an 
arms factory in Switzerland; for another, an apartment in Russia; for a third, the 
solitary room of a detention center for asylum seekers in Germany. The Rooms 
are defined not just through their built existence, but also by Situations and by 
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those who play their roles within them. As you visit different rooms from differ-
ent places of the world and incorporate different positions in that deadly network 
you get a broad, diverse and multiple view on that field.  
The human agency seems to allow less freedom in that piece than in the 
work of LIGNA as each movement in the installation and every position in the 
spaces is choreographed by the directors, acted and filmed by the protagonists 
and reenacted by the audience. It is this feeling of standing in place of somebody 
in a naturalistic reconstruction of an original venue that works better if you try to 
copy the point of view of the protagonist as perfectly as possible. Obedience to 
clear rules seems to promise a stronger experience. In Situation Rooms, the spec-
tators are not only asked to follow the path of the protagonists but also to interact 
with other users – to shake hands, to serve soup, to take coats. By doing so, they 
serve the story of another visitor by using their bodies – in other words: they be-
came an actor and perform with and for other spectators/actors. Concerning the 
technological agency we can add the following: the films are shot on iPads with 
a wide-angle lens framing a section of the world that demands actions and posi-
tions. They lay the path that the users will follow in order to reenact a historical 
situation. What brings us to the agency of chance that is marginal here as I com-
pared this system with a clockwork. In fact, everything is set up so that, in theo-
ry, each session of seven minutes looks the same and works in exactly the same 
way. Nevertheless, there is a strange and unpredictable situation produced if we 
consider the moment of the after-performance, when the audience has given 
back the technical equipment, have met in the foyer and started to talk. Then a 
new play starts. Questions are asked, “Who were you?”, “where were you?”, and 
“what did you experience?”, questions that show once more how the ‘job’ of the 
audience has changed: chatting after the show is now carried out from an actor’s 
perspective – not of that of an audience. 
To finish this reflection let us look at the final scene: All twenty users are 
brought into a conference room and gather around a table, some standing, some 
seated. Like as in the preceding hour, they all follow their displays and listen to 
the music that is played. The video clip moves around in the room, showing all 
other protagonists. After a while a message on both the display and the audio 
stream asks users to turn the display around so that it faces outwards; each visi-
tor now holds a portrait of the protagonist infront of himself, against his chest. 
An image reminiscent of a Facebook profile, a screenshot from a Skype conver-
sation or an ID-card on a lanyard that says: See, that is me. All users gathered 
collectively they show who they are in that situation – a spooky presence of all 
the missing people. However, after a short while the images began to switch 
screens, circulating the group at increasing speed, then finding themselves in a 
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black screen – the end: “please leave the installation”. The visitors that became 
these ten other persons and finally meet all the others are dismissed from their 
duty as actors and sent back to their life as theater goers – a debriefing that will 
actually take some more time as the stories will stay for a while. Situation 
Rooms is a wonderful example of a performance in digital culture if we recon-
sider the triptichon of digital culture of Stalder: Assembling the historic and per-
sonal stories of twenty protagonist of the international network of weapon trad-
ing (referentiality), having twenty users reenact them together (communality), 
sophisticatedly guided by an in-ear audio stream and a hand-held video display 
controlled via Wlan from a central server (algorithmicity) – these elements con-
struct not one but many narratives of that hybrid field. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The role of the spectator has changed dramatically. Not only how we consider its 
presence and activity in the classical theater setting (as Rancière proposed) but 
also in what is expected of them from the artists and producers when they pro-
pose performances that rely completely on a willingness to coproduce. It de-
mands much more than openness and awareness – it needs a readiness to follow 
the rules even if there is no explanation of where it might lead. Start walking – 
we will guide you. The romantic and nostalgic vision of the flâneur was the start-
ing point for my argument of how the role of the audience in some contemporary 
theater changes and what part technologies and practices of digital cultures hold 
in it. It is the walking, the looking at things and the assemblages of stories – bio-
graphical and autobiographical, images and memories that evoke not only a par-
ticipation in a performance but a coproduction of the very performance attended. 
In both examples, the impact of the acoustic source of the audio voice being very 
close to the ears of the recipients (earphones) and the direct addressing of visi-
tors/users/spectators in second person language, are strong. Digital devices take 
the role of a guide, they take the visitor by the hand and stay with them until the 
end of the show.  
Both the acoustic setting and the taking by the hand produce an individual 
approach to and for each member of the audience and help them produce their 
individual experience of the performance – the performances were literally dif-
ferent for each participant. On the other hand, there are still activities and situa-
tions that were made together, in a collective of co-players, co-producers. A 
common production through individual decisions and recalculated by technolog-
ical devices? Or a production of individual acting and common sociality at the 
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same time – mediated and orchestrated by algorithms, as Stalder writes in his 
book on the culture of digitality?  
In Benjamin’s works, a society is evoked only by the fact that there are peo-
ple on the streets, in the cities. How is that nowadays in the streets of our cities – 
what kind of societies are appearing and shaped by the use of devices? Review-
ing this article, the streets of European cities are occupied by multiple societies: 
In Istanbul, a mob, mobilized by a TV broadcast of a video call of Erdogan, 
ready to use violence, is confronting tanks and soldiers. In London, ten thousand 
followed a social media invitation to demonstrate against Brexit. And in Ham-
burg, hundreds of teenagers who normally sit in front of computers games rove 
the streets to hunt Pokemon with their handheld devices.  
Contemporary theater practitioners inhale possibilities of digital cultures and 
adapt how technologies and their use are changing the viewing habits for their 
productions. The strongest impact of digital cultures on the field of theater is 
documented by the fact that the audience has become more and more a real 
coproducer of the performance. If that is a sign of a stronger emancipation of the 
spectator (Rancière) or a (maybe neoliberal) imperative to creativity (Reckwitz 
2012) or an increase of gamification is still to be discussed – what is obvious is 
that spectatorship is a highly performative mode of constructing worlds and cul-
tures.  
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Performing institutions  
A catalogue of performative practices 
MELANIE MOHREN AND BERNHARD HERBORDT 
 
 
The world is constantly reconfigured. Concepts are defined, and rules for poten-
tial action are devised. Universities, academies and independent research institu-
tions enhance and communicate knowledge. Libraries and archives attend to its 
administration. Parliaments create laws for living and working together. Art may 
toy with these social machineries and realize their potential to differ. 
Therefore, we question the grand narrating machines of society with artistic 
means: archives, universities and theater – institutionalized concepts of produc-
ing history, knowledge, a public community. What emerges is a continuously ex-
tended catalogue whose entries are not written down, but are rather staged in-
stead with experimental settings: for instance, the archive project All That I Have 
(2010-2012), the eleven-day performance The Institution (2013), the theater pro-
duction The Audience (2015) or the theatrical outing to the countryside with The 
Theatre (2015).  
As these performative experimentations are essentially volatile, new potenti-
alities may continuously appear: potentialities that take shape in encounters with 
guests and visitors. The entries in our scenic catalogue are not conceived as new 
definitions or even designs of better institutions, but rather they contribute to a 
continuously extended collection of performative practices which are able to 
seize and enhance patterns of social action – patterns that have become part of a 
society’s set repertory by means of institutionalization. Through these patterns, a 
society obtains reassurance, ways of administration and continuation. Playing 
with these patterns enables us to react to social processes of transformation, to 
influence or even to generate them: Performing Organizations, Institutions and 
Societies.  
The experimental settings that are based on these considerations are de-
scribed below. They focus on physical encounters of performers, guests, visitors 
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and research material, but always take place in surroundings that become rhyth-
mical and enhanced through digital processes such as light, sound and video 
programming. Pre-produced as well as newly-recorded material is transmitted 
into the theatrical space; it interweaves with the current action and articulates a 
new temporality. A space that does not (yet) exist emerges in the thresholds be-
tween programmed, rehearsed and unpredictable processes, between virtual and 
actual infrastructures.  
 
 
ARCHIVING 
 
Since 2010, performances and walk-in installations have showcased the archive 
project All That I Have1. The starting point is a collection of images, sketches 
and texts, printed on square and labeled documents. Each document relates to 
one of 170 questions. For instance: ‘Who is speaking?’, ‘What are worlds made 
of?’, or ‘Are we alone?’. The questions function as the archive’s register. The 
rest of the material that has been added to the archive during international re-
search and interview travels, relates to one of these 170 questions. In the ex-
cerpts taken from texts and interviews, in sketches and photos – by now more 
than a thousand – different elements are listed: movements, stories, talks, 
sounds, people, places, and both visible and invisible things. The material is ar-
ranged in alphabetical order, is continuously extended, and eventually assembled 
into films, object collages, books, choreographies, texts, audio guides and space 
constellations. Each entry in the catalogue again relates to at least one of the 
numbered questions. Each performance, installation or publication that is based 
on the documents, objects and lists will be archived again. Visible (and invisible) 
information is thus translated and multiplied again and again, and becomes part 
of a ramified network of found (and invented) references.  
The visitors of archive exhibitions and performances may trace single ques-
tions within this network; they may, with an audio guide, follow stories through 
the archive (which are sometimes contradictory on purpose); they may find new 
connections between the archive material; they may wander aimlessly through 
cross-references, get lost between them; or they may expand the material with 
their own memories. In a strict sense, All That I Have is not an archive. It does 
                                                           
1  ‘All That I Have’ (2010-2012). Performance series by Herbordt/Mohren, Akademie 
Schloss Solitude Stuttgart, Künstlerhaus Mousonturm Frankfurt/Main, Museum for 
Contemporary Art Novi Sad, Sophiensaele Berlin, Württembergischer Kunstverein 
Stuttgart, and others, www.die-institution.org/index.php/en/2010-the-archive/. 
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not document, order and offer accessibility to an actual present. Rather, it col-
lects gazes, descriptions and notations which deliberately enhance the given ma-
terial. It documents possibilities of things being different, and it overrides the 
gap between existing knowledge and potentialities to come. These long lists are 
registers of possible protagonists, of stories that could be told, sounds that could 
be heard, things that are not (yet) to be seen. All That I Have is an inventory of 
how it could also continue; now, in this moment, and in any other.  
 
Figure 1: ‘All That I Have’ 
© Herbordt/Mohren 
 
 
DECENTRALIZING 
 
Our main goal is to establish an extended concept of theater with respect to for-
mat, spatial scope and participation. We imagine a theater which integrates other 
art forms effortlessly, and which for each project focuses on specific aspects ac-
cording to the context. A theater that may take place anywhere, but that searches 
vigorously for new configurations of theatrical principles. A theater that pur-
posefully rearranges the dividing lines between those who watch and those who 
are being watched, those who know and those who don’t, those who are involved 
and those who are not. At the center of its debates, a decentralizing theater takes 
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the peripheries of the institution of the theater, of urban spaces, and of clear-cut 
concepts of ‘oeuvre’ and ‘author’.  
For instance: The Theatre.2 Every other Sunday, a group of theater visitors 
sets out for a one-and-a-half-hour bus ride to visit a small village. The honorary 
village representative welcomes them to the new establishments: a walk-in vil-
lage chronicle, a guest house, a cinema, a museum for contemporary art and a 
theater. Each of these miniature institutions is installed in vacant buildings, tak-
ing place on the threshold of art and everyday life; the responsibility is mainly in 
the hands of the villagers. The art museum initiative, for instance, is a platform 
for local and associated artists. The village centre initiative constructs a new cen-
tre, part of which is a cake sculpture3 in constant transformation. The Michel-
bach Symphony initiative performs a farewell symphony,4 specifically composed 
for the village and its visitors with up to 100 participants. No musical training is 
necessary. At the same time, the visiting theater audience experiences the whole 
village as if it were staged. They may observe the village square through the 
window panes of the community hall while listening to sounds and stories with 
their headphones. They try to distinguish fact and fiction in the village chronicle, 
they watch a film about a fictitious village community in the cinema, they follow 
the traces of people that might have passed through the village in the guesthouse, 
or they even book a room there – for a night, or for a few months – free of 
charge and with breakfast at the friendly neighbour’s included. A series of dis-
cursive festivals at the cooperating theater5 and in the village6 accompanies these 
initiatives and activities. The visitors, together with guests from the arts and hu-
manities, discuss how participation may be introduced as a critical practice, 
which potentialities can be recognized in the withdrawal of communal institu-
tions in rural regions, and how art may accompany and initiate transformational 
processes in this context. The project creates decentralizing and self-organized 
                                                           
2  ‘The Theatre’ (2015). Performative outing to the countryside by Herbordt/Mohren, 
Theater Rampe Stuttgart/Michelbach an der Lücke, http://www.die-institution.org/ 
index.php/en/theatre/. 
3  ‘Cakeskape’ (2015). Steel sculpture by Michl Schmidt, Michelbach an der Lücke. 
4  ‘Michelbach-Sinfonietta’ (2015). Composition by Gordon Kampe, Michelbach an der 
Lücke. 
5 ‘The Village Festival’ (2015). Staged symposium by Herbordt/Mohren, Theater 
Rampe Stuttgart, October 24, 2015,  http://www.die-institution.org/index.php/en/20 
15-the-village-festival/. 
6 ‘The Theatre Festival’ (2016). Staged symposium by Herbordt/Mohren, Michelbach 
an der Lücke, May 22, 2016, http://www.die-institution.org/. 
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versions of grand machineries of narration in the countryside. The audience trav-
els to the village from all over the place and observes the village’s communal 
structures and everyday practices as art. In these processes, new interdependen-
cies emerge between town and countryside and between invented and existing 
infrastructures.  
 
Figure 2: ‘The Theatre’ 
  © Florian Model 
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ESTABLISHING 
 
We stage The Institution.7 It takes place in a centrally located apartment and lasts 
for 11 days, six hours a day, with around 70 active participants: actors, musi-
cians, researchers, artists, visual arts students, a cook and many more. The term 
‘institution’ is understood in its broadest sense: from a set of rules (for instance, 
to design ways of living and working together in a society) up to the concept of a 
consolidated organizational, programmatic and architectural narrative (such as 
the institution of theater).  
Yet our institution remains elusive. It is a performance which plays with 
these definitions. It invents strategies for how to continuously determine anew 
what an institution could look like. In concrete terms this means: a second floor 
plan is built into the existing one – slightly shifted against the first one, only ru-
dimentarily realized, and potentially pointing far beyond the original plan, as an 
exhibited architectural model reveals – including indoor garden, guest room, ar-
chive and debate room. For 11 days, the performers make use of the rooms in 
ever-changing ways and change its characteristics. In an endless combination of 
tasks (as guest, host, visitor, or witness), places (archive, public square, theater, 
or home), and situations (work, inhabit, invite, disappear, show, or observe) they 
play along the lines of a set of basic rules which continually change the rhythm 
of movements. All sequences have the same timeline. Every eight minutes and 
thirty-one seconds, a light flickers for twenty-nine seconds and an electronically-
distorted sound played back into to room can be heard.8 At the same time, The 
Institution, positioned in this space-time structure, becomes rearranged every day 
in its narrative and functional attributions by guests and visitors (artists’ inter-
ventions, music clubs’ rehearsals, workshops and seminars, neighbours’ meals). 
Everything that happens – be it a shared meal, a lecture or a performative play – 
becomes accessible and criticizable as a performance through these external 
                                                           
7 ‘The Institution’ (2013). Durational performance by Herbordt/Mohren, project space 
of Akademie Schloss Solitude Stuttgart, http://www.die-institution.org/index. 
php/en/the-play/. 
8 “Light takes about eight minutes and thirty-one seconds to travel from the sun to the 
earth. If the light of the sun suddenly expires, eight minutes and thirty-one seconds 
remain for one last inventory. Eight minutes and thirty-one seconds in order to con-
struct a future that continues differently, or a different history, in order to observe how 
it becomes darker and darker, and how, after twenty-nine seconds, everything starts 
again.” Excerpt from ‘The Institution’ (2013). Durational performance by Her-
bordt/Mohren, Stuttgart, http://www.die-institution.org/index.php/en/the-play/. 
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markings. Every thirty minutes, a visitor is guided through the rooms. They can 
observe what happens, and, at the same time, listen to factual background infor-
mation to invented stories on headphones, find themself alone in an automatized 
guest room, meet the hosts in the archive, and finally withdraw to the veranda 
for a private opening celebration.  
The Institution combines possible qualities of a (theatrical) institution: It is 
theater (in which actors stage something for an audience), rehearsal room (where 
neighbouring music societies rehearse the interpretation of an eleven-day com-
position), meeting point (for instance, for a neighbour’s meal), archive (where its 
fictive history is invented, collected and continued), seminar room and gallery. It 
provides a preliminary working context that cooperates with a number of region-
al and supra-regional institutions of the arts and sciences, as well as with local 
initiatives – while largely remaining self-organized. 
 
Figure 3: ‘The Institution’ 
© Bernhard Kahrmann 
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IMAGINING 
 
Performative practices produce a form of something that is (yet) to come. It pro-
vides a (preliminary) reality for something that is only imagined by performing it 
as concrete.  
 
“What I think is fascinating in projects like these is that they are concrete drafts of what 
establishing could also be. You remain in the conditional here, but in a concrete one. You 
could, because you can. Because you can do this here temporarily, one could.” (Badura 
2015: 292) 
 
A series of workshop talks with guests from the arts and sciences called Per-
forming Institutions,9 accompanies The Institution and serves as a platform for 
discursive preparation and critical reflection. The brief talks and discussions ask 
for the tasks and goals of institutions, for the criticism they might undergo, and 
how they could be thought of differently. So far, examples from architecture, the 
visual arts and from law have been debated, as well as the question of institu-
tional critique in the performing arts. The talks are an inherent part of the per-
formance; they merge art with the reflection of art, and they question the staged 
host institution in turn. With the succession of different contributions invented 
institutions meet upon staged ones, existing institutions encounter their possible 
criticism and future. The ambiguity of ‘vorstellen’ (imagine, perform, represent) 
lies at the core of the project. The fictitious host institution turns the tables on its 
visitors and asks them with each of its arrangements: Which other concepts 
could we think of as institutions? How could we arrange our living and working 
together? Which other strategies could we find to change these structures? 
 
  
                                                           
9 ‘Performing Institutions’ (2013-2015). Series of talks of the Young Academy at the 
Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities and the German National 
Academy of Sciences Leopoldina, initiated by Herbordt/Mohren, Berlin, Frankfurt, 
Mülheim, Stuttgart, and others, http://www.die-institution.org/index.php/en/2013-the-
conversation/, http://www.diejungeakademie.de/en/home/. 
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Figure 4: ‘Performing Institutions’ 
 
© Demian Bern 
 
 
TRANSLATING 
 
The concept that holds together the catalogue entries and the performances 
emerging from them is that of translation. ‘Translation’ here becomes repre-
sentative for the following entries that are (still) missing: ‘confusing’, ‘construct-
ing’, ‘disappearing’, ‘documenting’, ‘filling’, ‘inventing’, ‘recording’, ‘remem-
bering’, ‘repeating’, ‘reporting’, ‘representing’, ‘shifting’, ‘transforming’, and so 
on. Concepts, themes and scenes are translated from one medium to the other. 
Facts are translated into fictional documents and vice versa. Observations are 
translated into memories, memories into texts, texts into movements, movements 
into social issues, social issues into politics, politics into art. Information multi-
plies. Perspectives become doubled. Distinctions become blurred. Systems (and 
their institutions) become rearranged.  
 
 
WATCHING 
 
The audience may watch what is going on from a safe distance, like in the thea-
ter; they may participate in the open space of the stage; and they may also con-
tinuously decide between the two options. In this scenic arrangement, clear-cut 
divisions between watching and participating cannot be drawn. Rather, there is a 
constant process of negotiation between the two, and they cannot be considered 
separately. This blurring of boundaries is the project’s intention; it demands a 
constant self-questioning and readjustment of positions from the audience. This 
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is what The Audience (2015)10 is about, another performance in the series of The 
Institution. Initiatives and societies that form civil society alternatives to federal 
and communal institutions gather on stage. They act side by side, they each fol-
low individual goals, but together they build the model of a different city within 
the city. The performances trigger informal processes of discussion, exchange 
and collaboration that continue beyond the context of the performances. The the-
ater audience is invited to enter the staged, alternative model of a city, to follow 
its rhythms and routines, to participate in them or to observe them from a dis-
tance. A composed sound structure that connects the light and video work, 
frames the performance. A staged film team films a fictitious documentation of 
these activities. In the auditorium, headphones and screens broadcast sound and 
image of the live documentation. The spectators turn into The Audience in both 
senses of the word: as a public participating in its city while critically observing 
it at the same time – like in the theater. 
The contributions, in this text only collected in extracts, form an archive of 
potentialities of being different; they readjust prevalent structures of retaining 
and ordering knowledge; they come up with different architectural and organiza-
tional solutions for social tasks; they translate that which is present into that 
which is not yet present; they perform things only imagined as if they were real, 
and they blur the distinction between watching and participating, between civil 
society action group and art. The contributions collected in this text present per-
formative actions that might be capable of expanding social structures. They 
may be described with the term of ‘performative practices’. The series around 
The Institution sketches such practices, creates a catalogue whose entries are not 
linked to definitions, but to scenic arrangements.  
In this context, it is always central to implement thresholds of indeterminacy. 
These thresholds between everyday life, research and aesthetic experience, do 
not clearly show where representation starts, where the accompanying criticism 
ends, and where an unexpected encounter, a factual model experiment begins. 
With the help of digital technology, additional virtual and actual infrastructures 
of things present, past, and still to come, are connected. And yet, the conditions 
of all encounters described are staged. They follow an assigned timeline; when a 
certain period has ended, specific events occur; nothing happens by chance. Such 
systems of rules, which organize encounters of most different agents, can be 
called institutions.  
                                                           
10  ‘The Audience’ (2015). Performance by Herbordt/Mohren, Theater Rampe Stuttgart, 
http://www.die-institution.org/index.php/en/home/. 
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When institutions start to protect the awareness of potentialities in their routines 
and decisions – instead of insisting on solutions once determined – they might 
turn out to be better institutions:  
 
“SV Institutional change, new models of institutions are possible. It is actually possible to 
break up institutions and to make something new. (Valk 2015: 303) 
 
ID To dare to have utopian concepts, to risk to make yourself vulnerable or even ridicu-
lous. When you do certain things, you can of course do something wrong, but sometimes 
it’s better to do something wrong than to play it totally safe. (Dressler 2015: 297) 
 
VV To me it seems essential to be able to answer this: If institution is an answer, what was 
the question? Which social function does an institution have? Which kind of public does it 
produce? (Vuković 2015: 298) 
 
BH What we would need is not ‘no institutions’, but rather better ones.” (Herbordt 2015: 
250) 
 
Within the quotes above, the necessity to perform institutions in alternating ways 
is marked. The artist’s book they are extracted from is called Vorgestellte Institu-
tionen / Performing Institutions (Herbordt/Mohren 2015). It concludes: 
  
“In their last minutes, they will carefully establish a square meter for a single visitor one 
last time. One last time, they will take a circuitous, but nonetheless purposeful route, alt-
hough there would be a much easier one. They will believe they have indeed briefly seen 
things in passing, which, however, isn’t true. They will report to others about their plans. 
They won’t worry about what of these plans will really happen. At eleven o’clock at night, 
they will arrive in the entrance hall. They will recount a performance. They will see each 
other again and it will be a proper celebration. On an easily visible brass plate in the mid-
dle of the entrance hall, they will be able to read: The cornerstone of this institution was 
laid among the esteemed presence of visitors, guests, witnesses, and hosts. Someone will 
have said: We are not at the end of history. We shouldn’t give up writing it, but rather start 
writing in the first place! They will step into the entrance hall and everything will be 
brightly lit.  
A succession of unexpected sounds.  
A change of lighting and a new beginning.  
Everything is brightly lit.” (Herbordt/Mohren 2015: 306-307)  
 
Translated by Sandra Fluhrer and Nadine Feßler 
224 | MELANIE MOHREN AND BERNHARD HERBORDT 
 
Figure 5: ‘The Audience’ 
© Luzie Marquardt 
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Organizing 
 

 
 
‘The machine could swallow everything’ 
Satin Island and performing organization 
TIMON BEYES 
 
The machine could swallow everything, incorpo-
rate it seamlessly, like a giant loom that  
reweaves all fabric, no matter how recalcitrant 
and jarring its raw form, into what my hero 
would have called a master-pattern – or, if not 
that, then maybe just the pattern of the master.  
MCCARTHY 2015: 34 
 
Satin Island, the latest novel by artist and writer Tom McCarthy, is set in the 
strange world of organization in digital cultures. The book is woven around the 
experiences, observations and reflections of its protagonist, “U”. U is an anthro-
pologist, whose fieldwork and subsequent doctoral thesis on club culture was 
mainly lauded not for its insights into the clubbing scene, but for its methodolog-
ical meditations on ethnographic research and the performativity of the research-
er. The thesis brought him enough attention – “a famous anthropologist […] is 
about as well known as a third-division footballer” – to be plucked “from the  
dying branches of academia” and grafted into “the febrile hothouse” of a consul-
tancy firm in London (McCarthy 2015: 28-29). “U” reads as ‘you’, of course: 
The figure of the corporate anthropologist or ‘semiotic engineer’, as employees 
of Silicon Valley firms who hold humanities degrees have been called (Lewis-
Kraus 2015), represents a contemporary ‘organization (wo)man’. U’s anthropol-
ogist “hero”, referred to in the opening quote, is Claude Lévi-Strauss (McCarthy 
2015: 33). Yet the ethnographic discovery of social-cultural patterns is now put 
to work for “the Company”, as U’s employer is called throughout the book, with 
a capitalized ‘C’. Peyman, the boss of the consultancy firm, tasks the protagonist 
with writing the “Great Report”: “Not just a book: the fucking Book. […] Sum 
the tribe up. Speak its secret name” (ibid.: 55; orig. emphasis).  
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Satin Island, then, is a novel on the problem of reporting on, and from within, 
the conditions and effects of today’s ubiquitously networked – and thus perva-
sively organized – spheres of life; at one point in the book, the novel itself is pre-
sented as the remnants of the impossible Great Report, the “offslew of the real 
unwritten manuscript” (ibid.: 103).1 In this chapter, I read the text as a report on 
contemporary organization and, more specifically, on the performativity of  
organization in the time of ubiquitous and pervasive media technologies. To do 
so, I first discuss existing encounters of organization theory and performance 
(studies). On this basis, I reflect on different layers of performativity and organi-
zation as they are enacted in Satin Island. Perhaps the most significant layer 
concerns the effects of digital technologies and networked infrastructures. Some 
of the novel’s most striking passages, or so I argue, reflect a ‘posthumanist per-
formativity’ (Barad 2003) and therefore instigate a posthumanist theorizing of 
organization.  
 
 
ORGANIZATION THEORY AND THE QUESTION  
OF PERFORMATIVITY 
 
What comes to the fore when one approaches organization through the notion of 
performativity? As the use of these terms in general and in the book this chapter 
appears in demonstrate, performance and performativity have become all-
purpose “carry-home concept[s]”, widely applicable and taking many forms 
(Loxley 2007: 29). In this spirit, the study of organization, too, was recently  
diagnosed to have taken its own “performativity turn” (Gond et al. 2015: 18). 
Without aspiring to a complete overview, I distinguish between three broad  
encounters of organization theory, performance studies and performativity. The 
first relates to questions of organizational efficiency and performance manage-
ment; the second consists of theatrical and dramaturgical approaches to organi-
zation; and the third is marked by a turn to the performativity of different  
                                                           
1  A version of Satin Island’s cover already plays with the novel’s ‘open form’ and its 
shifting boundaries with other textual genres: Scattered across the page are both  
coloured dots of different shapes and sizes and possible ‘qualifiers’ or denominators 
of what the book ‘is’, all of them crossed out: “a treatise”, “an essay”, “a report”,  
“a confession”, “a manifesto”. Only “a novel” is (momentarily?) not crossed out – 
“and I think that would be the space of literature, which is neither one nor the other; 
it’s this messy, unresolved between” (McCarthy: 2016: 50). 
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processes of organizing, where organization becomes a provisional phenomenon 
and a precarious effect of diverse performative practices. 
First, there is a strong current of understanding organizations as machines of 
efficiency, measured and acted upon through performance criteria – and the cri-
tique of such an understanding and its consequences. This is what performance 
theorist Jon McKenzie (2001) refers to as ‘organizational performance’.2 Such 
‘performance studies’ reproduce what Lyotard, in The Postmodern Condition 
(1984), discussed as the proliferation of ‘performativity criterion’ and ‘performa-
tivity principle’ as a legitimizing practice, which here means achieving desired 
outcomes effectively and generating desired returns. Part and parcel of “a gener-
alized spirit of performativity” (1984: 45), such a notion of organizational per-
formance is closely connected to the marketization or ‘mercantilization’ of 
many, if not all walks of life (and prominently includes the educational sector, as 
Lyotard foresaw).  
Second, there is what one could call the theatricality of organizational prac-
tice as interpreted through theatrical and dramaturgical metaphors. Drawing  
upon Goffman’s seminal work on identity formation and presentation of the self, 
but also the social anthropology of Turner and even Burke’s ‘dramatistic  
pentad’, organizational life here is analyzed in terms of theatrical performances 
and according to dramaturgical principles (cf. Mangham 1986; Cornelissen 
2004). All organization is a stage, on which rituals, quotidian dramas and role-
playing is performed. What mainly comes into view in this line of thought, then, 
is the everyday performances in organizations and how to think of organizations 
as made up of such mundane performances. Moreover, there is also work on  
theaters as well as theatrical performances or interventions as cases of organizing 
(Beyes/Steyaert 2006), for instance by investigating the practice of Rimini 
Protokoll (Biehl-Missal 2012; Beyes/Steyaert 2013; Schipper, this volume). 
Third, echoing the wider performative turn in the cultural and social sciences 
– and, correspondingly, the expansion of what falls into the field of performance 
studies – the notion of performativity has more recently inspired a number of 
                                                           
2  While originating from – and still strongly influenced by – sociological thought, the 
study of organization has come to be shaped to quite some extent by the institutional 
power of business school-interests. It is thus often, albeit not exclusively, limited to a 
certain type of bounded organizational form, usually capitalist firms, and it is prone to 
an instrumental and oddly normative logic of coming up with knowledge that not only 
helps us to better understand such organizations but to help them performing better 
economically, i.e. with insights ‘for’ management and for questions of steering and 
control (Beyes, 2007). 
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studies and approaches according to which organization is continuously per-
formed and produced through various actions and processes. It is therefore this 
loose group of texts that constitutes organization theory’s minor ‘performativity 
turn’. Following Latour, Czarniawska (2008: 6-7) distinguished between “osten-
sive” and “performative” approaches to organization. Whereas ostensive defini-
tions look at organizations as distinct, presupposed units, into which actors are 
placed and which are therefore assumed to exist independently of everyday  
social and material processes of organizing,3 a performative sensibility sees  
organization as something that is continuously effected.  
In this register, studies that explicitly enlist notions of performativity have 
drawn upon what are usually regarded as the main strands of performativity  
theory (Gond et al. 2015). Based on Austin’s speech-act theory and its ramifica-
tions, organizational scholars have inquired into performative utterances as  
perlocutionary acts, i.e. into how organizations come into being through com-
municational flows (Cooren 2004). Following Callon’s ‘performation program’, 
others have traced how theories of economy and management are brought into 
being and translated into organizational practice (Muniesa 2014; Schröter, this 
volume). Inspired by Butler’s work, organizational researchers have interrogated 
                                                           
3  Broadly speaking, the first two ‘schools’ of performance and organization studies that 
I have mentioned – organizations as theatre, organizational performance – tend to  
reproduce the entitative/ostensive view of organization. The third, performative view 
overlaps with the much-discussed processual shift in organizational theorizing: It  
entails a replacement of ‘what?’-questions (what is an organization?) with ‘how?’-
questions (how is organization assembled, or how does organizing take place?). In 
other words, this in itself heterogeneous approach deviates from “a Cartesian habit of 
mind” (Barad 2003: 807), according to which organizations exist as entities with  
inherent, presupposed attributes – and anterior to their representation.  
 It follows that what is at stake, too, is a shift from the study of organizations as 
bounded, stable entities (the company, the nonprofit-organization, bureaucracy) to a 
focus on processes of organizing between, beyond, after or before the bounded notion 
of an organization. Cooper’s work is seminal in this respect. As he wrote, “if we insist 
on thinking in terms of organizations, we miss the bigger question of how organiza-
tion as a generic process both structures and destructures our world, how our minds 
and bodies are caught up in its complex, reflexive dynamics. To think of organiza-
tions is to think of specific objects external to us. To think of organization is to recog-
nize a more general force which includes us in its perpetual movement between order 
and disorder, certainty and uncertainty” (1998: 154; orig. emphasis). Hence this chap-
ter’s title: ‘performing organization’ rather than ‘performing organizations’. 
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the performative making of gendered identities in organizations (Tyler and Co-
hen 2010) and pondered the potential of queer theory to disrupt mainstream  
accounts of organizational life (Parker 2001). Importantly, the notion of per-
formativity has not only been linked to discursive formations of organizational 
realities and the production of identities, but also to the very material and affec-
tive forces of organizational spaces (Beyes/Steyaert 2012) and to its objects and 
technologies (Orlikowski/Scott 2014; Nyberg/Wright 2015). Moreover, the per-
formativity of organizational scholarship itself has been discussed both methodo-
logically (Beyes/Steyaert 2011) and politically, the latter primarily by way of the 
development of, and debates on, the notion of ‘critical performativity’ (Spicer et 
al. 2009; see McKenzie, this volume).  
In sum, organization studies’ minor ‘performativity turn’ has spawned a 
number of promising approaches for investigating the ‘doing’ of organization, 
and it has helped ushering in an appreciation of, and a sensibility for, organiza-
tion as a processual, material, situational and contested accomplishment. And 
yet, forays into the performative effects of digital technologies are recent and 
few, and they tend to presuppose formal organizations, in which IT systems ‘do 
things’ to organizational processes and its actors. The subsequent discussion of 
Satin Island and its layers of ‘performative organizing’ builds up on organization 
theory’s ‘performativity program’. It briefly touches upon the performative force 
of communication and the performativity of concepts before arriving at the 
agency of objects and technologies. As I try to show with and through the novel, 
however, the entanglements of digital technologies and human conduct deserves 
further scrutiny.  
 
 
BLACK BOX ORGANIZING: DOING ORGANIZATION  
IN SATIN ISLAND 
 
Beyond the figure of Peyman, the somewhat charismatic boss, McCarthy’s  
depiction of the nameless Company barely touches upon formal hierarchies, 
structures of organizational decision-making or organizational members. Rather, 
it is infrastructures, media and materialities as well as U’s experience of – and 
reflections on – these organizational environments and atmospheres that domi-
nate the ethnographer’s narrations. For instance, the Company’s London premis-
es’ glass walls created 
 
“an expansive vista in which sketches, diagrams and other such configurations of precious 
data, lying faced-up on curved tabletops, pinned to walls or drawn on whiteboards or,  
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occasionally (and this made the data seem all the more vulnerable, fragile even), on the 
glass itself, seemed to dialogue with one another in a rich and esoteric language, the scene 
conveying (deliberately, of course) the impression that this was not only a place of busi-
ness but, beyond that, a hermetic zone, a zone of alchemy, a crucible in which whole 
worlds were in the mix.” (McCarthy 2015: 20-21) 
 
Yet what kinds of worlds are in the mix remains unclear. Alongside having to 
write the Great Report, the protagonist participates in the large-scale “Koob-
Sassen-Project”, “supra-governmental, supra-national, supra-everything” (ibid.: 
110), in which the Company has a role among hundreds of other players. The 
Project’s aim and content are never clarified – for legal reasons, as U explains, 
but also because he and, apparently, the other people involved, simply do not 
know what the project involves. It is a “black box” (ibid.: 60): “Sometimes it 
seemed enormous, like an emperor’s mausoleum; at others it appeared no larger 
than a trunk, or coffin; at others still, the size of a child’s toy- or music-box. The 
only constant or unchanging aspect of it was that it was black: black and inscru-
table, opaque” (ibid.: 70). The Project is amorphous and shape-shifting; it cross-
es the boundaries of formal organizations; “it has to be conceived of as in a per-
petual state of passage, not arrival – not at, but in between” (ibid.: 74; orig.  
emphasis). Satin Island can thus be read as a novelistic reflection – or a report – 
on the performativity of organization understood as process, as an unstable and 
at least partly diffuse phenomenon that perpetually needs to be accomplished 
through different layers of performative agency. In the following, I tentatively 
distinguish between three layers enacted in the book: communicative performa-
tivity, the performativity of concepts and the performativity of media technolo-
gies that is tied to digital devices and algorithms.  
 
 
PERLOCUTIONARY ACTS 
 
“They discussed [the Project] not as people discuss things they know about, subjects 
whose properties and parameters are given, but rather as they try to ascertain those of a 
foreign object, one that is at once present – omnipresent – and elusive: groping after its 
dimensions; trying, through mutual enquiry, to discern its composition, charge and limit. 
When, in the course of my professional activities, I asked people to provide a visual image 
that, for them, most represented it, I got answers varying from hovering spaceship to  
rabbit warren to pond lilies.” (McCarthy 2015: 63) 
Precisely because it is perceived as shape-shifting and inscrutable, the Project 
has to be performed into its (amorphous) being by way of incessant talk. The  
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anthropologist’s “in-transit-metaphor” and “perpetual-state-of-passage-analogy” 
(ibid.: 117) itself becomes a performative ploy, used in Company memos and 
project representations. The ethnographer is convening meetings with civil serv-
ants, asking them to “discuss their sense of what the Project entailed, or more 
subtly, implied” (ibid.: 50). Yet the civil servants are too clever for ethnographic 
tricks, knowing full well they are being observed and studied – the ethnographer, 
of course, knows that his interlocutors know – and in response they conjure up 
catchphrases such as “‘excitement’ (one hundred and eighty-two occurrences 
over three hours); also ‘challenge’ (one hundred and four); ‘opportunity’ (eighty-
nine); ‘transformation’ (seventy-eight); and, as an upscale variant on the last 
word, ‘re-configuration’ (sixty-three)” (ibid.: 50). (McCarthy is a brilliant sati-
rist.) 
Yet fittingly, nobody else is performing organization through speech acts 
such as Peyman, head of the Company. McCarthy presents him as a man without 
qualities of and for the present: as a cipher for organizational management as a 
kind of art of fabulation. If he (Peyman) had to sum up what the Company did, 
he would “choose not consultancy or design or urban planning, but fiction” 
(ibid.: 45; orig. emphasis).  
 
“The city and the state are fictional conditions; a business is a fictional entity. Even if it’s 
real, it’s still a construct. Lots of the Company’s projects have been fictions that became 
real. […] We should view all propositions and all projects this way.” (ibid.)  
 
Peyman’s aphorisms, slogans and imperatives sound clever yet are sometimes 
hard to decipher in terms of their constative or ostensible meaning, part of the 
Company’s “rich and esoteric language” referred to above (ibid.: 21). Both illo-
cutionary intent and perlocutionary effects of such fabulation seem to reside in 
attracting and seducing (potential) clients as well as impressing and partly dumb-
founding colleagues and underlings.   
 
 
PERFORMING CONCEPTS 
 
Peyman’s talk already touches upon a second and related layer of how organiza-
tion is performed in Satin Island: the performative force of theories or concepts 
themselves. McCarthy enacts a dark satire of the translation of aesthetic and  
allegedly critical theories into contemporary selling propositions. Such theories 
and concepts seem perfectly attuned to a culturalized or aesthetic economy in 
which the emphasis shifts to the creation or staging of worlds in which objects 
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and subjects exist (Lazzarato 2004) – a state of affairs that calls for expanding 
the categories of use value and exchange value with ‘orchestration value’ or 
‘staging value’ [Inszenierungswert] (Böhme 2016). Apart from the heavy-
handed irony of having the corporate anthropologist and ardent admirer of Lévi-
Strauss consult the jeans-maker Levi Strauss, McCarthy’s U makes good use of 
his schooling in continental theory and scholarly self-reflection, yet for the sake 
of the market, “feeding vanguard theory […] back into the corporate machine” 
(McCarthy 2015: 34). ‘For’ the client Levi Strauss, U stole a concept from the 
French philosopher Deleuze:  
 
“for him, le pli, or fold, describes the way we swallow the exterior world, invert it and 
then flip it back outwards again, and, in so doing, form our own identity. I took out all the 
revolutionary shit (Deleuze was a leftie); and I didn’t credit Deleuze, either. […] I did the 
same thing with another French philosopher, Badiou: I recycled his notion of a rip, a sud-
den temporal rupture, and applied it, naturally, to tears worn in jeans, which I presented as 
the birth-scars of their wearer’s singularity, testaments to the individual’s break with gen-
eral history, to the successful institution of a personal time.” (ibid.) 
 
 
PERFORMING MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES 
 
In Satin Island, the performances of human communication, self-styling and 
concepts are embedded in a narrative of apparatuses and data streams. Stalder 
(2016) recently suggested three mutually interwoven characteristic forms or 
qualities that mark digital culture: ‘referentiality’ [Referenzialität], collectivity or 
communality [Gemeinschaftlichkeit] and, importantly, ‘algorithmicity’ [Algo-
rithmizität]. With regard to the novel’s organizational performativity, the dimen-
sion of referentiality is at work in the mash-up of theory and (business) practice 
enacted in the Company. The quality of communality could then be connected to 
the on-going task of communicatively performing and relating what is occurring, 
to bring into being different versions of what is taking place. Yet today, both 
qualities are pervaded and shaped by digital networks and their automated pro-
cedures of decision-making that handle data, extract information as well as offer 
and perhaps pre-determine modes of action. Such is the invisibility and inscruta-
bility of the Koob-Sassen-Project:  
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“It was a huge, ambitious scheme, he said, on the same scale as poldering and draining 
land masses of thousands of square miles, or cabling and connecting an entire empire – 
and yet, he continued, the most remarkable thing about it was that, despite its massive 
scale, it would remain, in an everyday sense, to members of the general populace, invisi-
ble […]. It was a feat, rather, of what he called network architecture. He went on for a 
long time about networks, convergence, nodes and relays, interstices – it was very  
abstract.” (McCarthy 2015: 31-32; orig. emphasis) 
 
It seems that what could be called the algorithmic performativity of organizing, 
which is enabled by network infrastructure, is what drives the Project and what 
provokes the experiences of opacity and not-knowing (Beyes/Pias 2014). More-
over, this kind of performativity leads the ethnographer to deeper suspicions 
about the nature and possibility of a Great Report. As U, the good reader of  
Lévi-Strauss, very well knows (McCarthy 2015: 104), the problem might not be 
that the Great Report is an unwritable fantasy and thus a quixotic quest in the 
first place. Rather, the report has already been written or it is continuously being 
written, albeit not by field researchers, anthropologists or sociologists, but by 
software. U experiences a kind of epiphany: 
 
“Write Everything Down, said Malinowski. But the thing is, now, it is all written down. 
There’s hardly an instant of our lives that isn’t documented. Walk down any stretch of 
street and you’re being filmed by three cameras at once – and even if you aren’t, the 
phone you carry in your pocket pinpoints and logs your location at each given moment. 
Each website that you visit, every click-through, every keystroke is archived: even if 
you’ve hit delete, wipe, empty trash, it’s still logged somewhere, in some fold or enclave, 
some occluded avenue of circuitry. […] And as for the structures of kinship, the networks 
of exchange within whose web we’re held, cradled, created […]: well, those networks are 
being mapped, that task performed, by the software that tabulates and cross-indexes what 
we buy with who we know, and what they buy, or like, and with the other objects that are 
bought or liked by others who we don’t know but with whom we cohabit a shared buying- 
or liking-pattern.” (ibid.: 107; orig. emphasis)4 
                                                           
4  McCarthy-the-satirist has U fantasizing about the possibilities of resistance and  
resistance movements against the ‘automatic writing’ in general – which would reduce 
us to “no more than actions and commands within its key-chains” (2015: 108) – and 
the Project in particular. It is worth quoting, even if reflecting upon the limits and  
potential of resistance is beyond the scope of this chapter: “And then my cohorts, that 
semi-occluded network of covert anthropologist I’d dreamt into being already: they 
could join me in the cause. Together, we could turn Present-Tense Anthropology™ 
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The novel here reflects a debate that, as far as I can see, the study of organization 
is only beginning to confront: how the performativity of algorithmic ordering is 
a common feature of today’s processes of organizing beyond the boundaries of 
formal organizations. To quote the media theorists Galloway and Thacker (2007: 
29), there is a new “new physics of organization” that enacts ‘protocological’ 
forms of control and entrainment. Such performativity is indeed central to  
contemporary organization in that it encourages and partly shapes social and  
individual conduct (Neyland 2015). Part of the problem is the fact that access to 
– and modulation of – the digitally generated data masses of, for instance, social 
media platforms, is both restricted to, and everyday practice in, the research  
departments of, say, Google and Facebook; this kind of data is unavailable for 
public research (Baxmann et al. 2016).5 
 
 
BUFFERING 
 
The ‘being-written’ of human/non-human networks points to a final and  
important aspect or layer of performativity that lurks in the question of the  
effects of digital infrastructures and algorithms, yet cannot be reduced to these 
effects. Socio-material analyses (of organization) tend to fall back upon the dis-
tinction between human and machinic actors or objects in trying to make sense 
of the agency of objects and technologies on the one hand, and human agency on 
the other hand. They enact, in Barad’s terminology, ‘agential cuts’ in order to 
                                                           
into an armed resistance movement: I pictured them all scurrying around to my  
command, setting the charges, using their ethnographic skills to foment riots, to  
assemble lynch-mobs, to make urban space itself, its very fabric, rise up in revolt. I 
saw manholes erupting; cables spontaneously combusting; office wi-fi clouds crack-
ling the way to audibility, causing hordes of schizoid bureaucrats, heads given over to 
a cacophony of voices, to flee their desks and tear about the streets, blood trickling 
from their ears […].” (ibid.: 111) 
5  In 2014, a study on “Experimental evidence of massive-scale emotional contagion 
through social networks” caused a minor scandal. Co-authored by a researcher  
employed at Facebook, the study analysed the results of an experiment with and on 
nearly 700’000 Facebook users (without their awareness) that entailed the purposeful 
manipulation of newsfeeds in order to find out if and how moods are transferred and 
travel across social networks (Kramer et al. 2014). It is surprising that some people 
were genuinely surprised that Facebook would do this kind of thing, i.e. to instrumen-
tally try to induce changes in users’ emotions. 
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delineate and perform objects, algorithms and subjects as distinct entities (Barad 
2003). They thus tend to skirt the problem of thinking together the human and 
technology. Yet the mapping of the great report through a kind of foundational 
entanglement of algorithmic agency (which reacts to, and informs human  
conduct) and human agency (which reacts to, and informs algorithmic communi-
cation) hints at a different kind of agency, an ‘intra-agency’, that “calls into 
question the givenness of the differential categories of ‘human’ and ‘nonhuman’, 
examining the practices through which these differential boundaries are stabi-
lized and destabilized” (ibid.: 808).6 Barad’s notion of posthumanist performa-
tivity thus instigates scholars to explore the processes and practices through 
which such hybrid entanglements, roles and meaning are performatively brought 
into being, without departing from a-priori assumptions of either human or  
machinic agency.  
In this sense, Satin Island’s most striking passages enact a kind of poetics of 
intra-action that surpasses a ‘mere’ satire of late capitalism’s capture of practices 
and concepts of cultural and scholarly production. That processes are material 
and immaterial, human and non-human at the same time, part of the same man-
gle of practice, seems to inform the descriptions of organizational spaces such as 
the Company’s headquarters or an airport lounge that sets the scene at the book’s 
beginning. Relatedly, the phenomenon of buffering is a recurring theme in the 
novel, perhaps offered as a counterpoint to the bleak diagnosis of software’s 
great report, which influences how human actors move and communicate yet is 
readable only by other software. U frequently experiences bouts of buffering that 
resemble provisional interruptions, suspensions or recesses, in which, for a  
moment, “the entire time of the world and of your subjective agency is put on 
hold”, as McCarthy commented after the novel’s publication (2016: 45). By way 
of Barad’s posthumanist account of performativity, one can grasp these ‘liminal 
spaces’ as phenomena – for her, phenomena, not things or objects, are primary 
ontological units (2003: 818) – that are produced through intra-action. That is 
precisely why these small in-between moments of buffering, when what will 
                                                           
6  The neologism of ‘intra-action’ takes the place of the well-worn notion of ‘interac-
tion’, which according to Barad would presuppose the prior existence of entities that 
are then related, such as technological object and human being. Instead, “[i]t is 
through specific agential intra-actions that the boundaries and properties of the  
‘components’ of phenomena become determinate and that particular embodied  
concepts become meaningful” (ibid.: 815). In other words, the concept of intra-action 
helps thinking the ‘agential cut’ that effects the separation – and thus the emergence 
of relata like subject and object. 
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happen next becomes dubious, afford “a sense of bliss” as well as “a kind of 
dread” (2015: 64):  
 
“I’d spend long stretches staring at the little spinning circle on my screen, losing myself in 
it. Behind it, I pictured hordes of bits and bytes and megabytes […] I pictured a giant 
über-server […] pumping out information non-stop, more of it than any single person 
would need in their lifetime, pumping it all my way in an endless, unconditional and 
grace-conferring act of generosity. Datum est: it is given. It was this gift, I told myself, 
this bottomless and inexhaustible torrent of giving, that made the circle spin: the data  
itself, its pure, unfiltered content as it rushed into my system, which, in turn, whirred into 
streamlined action as it started to reorganize it into legible form” (ibid.: 63; orig. empha-
sis).7 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The layers of performing organization that are gathered and interwoven in Satin 
Island present a challenge to rethink and complexify the relation of organization 
and performativity. There is perhaps an irony in turning to the ‘old’ artistic  
medium of the novel to ponder processes of organizing (in) digital cultures. Yet 
it seems to me that the open and speculative form of a novel such as Satin Island 
allows for explorations of the complexity and performativity of organizational 
processes that are not, or only rarely, to be found in the methodologically con-
trolled and thus less daring proceedings of the social sciences.  
In any case, organization in Satin Island does not, or only marginally, rely on 
criteria such as contractual membership, corporative legal form, formal hierar-
chical power or routinized decision programs – although these classic definitions 
of what constitutes an organization can of course be studied in terms of their 
communicative and material performativity, too. Neither does performativity 
merely reside in organizational efficiency programs or the everyday dramas of 
                                                           
7  U proceeds to derive a speculative theory of experience from the phenomenon of 
buffering, according to which affect theory’s missing half-second (see Angerer, this 
volume) is part and parcel of the necessary buffering of experience: „[i]t dawned on 
me that what I was actually watching was nothing less than the skeleton, laid bare, of 
time or memory itself. […] We require experience to stay ahead, if only by a nose, of 
our consciousness of experience – if for no other reason than the latter needs to make 
sense of the former […] and, for this purpose, has to be fed with a constant, unsorted 
supply of fresh sensations and events.” (McCarthy 2015: 64) 
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organizational life and its mise-en-scènes. For instance, it remains unclear where 
and how decisions about the Project are made, other than the suspicion that they 
are shaped in conjunction with the data streams of its network architecture. And 
although the reader is confronted with U’s organizational experiences and  
actions, McCarthy is clearly not interested in presenting organizational life as 
one of role-playing and everyday dramas. Rather, organizational effects are per-
petually accomplished through talk and speculation; through translating concepts 
and theories into organizational imperatives and selling propositions; and, signif-
icantly, through organizational practices that rely on digital infrastructures and 
data streams just as much as on the material spaces of organizing and its human 
actors. At times, U’s experiences point to a posthumanist performativity that  
influences organized life, where the presumed agency of human actors and/or  
algorithmic infrastructures is blurred into more indistinguishable forms of intra-
action that produce phenomena.  
It makes sense, then, to perceive U as a revenant of “K”, whom Kafka sent 
into the contingent and impenetrable, uncanny and violent machine of bureau-
cratic ordering and organization, so often not deemed more than rationally and 
functionally ordered. As Benjamin (1999: 803) commented, the issue of the  
“organization of life and work in the human community” would inform Kafka’s 
oeuvre, in which organization itself had taken the place of fate in modernity. As 
Satin Island shows, the late capitalist and pervasively mediated and networked 
world of organizing engenders its own obscurity and uncanniness, a fate that  
requires further and deeper engagements with organization’s posthumanist  
performativity.  
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Performing the economy, digital media  
and crisis  
A critique of Michel Callon 
JENS SCHRÖTER 
 
 
Milton Friedman, who received the Nobel Prize in economics in 1976, published 
a famous and controversial essay in 1953. In “The Methodology of Positive 
Economics” he wrote:  
 
“Positive economics is in principle independent of any particular ethical position or nor-
mative judgments […]. Its performance is to be judged by the precision, scope, and con-
formity with experience of the predictions it yields. […] [T]he belief that a theory can be 
tested by the realism of its assumptions independently of the accuracy of its predictions is 
widespread and the source of much of the perennial criticism of economic theory as unre-
alistic. Such criticism is largely irrelevant, and, in consequence, most attempts to reform 
economic theory that it has stimulated have been unsuccessful.” (Friedman 1966: 4 and 
41)  
 
Friedman argues that only the predictions of a given model, not its assumptions, 
have to be correct. This argument was and is used to defend different, more or 
less orthodox (‘neoclassical’) economic models, based on problematic assump-
tions (e.g. methodological individualism, homo oeconomicus, money as neutral 
‘veil’, the ‘auctionator’1). Friedman explicitly states that this kind of ‘criticism is 
largely irrelevant’. Unfortunately, it also fails to support orthodox economic 
models, insofar as most of them predict that markets tend towards a state of equi-
                                                           
1 There are lots of critiques on these points, see especially with regard to Friedman 
Keen (cf. 2001: 148-153). See Keen (2011) for a general critique of mainstream eco-
nomics. 
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librium. This is not to say that there are no theoretical extensions and refine-
ments that discuss the possibilities of market failure and of course the notion of 
‘neoclassical’ is too narrow to describe what remains of pluralism in ‘main-
stream’ economics. But since 2008, there’s a growing feeling that ‘orthodox’ or 
‘mainstream’ economics is somehow incorrect. Economist Kenneth Rogoff, 
former member of the International Monetary Fund, admitted that the “very ele-
gant economic models that dominated academic science for decades turned out 
to be very useless in practice”.2 There was a “complete failure of neoclassical 
economics to anticipate the crisis” (Keen 2011: xi). Today it seems that only 
theoretical models that predict crises are correct. 
It is significant that at least some economists criticize their own models – 
while Michel Callon says, admittedly five years before the crisis: “There are […] 
positions we have to abandon. The first is the idea of critique of hard econo-
mists, which is intended to show them that [they] are wrong” (Barry/Slater 2002: 
301). This statement by Callon, implies that he follows the potentially obsolete 
models of ‘hard economists’ without any critique, already points to the necessity 
of analyzing his approach of the ‘performativity of the markets’ more closely.  
Why Callon? He is one of the leading proponents of Actor-Network-Theory 
(ANT), which is highly fashionable at least in contemporary media studies. The 
aim of this paper is to show that ANT has no explanation for the economic crisis, 
not even a notion of it. In showing this, a deeper theoretical problem is ad-
dressed. In criticizing Callon’s approach, I would also like to criticize what has 
recently be called the practice turn in media studies (often using ANT) and I will 
try to defend what one could call ‘the logic of specific logics’. To avoid misun-
derstandings: It is of course to be welcomed that media studies analyze media 
practices empirically, e.g. using ethnographic methods, and do not just deduce 
abstractly potentials of a given medium from its alleged essential properties. But 
if this orientation on practices is radicalized, if it is stated that the media are 
simply an effect of practices and if a ‘non-media centric media studies’ is devel-
oped, as recently done by Shaun Moores and David Morley (cf. Kraj-
ina/Moores/Morley 2014), then we cross the line towards what I call praxeo-
                                                           
2 „Neuorientierung der Wirtschaftswissenschaften“ see: http://www.handelsblatt.com/ 
unternehmen/management/koepfe/star-oekonom-fordert-neuorientierung-der-wirtscha 
ftswissenschaften/6097068.html 
  Cf. Keen (2011: 12-15) on the very few economists that predicted the crisis from 2008 
(although the neo-marxian approaches are not mentioned). 
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centrism, in which the practices of presupposed human actors are privileged.3 
Callon’s theory of the performativity of economics is quite exemplary for this 
problem – in forgetting the scripts of money and digital technologies and how 
these two non-human actors interact. 
In her famous 1992 text on the “De-scription of technical objects”, Made-
leine Akrich, herself a central proponent of ANT, demanded a two-step analysis. 
Firstly there had to be the analysis of the technical object, the opening of the 
black box, the reading of the scripts of the object, a move also demanded by 
Bruno Latour (2005: 79-82), the most important author of ANT. Only then, as a 
second step, practices should be analyzed – because without knowing the scripts, 
one could not even know if a practice was a ‘misuse’ of the object or exactly the 
intended, prescribed use. One could not even know if there was room for differ-
ent practices at all. Often the human actors are themselves, not aware of the con-
tingency and historicity of the technological scripts. Ethnographic methodolo-
gies, as used by Morley for example, pay more attention to the actions of people 
because technical objects don’t reveal their scripts if you simply observe them 
visually from the outside. The symmetry proposed by ANT between human and 
non-human actors tends to be dissolved by privileging human actors. Instead of 
‘non-media-centric media studies’, it seems, a non-praxeocentric praxeology is 
required. 
 
 
1. CALLON, PERFORMATIVITY AND CRISIS 
 
The central slogan of ANT is: ‘Follow the actors’ and at least Latour (2005: 54) 
names Harold Garfinkel’s (1967) ethnomethodological approach as one of his 
central intellectual sources. In this sense, ANT observes the ongoing, processual, 
performative production of ‘the social’ through ever changing networks of hu-
man and non-human actors. “The performativity program starts with an ethnog-
raphy of socio-technical agencements” (Callon 2005: 5).  
                                                           
3 Of course in Callon this is more complex: human actors are themselves defined by  
relations and theoretically humans are not the fundamental unit of ANT-analyses (see 
Callon 2007: 346). But de facto human practices are often privileged above non-
human actors, as I will try to show.  
250 | JENS SCHRÖTER 
 
In 1998, Callon published the anthology, The Laws of the Markets, in which he 
presented his concept of the performativity of economics (Callon 1998a).4 The 
main idea is that economics, – the science describing economical processes – 
does not just describe the economy but also produces it.5 That means an entity 
like ‘the market’ is not given, but continuously produced6 and one of the ingredi-
ents of these, as he calls it, (with a notion that can already be found in the work 
of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari,) agencements, are economic theories (for a 
critique cf. Brisset 2016).  
I begin my reading with the observation that Callon surprisingly reinvents 
some basic concepts already invented by Marx. I insist on that point, because 
what is really problematic is that there is no notion of crisis, the word does not 
                                                           
4 It is not possible here to detail the history of notions like ‘performativity’ and ‘praxe-
ology’ – but it is also not necessary, I will stick to the versions given by Callon and 
his followers, but see Reckwitz (2003). 
5 The first obvious question arises already here: Callon just speaks of ‘economics’ and 
of ‘economists’ (see the quote above) without specifying which economics he means. 
That suggests he simply accepts the reigning mainstream economics, that is, simply 
put, neoclassical theory (mentioned e.g. in Callon 1998b: 22; cf. also Mirowski/Nik-
Khah 2008: 96 and 117). He refers to “standard economic theory” (1998c: 247) and 
marginalist analysis (ibid.: 247-248), which is of course part of ‘standard’ neoclassical 
theory. This already negates the conflict in economics between this mainstream and 
so-called heterodox economics (cf. Keen 2001 and 2011 for a scathing critique of the 
neoclassical mainstream; cf. Lee 2009 on the history of heterodox economics; see also 
http://paecon.net; Callon (2005: 11) at least mentions “heterodox or even radical  
currents” – but gives no clear explanation why he implicitly and explicitly prefers the 
orthodox one. One has to assume it is because it is dominant – but that would presup-
pose what has to be explained).  
6 Here the next question arises. Fine (2003: 480) observes that markets of course exist-
ed long before economy as an academic discipline existed (as Callon 2005: 8 himself 
admits). So why is analyzing economics particularly important or relevant in order to 
understand how markets are performed? Of course one could argue that market partic-
ipants have something like implicit theories of what a market is (cf. ibid.: 9), but then 
one should analyze these instead of academic economics (cf. Mirowski/Nik-Khah 
2008: 99, they especially insist in the case of the so-called ‘FCC auctions’: “Corpo-
rate imperatives played the decisive role in determining the auction” (ibid.: 112; orig-
inal emphasis) – and not ‘performing economists’).  
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even appear in the index of The Laws of the Markets7 and at least Marxian theo-
ry, whatever else its flaws may be, has developed some ideas for the cause of 
economic crisis. This is a particularly pressing problem: Keen’s controversial 
study, Debunking Economics, begins with the observation (2001: 1), that main-
stream economics in the last decade was indeed very often involved in construct-
ing (‘performing’) markets and economies – and that this went awry quite often. 
It is difficult to conceive how crisis comes about when the markets are ‘per-
formed’ – and it is not very convincing just to say, well, performing something 
can also go wrong, or as Callon (2007: 326) puts it: “But the performation may 
well fail, and the conditions of felicity may not be fulfilled.” But why and how 
does performation fail?  
One of the rare examples for crisis in Callon is the crash of October 19, 
1987, connected to the Black-Scholes Formula, a mathematical tool, developed 
in the early 1970s to calculate and therefore price risks of given assets (cf. Taleb 
2010). Callon (2007: 321) writes: “Yet failure can occur when events take place 
that are incompatible with the formula and its world. Financial crisis is a crisis 
for the formula.”  
Firstly, this implies that the crisis is in a way an unexpected and unwanted 
event, a ‘failure’. Although this may seem self-evident, it is not – especially in a 
framework in which the thesis is that the economy is performed and this ‘per-
formation’ is described as the “construction of a world” (ibid.: 333). There are at 
least some conspiracytheory-style economists (cf. Bichler/Nitzan 2014; similar 
arguments can be found in Post-Operaism) who would argue that the crisis is 
wanted by ‘the capitalists’ and that ‘unemployment’ is one of their ‘weapons’. 
So there should at least be an argument, why the crisis was not an intended effect 
of the ‘formula’ but its failure. Why should ‘performing the economy’ mean 
producing a successful economy? And by which criteria ‘successful’? 
Secondly, even when we exclude this first possibility, Callon’s quote sug-
gests that a better formula (with less “technical shortcomings”, Callon 2007: 
323) might not have failed – crisis is not a structural property of non-human ac-
                                                           
7 Callon can, of course, not be criticized, for not mentioning the dot.com crisis of 2001 
or the financial meltdown of 2008 in The Laws of the Markets from 1998. But the 
crash of 1987 is not mentioned once, the crash from 1929 is only mentioned three 
times (1998a: 78 (twice), 205). It seems that in a very ‘neoclassical’ fashion crashes 
and crises are ignored as purely contingent, external phenomena. Even after 2008, this 
didn’t change in the Callon school. In Fabian Muniesa’s book The Provoked Economy 
from 2014 there is one mentioning of the 1987 crash (77) and one of the 1929 crash 
(16). No theoretical explanations are given why such crises exist. 
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tors like money or capital (as Marxists would have it), but a mistake made by 
human actors, like financial mathematicians.  
Thirdly, this formulation leads to deep problems in the overall makeup of the 
argument. Underlining the performative character of economics, Callon insists 
that the formula produces its world, otherwise it wouldn’t be performative, that 
is producing what it only seems to describe. When “a world is put into motion by 
the formula describing it” (ibid.: 320), how then can “unexpected events” (ibid.: 
326) appear? And if they occur, doesn’t that point to an unperformed outside? Is 
‘crisis’ not by definition the limit of the constructive activity8 implied by the no-
tion of performativity? And what exactly does it mean when Callon (ibid.: 323) 
then observes, that “it is not the formula itself that can cause that world […] to 
exist. Other forces, other interests are involved”? If the formula can be disrupted 
by those ‘other forces’, shouldn’t they be of primary interest? And how is this 
boundary, between the performed world and its outside, to be described? To an-
swer this, one would need a theory that does not perform, but describe (a possi-
bility explicitly rejected by Callon9), because if this meta-theory would again 
perform, how could an un-performed outside be described by a performing theo-
ry? Wouldn’t the meta-theory then perform the boundary between the performed 
and the un-performed? And how could this be understood – wouldn’t this end in 
                                                           
8 As already quoted, Callon (2007: 333) speaks explicitly of “construction of a world”. 
But admittedly it is not clear in the discussion on performativity if ‘performing’ some-
thing is the same as ‘constructing’ it (especially the work of Judith Butler 1993: 4-12 
is a case in point). But in relation to Callon, MacKenzie, Muniesa and Liu write, that 
“he proposes considering economics not as a form of knowledge that depicts an  
already existing state of affairs but as a set of instruments and practices that contribute 
to the construction of economic settings, actors, and institutions” (2007: 4, emphasis 
added, JS). 
9 Callon (1998b: 29, emphasis added, JS) writes: “Social science is no more outside the 
reality it studies than are the natural and life sciences. Like natural science, it actively 
participates in shaping the thing it describes.“ If describing a thing means producing it 
‘performatively’ then this is also the case with Callon’s approach itself. When he 
writes that the notion of “framing […] enables us to think and describe the process of 
‘marketization’” (19, emphasis added, JS), doesn’t that mean that his notion of ‘fram-
ing’ not only describes ‘marketization’, but also shapes and produces it? Doesn’t  
Callon’s theory shape all things it describes as performative? And how then can he 
state in the title of Callon (2007: 311) that “economics is performative” (emphasis 
added, JS), as if this were an ontological (that is: non-performed) fact outside of his 
own theory? 
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a massive self-contradiction, a theory performing the un-performed? And so 
forth.  
It is not possible here to read all passages of Callon and his followers closely 
to point to the somewhat vague character of the notion of performativity. A few 
remarks will suffice:  
Firstly, the possibility of failure or “misfire” (Callon 2010) is central to the 
debate of performativity, already in an early text by Derrida (1988) on Austin’s 
notion of the ‘performative’, which is relevant for Butler’s (1993) arguments on 
performativity. In his debate with Judith Butler (2010), Callon insisted that “the 
general rule is a misfire” (2010: 164) and agrees with Butler’s idea that “the risk 
of breakdown and disruption are constitutive to any and all performative opera-
tions” (ibid.: 165, quoting Butler 2010: 152). I cannot go into why exactly per-
formative operations are in a way structurally prone to breakdown – in my view 
this question isn’t clearly answered by Butler, Callon or Derrida. But even if we 
assume it to be correct, it still fails to demonstrate why the economy sometimes 
works (or at least: seems to work) and sometimes is in a state of manifest crisis – 
again the questions of the ‘conditions’ or the ‘outside’ which produce resistance 
to the performation becomes pressing. 
Secondly, Callon writes:  
 
“MacKenzie proposes the notion of counterperformativity to denote these failures, be-
cause in this case the formula produces behaviors that eventually undermine it. […] What 
Popper called refutation is another name for counterperformativity or what I have called 
overflowing.” (2007: 323)10  
 
Now it is the formula that produces what undermines it – how does this relate to 
the ‘unexpected events’ cited above? When ‘counterperformativity’ is the same 
as ‘refutation’ by Popper – which means that theories can never be positively 
confirmed, but only definitely be falsified by experimentation – why then is this 
complicated notion of ‘performativity’ necessary at all? Wouldn’t it then be 
enough to say – as Keen (2001; 2011) does – that a certain model to describe the 
economy, let’s say neoclassical economics, doesn’t fit to the observed facts (the 
crisis) and therefore is simply wrong?11 Of course, Callon (2007: 320) insists 
                                                           
10 The concept of ‘overflowing’ is discussed in more detail in Callon (1998c). Basically 
it’s the “irrepressible” (ibid.: 250) result or side-effect of ‘framing’ – it is that what 
necessarily evades framing. 
11 It is interesting that Callon (2007: 330) writes: „The Black and Scholes formula or the 
theory of general equilibrium, confined to the academic world can find its appropriate 
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that “the concept of performativity has led to the replacement of the concept of 
truth (or nontruth) by that of success or failure”. But if a scientific theory makes 
a prediction that is confirmed by observation – then we call it a successful theory 
and also a ‘true model’, as long as (in accordance with Popper) it is not refuted 
by new observation. Otherwise “a prediction proves false” as Butler (2010: 153) 
puts it in a critical discussion of Callon’s approach. So the difference of ‘suc-
cess’ and ‘truth’ is not quite convincing. It is not clear that Callon’s notion of the 
performativity of economics offers a ‘successful’ model to understand crisis. 
 
 
2. CAPITALISM AND KAPITALISM 
 
If we follow Friedman’s methodological musings, meaning only theories pre-
dicting crisis are correct nowadays, the absence of a coherent theory of crisis 
points to fundamental problems in Callon’s approach. My thesis is that the 
praxeocentric reduction of the inner logic of non-human actors is the reason for 
Callon’s inability to cope with the crisis. And the two non-human actors whose 
interior logic is erased are two media technologies: money and the digital com-
puter. Callon (2007: 354) writes:  
 
“I use the word Kapitalism, with a capital K, to denote the reality imagined by everyone 
who considers the Western economic system to be a homogeneous reality, endowed with 
its own logic [emphasis added]. The assumption of a homogeneous economic reality is 
made by those who criticize capitalism12, thus defined, as well as by those who defend it 
                                                           
milieu, its felicity conditions. But when they move over to the Chicago derivatives  
exchange or to ministries responsible for economic planning, they may encounter or 
even trigger resistance, for their felicity conditions are not filled. […] Within the aca-
demic world, marginalist analysis thrives without any problem. As soon as it leaves 
that world of textbooks and students, which suits it so well, it gets into trouble.”  
‘General equilibrium’ and ‘marginalist analysis’ show that Callon is talking here 
about so-called mainstream, neoclassical economics – but when ‘marginalist analysis’ 
gets into trouble when its confronted with the real world, doesn’t that simply show 
that it is wrong (as Keen [2001; 2011] at least for some forms suggests)? And isn’t it 
revealing that nowadays lots of students of economics demand ‘real world economics’ 
– obviously economics fitting better to the world (see: http://www.real-world-econom 
ics.de; http://paecon.net)? 
12 See Callon (in: Barry/Slater 2002: 297): “Capitalism is an invention of anti-
capitalists”. In a way this statement isn’t very helpful because it is obvious that a  
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by talking of the market and its laws, in general. Experiments13 in past decades have 
shown that Kapitalism could only be a fiction: no program has managed to make Kapital-
ism exist nor to overthrow it. There are only capitalisms.” 
 
A typical move for praxeocentric discourses is to deny the possibility of an ‘in-
herent logic’ in relation to non-human entities – the argument is always that en-
tities are situated in historical and local practices and therefore are different 
without any underlying homogeneous logic (see Callon 2005: 15: “I don’t be-
lieve in A Kapitalism that could be reduced to AN impersonal logic”).  
Firstly, it is simply wrong that the critics of capitalism, against whom Cal-
lon’s argument is obviously made (explaining the German sounding “Kapital-
ism” with a capital ‘K’14), postulate a homogeneous entity called ‘capitalism’. 
‘They’ always admitted that capitalism has had historical phases e.g. imperialism 
and state-monopolistic capitalism or in another theoretical vein, Fordism and 
post-Fordism or that there is uneven development etc.15 They just postulated that 
capitalism has one or more fundamental principles that remain in place below 
historical and local differences, that is why Marx analyzes capitalism in “its ideal 
average” (1991: 970).  
Secondly and far more importantly, Callon seems to at least gesture to the ex-
istence of such a principle too: How could he even speak of ‘different capital-
isms’? He presupposes a fundamental principle common to all these capitalisms 
or otherwise he couldn’t even classify the different phenomena under one label 
‘capitalism’.16 See this symptomatic quote by Callon (2005: 5):  
                                                           
notion like ‘capitalism’ is the result of a description that is based on a theoretical 
model (e.g. differentiation theorists like Niklas Luhmann wouldn’t use it, he would 
speak of ‘functionally differentiated society’). And you can use such a model to  
criticize what you describe. But that’s of course true of all descriptions (also of that 
describing economics as performative) and insofar it makes no sense to say ‘Capital-
ism is an invention of anti-capitalists’ as if that would be a valid critique. 
13 The ‘experiments’ seems to be Callon’s word for so-called ‘real socialism’ (cf.  
Callon 2007: 349). 
14 I guess that this is related to the German tradition coming from Marx.  
15 The literature on these points is far too extensive as to be summed up here. 
16 Of course different theorists (like Niklas Luhmann) would doubt that there is such a 
thing like ‘capitalism’. For Luhmann there would only be different subsystems (one 
among them economy) whose difference is the unity of society, but ANT is no differ-
entiation theory and Callon himself introduces the question of capitalism, therefore he 
has to live with the question how to define capitalism (and even in differentiation  
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“Instead of assuming, for example, the existence of a spirit of capitalism or an overall log-
ic of a mode of production, we can relate certain forms of economic activity to the more or 
less chaotic, regular and general upsurge of calculative agencies formatted and equipped 
to act on the basis of a logic of accumulation and maximization.” 
 
At first, the idea of an ‘overall logic of a mode of production’ is negated – but 
then self-contradictorily ‘a logic of accumulation and maximization’ (that is of 
course, the logic of capitalist accumulation17) is reintroduced.  
This logical flaw typical of praxeocentrism is repeated over and over in his 
texts and it finds its most radical expression in a statement he quotes approving-
ly: “Rationality is always situated” (Callon 1998b: 48). For Callon, it seems to 
be universally rational to assume that rationality is never universal, but always 
situated – that is self-contradictory. A radical praxeocentrism dissolving every-
thing in locally and historically situated occurrences is logically impossible, be-
cause it could not even compare two different occurrences to highlight their local 
specificity, because to compare them, a general principle of comparison (here: 
that both occurrences are ‘practices’) has to already be taken into account. It 
makes no sense to say, ‘there is no such thing as photography but only photo-
graphic practices’, because even to select two practices to compare them as dif-
ferent photographic practices, presupposes an implicit knowledge of what pho-
tography is, otherwise the practices could not even be selected.  
Coming back to Callon: One of the main goals of his whole approach, and 
one I find quite appealing, is to show that markets are nothing natural and that 
the calculative agencies required in markets have to be constructed. Although 
Callon (1998b: 6) rejects “sociocultural frames”, he mentions such things like 
the law and the state, which also were named as preconditions for markets in the 
Marxian tradition (cf. Pashukanis 2002). But he insists particularly on the way in 
which the homo oeconomicus is produced. While this would perhaps be sub-
sumed under the problematic notion of ‘ideology’ in the Marxian tradition, Cal-
lon is more interested in the concrete tools and operations that produce ‘calcula-
tiveness’ on the side of the human actors and ‘calculability’ on the side of the 
objects. The question immediately arises, what is calculated and why there is 
calculation at all. “Competition between calculative agencies […] is largely de-
                                                           
theories like systems theory there is a controversial discussion nowadays if economy 
is really just a subsystem among others, cf. Pahl 2008: 55-63). See also the discussion 
between Barry, Slater and Callon (in: Barry/Slater 2002: 296), where they discuss the 
question of a “fundamental aspect” of capitalism. 
17 See Marx (1990: 742): “Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets.” 
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termined by the respective qualities of the calculating devices. The probability of 
gain is on the side of the agency with the greatest power of calculation […]” 
(Callon 1998b: 45). Competition and the goal of ‘gain’ are presupposed here and 
explain why calculation is used. That means: Callon presupposes a social form in 
which any entity, besides their specific and unique use-value, also has an ab-
stract exchange value, because only such an abstract value can be calculated. 
Although he doesn’t use these Marxian notions, one of his examples is very tell-
ing (cf. Callon 2007: 336-339): Norwegian fishers that are turned into economic 
subjects by transforming the fish into calculable ‘cyborg-fish’, that is: commodi-
ties. This is nothing other than a reinvention of what Marx (1990: 873-907) 
called ‘primitive accumulation’, in which objects are violently transformed into 
objects that have exchange value (and besides, may be useful).18 For Marx, prim-
itive accumulation is the precondition of the establishment of capitalist societies. 
But Callon does not use the term ‘value’ systematically in The Laws of the Mar-
ket, sometimes he speaks of “usage value” (1998b: 33) or “use value” (ibid.: 35), 
“exchange value” is only to be found in a quote (ibid.: 19), so basically it re-
mains unclear what exactly is calculated in Callon’s approach.19 Interestingly, in 
another text he writes: “As the old Marx so clearly saw: there is no exchange 
value without a use value, and no use value in a market regime without the pro-
duction of an exchange value” (2005: 6). 
 
 
                                                           
18 Holm (2007: 239) is very explicit about that: “When the cyborg fish is in place, the 
most violent acts of dispossession against coastal communities have already been  
undertaken; the fisheries commons have already been closed; the heritage of the 
coastal people has already been parceled and laid out, ready for the auction. With the 
successful introduction of fisheries resource management, most of the organizational 
and institutional apparatus that could have served as a power base for those who want 
to resist ITQs has already been squashed.” We read of ‘violence’ through which the 
‘commons’ (Gemeingut or Allmende in German) of the fishermen are closed and 
thereby the fishermen are ‘dispossessed’. This is exactly the process of primitive ac-
cumulation as described by Marx. See also Callon (1998b: 24 and 27) on “extending 
the spaces of calculation”. See also Holm/Nielsen (2007) again on the ‘cyborg-fish’. 
19 The word ‘value’ is sometimes used in Callon (1998b: 38, 50) in a vaguely moral 
sense, ‘values’ that are opposed to the market.  
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3. CALCULATION AND MONEY 
 
At this precise point we have to return to the question of a ‘specific logic’. 
Shouldn’t we say that the reduction of everything to exchangeable, calculable 
abstract quantities, a process that is also implied in Callon’s central notion of 
‘framing’ (see below), is specific for capitalism? This is at least the answer 
Marxian theory would give – capitalism is most generally to be understood as 
the total reign of abstract value-form, represented in money, meaning that every-
thing, especially labor-power, is turned into exchangeable commodities with an 
exchange value that is measured or at least represented in its price (cf. Larsen et 
al. 2014).20 Due to his praxeocentrism, we should expect that Callon denies this, 
especially since it would force him to accept the existence of Kapitalism (with a 
capital ‘K’) and this is indeed the case:  
 
“[T]here is no Great Divide between societies populated by calculative agencies and so-
cieties in which the agents do not calculate. Even Deleuze and Guattari were on the wrong 
track with their concept of deterritorialization, that extraordinary faculty bestowed on cap-
italism for breaking all ties and undoing solidarity […]. So-called traditional societies are 
populated – sometimes even over-populated with calculative agencies.” (Callon 1998b: 
39) 
 
Callon argues that there is no great divide between societies with and without 
calculative agencies, because there are no societies that do not calculate: there 
was always calculation and as a consequence, there is nothing special about capi-
talism – if capitalism can be equated with or related to calculation (see below), a 
connection Callon infers by referring to Deleuze and Guattari on capitalism next 
to his musings on calculation. We would either have to abandon the term ‘capi-
talism’ or we would have to call all societies, even ‘so-called traditional socie-
ties’, capitalist, acknowledging that there are indeed different capitalisms and no 
Kapitalism with any underlying principle. But this argument leads Callon to ar-
gue against himself: By stretching the principle of calculation to all societies and 
thereby erasing any (great) ‘divide’, he is the one who homogenizes unduly. It is 
difficult to understand why he rejects, on the one hand, a homogenizing principle 
                                                           
20 I’m ignoring here the difficulties of relating values and prices, whose relation turned 
into a difficult problem in the Marxian tradition. Keen (2001: 269-299) devastatingly 
criticizes Marxian economics on this ‘transformation problem’ as others do, but there 
are also defenders of Marx and authors who argue that this whole debate is completely 
beside the point (see Kliman 2007).  
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(‘Kapitalism’) that allows to relate different ‘capitalisms’ to each other and on 
the other hand introduces an even wider homogenizing principle – a calculation 
as such – that surprisingly and a-historically unites ‘traditional societies’ (by 
which, I guess, he means so-called ‘primitive societies’) and modern industrial 
capitalism under one category. But his argumentation is not only logically but al-
so historically unconvincing. If we assume that Callon relates the question of 
calculation to the existence of money (because he talks about the economy and 
not about mathematics), he would have to argue (if calculation is his homogeniz-
ing principle), that the sheer existence of money already means that there is capi-
talism. As Jacques Le Goff (2012) and others have shown, however, even the ex-
istence of money (as a materialization of calculation) does not make a society 
capitalist.21 Money is much older than capitalism. 
The question is, if a society is centered around money and, to use Akrich’s 
term, its scripts. Only when the basic script is M-C-M’, meaning that money (M) 
is used to produce commodities (C) that are sold for more Money (M’) and when 
this script is fundamental for all activities (cf. e.g. for a recent and especially 
pointed argument Lotz 2014), then we can speak of capitalism. At least this is a 
definition that avoids the confusion created by Callon. This script (M-C-M’) is 
the definition of capital, according to Marx (1990: 247-257): Capital is the pro-
cess of making more money out of money.22 Marx (ibid.: 166-167) writes: “They 
                                                           
21 As these remarks suggest, there is a profound lack of historical thinking in Callon. 
One can see this already at the very beginning of his introduction of The Laws of the 
Markets, where he writes: “The aim of the present book is to contribute to the analysis 
and understanding of the subtle relationships between economics and the economy; 
not within an historical perspective, although some chapters do include historical ma-
terial, but within a deliberately anthropological one.” (Callon 1998b: 2) It is of course 
legitimate to choose an anthropological perspective, but as I suggested (and will go on 
arguing) this produces severe problems of understanding ‘the economy’. But worse, 
just one page after he explicitly rejected a ‘historical perspective’ he writes: “[T]he 
market is a process in which calculative agencies oppose one another, without resort-
ing to physical violence, to reach an acceptable compromise in the form of a contract 
and/or a price […] Hence, the importance of the historical dimension which helps us 
to understand the construction of markets and the competitive arrangements in which 
they are stabilized, for a time and in a place.“ (ibid.: 3) The least one can say is that 
Callon’s relation to history is somewhat unclear. See also Callon (2007: 347) on his 
ideas for a “history of economics”. 
22 My reading of Marx follows recent neo-marxian approaches like the ‘critique of val-
ue’ (cf. Larsen et al. 2014) that focus not on class struggle but on the autopoietic 
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do this without being aware of it.” Marx’ definition implies that there is a script 
to money regulating our practices. Money is not just a transparent means for 
human ends existing independently of money – as a praxeocentric theory would 
have it (and by the way, also neoclassical economics has it, in which money 
plays nearly no role, cf. among a lot of other authors Pahl 2008: 9-16).  
Insofar as money is pure abstraction, that is: pure quantity, its quantum can 
only diminish or grow. It is not surprising that in its practical use, its quantum 
diminishes or grows. And therefore it is also not surprising that economic actors 
‘calculate’, as Callon rightly insists, because money can only be calculated. Cal-
lon argues in a typically praxeocentric matter, that there are only different mar-
kets: “The idea of the market as a unified category and institution is progressive-
ly disappearing” (Callon, in Barry/Slater 2002: 291)23 but of course no one 
would trade and calculate on markets if the outcome wasn’t more money than the 
amount invested. Again: This script disappears and although Callon implies, as I 
have argued above, the goal of ‘gain’ as central for markets (1998b: 45) the ex-
                                                           
movement of value in the form of money as central for capitalism. One point might 
seem problematic here: If the tendency of money to become more money would lie – 
as I suggested – in its purely quantitative character, shouldn’t the existence of money 
automatically lead to capitalism and how can there be societies with money but with-
out capital (understood as infinite process of accumulation of money)? Although this 
is a complex question, which cannot be answered here in detail, it seems that firstly in 
many ‘traditional’ societies money-commodity-relations are marginal (compared to 
subsistence) and secondly that the disruptive script of money was deliberately re-
pressed, e.g. by the ban of interest (as in Islam) or giving money such a heavy and 
cumbersome materiality that it cannot be accumulated easily, as in the classical case 
of the ‘stone money of Yap’ (cf. Gillilland 1975). 
23 The context of the quote is: “But the market is not this unified category as it was in 
the nineteenth century, or even in the first half of the twentieth century. I think that the 
paradox is the following: everybody agrees that the market is a very effective institu-
tion, but now it seems to me that more and more people consider that there are various 
ways of organizing concrete and specific markets. So it’s a very different situation  
because you now have an abundance of ways of seeing economic markets. The idea of 
the market as a unified category and institution is progressively disappearing.” Again: 
that different forms of markets may exist is plausible – but that doesn’t mean that 
there isn’t an underlying principle (a ‘unified category’) that makes it possible to  
address this different phenomena as markets in the first place. Interestingly, Callon 
argues that the idea of the market ‘as a unified category’ is ‘progressively disappear-
ing’, although he gives no hint what the reasons for that might be. 
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plicit “imperative of profitability is absent” (Fine 2003: 480), because this would 
explicitly (and rightly so) introduce a unifying principle.  
Callon (1998b: 12) states: “The agent is calculative because action can only 
be calculative.” For one, this statement fails to differentiate economic practice 
(‘action’) from every other practice and thereby again underlines the status of 
calculation as Callon’s homogenizing principle. Moreover, Callon deduces cal-
culativeness from action (‘because action can only be calculative’), that is: from 
practice and not from the central role of a medium whose script is pure calcula-
bility. Although the role of devices, technologies etc. is so central for Callon’s 
argument, they are suspiciously often reduced to useful tools in the hands of hu-
man actors. This is especially (and very significantly) the case for money – it 
seems that Callon, implicitly following (and not criticizing, as was noted above) 
the economical mainstream, also follows the neoclassical mainstream’s exclu-
sion and oblivion of money.24 We can expect that this discursive operation ap-
pears as a reduction and erasure of the pure quantitativeness, calculability and 
abstraction of money. That is exactly the case.  
 
 
4. MONEY, COMMODITY, PRODUCTION 
 
Callon (1998b: 21-22) begins with describing the script of money:  
 
“To be sure its main contribution was to provide a unit of account without which no calcu-
lation would be possible. However the essential is elsewhere. Money is required above all 
– even if this point is often overlooked – to delimit the circle of actions between which 
equivalence can be formulated. It makes commensurable that which was not so before. 
[…] It provides the currency, the standard, the common language which enables us to re-
duce heterogeneity, to construct an equivalence and to create a translation […]. It is the fi-
nal piece, the keystone in a metrological system that is already in place and of which it 
merely guarantees the unity and coherence. Alone it can do nothing [emphasis added, JS]; 
combined with all the measurements preceding it, it facilitates a calculation which makes 
commensurable that which was not so before.” 
                                                           
24 See also Orléan (2014: 4) who underlines that for the „neoclassical theory of value 
[…] money is a peripheral fact, a secondary device, a mere adjunct to utility that  
exists solely as a means of facilitating transactions“. It should be noted that in 
Latour’s theory of ‘immutable mobiles’ there is also a reduction of money to just one 
‘immutable mobile’ amongst others, so this repression of money seems to be common 
to different authors from ANT, cf. Schröter (2011: 229-241). 
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At first sight, Callon seems to acknowledge the script of money – but with a sig-
nificant twist: Money is added as the endpoint of a metrological chain of meas-
urements onto a world before money. There is a world performatively roduced as 
calculable by measurement and then money comes in – ‘merely’ as a ‘final 
piece’. But this doesn’t explain how ‘equivalence’ is achieved, how money is re-
lated to ‘measurement’, that is: what it measures. Therefore, as was already stat-
ed above, some theory of value would be needed, which is not provided by Cal-
lon.25  
But to reduce money to the ‘final piece’ also negates that in the world we 
live in, everything is already produced with regard to money. Nothing is pro-
duced that doesn’t at least potentially yield more money than was invested – and 
this rule even shapes the commodities in a very concrete way, think of so-called 
‘planned obsolescence’ (cf. Bulow 1986). In Callon’s model,26 money is added 
as a market device to a production devoid of money: production does not ap-
pear.27 But if production is already structured with regard to money, money is 
not just a practical means of exchange. Commodities are things that have a price, 
that is, they are equivalent to some amount of money. Being a commodity means 
being a thing and being money. 
Callon (1999: 189) writes about the being of a commodity: “[T]o transform 
something into a commodity, it is necessary to cut the ties between this thing and 
other objects or human beings one by one.” The central notion here is ‘framing’:  
 
“[A] clear and precise boundary must be drawn between the relations which the agents 
will take into account and which will serve in their calculations, on the one hand, and the 
multitude of relations which will be ignored by the calculation as such, on the other.” 
(ibid.: 186-187; see also Callon 1998c) 
 
                                                           
25 Callon (1998: 22) writes: “Money establishes an ultimate equivalence between the 
value of a human life and that of investment in pollution abatement.” He makes this 
statement in relation to an example, in which the “negative externalities, for example 
the effects of pollution produced by a chemical plant” (ibid.: 21) are concerned. But 
the question arises: How can such different things be compared and made equivalent? 
‘Measurement’ alone cannot be the answer, because you need something to be meas-
ured – that is ‘value’. But Callon does not define ‘value’ (see above). 
26 And it is a model, even when Callon (cf. 1999: 194) insists that ANT is not a theory. 
27 To be sure, “producers” are mentioned a lot (Callon 1998b: 18, 19, 20 and passim), 
but there is no description or theory of production. 
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The objects simply seem to be there, out of nothing, and framing seems to mean 
ripping them out of emotional contexts to sell them. This looks more like a flea 
market than like a real economy in which commodities are produced as com-
modities for the markets. When Callon (1999: 189) writes: “one is not born a 
commodity, one becomes it”,28 this is not quite correct for the vast majority of 
objects surrounding us (the processes of primitive accumulation mentioned 
above set aside here, because in primitive accumulation, objects that weren’t 
commodities are turned into commodities). Although the book is called, The 
Laws of the Markets, Callon speaks right on the first page of the introduction of 
“economy” (1998b: 1), as if markets and (capitalist) economy were identical. He 
only talks about markets. This is also typical of the neoclassical approach, which 
tends to focus on exchange (cf. e.g. Orléan 2014: 37). To argue that way is to 
erase production, which means to erase capital from the picture, understood as 
M-C-M’ in which production of commodities is part of the movement of value, 
where commodities and money are in a way the same, namely metamorphoses of 
capital (cf. Marx 1990: 255). It seems that Callon has this theoretical (Marxian) 
argument in mind when he writes:  
 
“Money seems to be the epitome of the commodity; it is pure equivalence, pure disentan-
glement, pure circulation. Yet, as Viviana Zelizer showed so convincingly, agents are ca-
pable of constantly creating private money which embodies and conveys ties […]. This is 
the case of grand-mothers who gives her grand-daughter silver coins, or supermarkets 
                                                           
28 See also Callon (1998b: 19), where he develops basically the same argument, quoting 
anthropologist Nicolas Thomas on the definition of ‘commodity’: “Commodities are 
here understood as objects, persons, or elements of persons which are placed in a  
context in which they have exchange value and can be alienated. The alienation of a 
thing is its dissociation from producers, former users, or prior context.” Interestingly 
enough, Callon doesn’t take his definition of ‘commodity’ from economic theory (as 
one might expect, given his argument that economic theory performs the economy), 
but from an anthropologist. Firstly that shows that he consequently follows his line of 
equating traditional societies and industrial capitalism (by means of ‘calculation’). But 
secondly, and in line with my critique of this being ahistorical, this is highly problem-
atic. To me it simply makes no sense to describe commodity production in industrial 
capitalism with a notion like ‘alienation’ in the sense that the product has to be torn 
away from its producer – products (commodities) in industrial capitalism are made to 
be given away, no one is emotionally attached to them.  
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which give fidelity vouchers to their customers.” (Callon 1999: 190; he is alluding to 
Zelizer 1998)29  
 
Or see a similar quote from another publication: “Earmarking is deployed as 
much in the domestic sphere, with silver coins which a grandmother gifts to her 
grandchildren to put in their piggybanks in memory of her, as in systems of mass 
distribution, with vouchers, fidelity or credit cards and other such devices” (Cal-
lon 1998b: 35). 
This is highly symptomatic: The coins grandma gives her granddaughter are 
treated as ‘private money’ – although these coins cannot be exchanged against 
commodities. Grandma can give as many coins as she wants to her granddaugh-
ter, she could even produce new ‘private money’ by writing the word ‘money’ 
on paper snippets as much as she likes, but she shouldn’t try to go to a super-
market (even to one that emits vouchers) and try to acquire commodities with the 
private money.30 ‘Private money’ is not money at all (there is no ‘private money’ 
as there is no ‘private language’), even if the human actors name it ‘money’ – 
which demonstrates that there’s an irreducible script that cannot be easily 
changed by different practices.31 Callon (1998b: 35 and 54, FN 6) gives an ex-
ample of a prostitute who writes the day and the date of an especially beautiful 
night with a client on a banknote – this is an example that “the banknote is an 
excellent medium for the exercise of rewriting”. Apart from the fact that the 
banknote here is explicitly called a medium the argument seems to be that mon-
ey is not abstract and that its “official attachments” can be ‘overloaded’ with 
                                                           
29 It is strange that Callon defines the commodity by framing, that is untying (1999: 189: 
“cut the ties between this thing and other objects or human beings one by one”); but 
doubts that money is ‘disentanglement’ and follows Zelizer on ‘money which embod-
ies and conveys ties’. With this argument he separates again commodities from money 
(because only commodities seem to follow the basic operation of ‘framing’), although 
commodities can only be understood as commodities in relation to money. Giving 
away a thing on the market (and in that sense ‘untying’ it from me as the seller) means 
exchanging it against money – money is the force that allows generalized ‘untying’ 
and in that sense it is ‘pure disentanglement’. It is a basic move in Callon to tear apart 
money and the commodity – to erase the basic logic of capitalism. 
30 This shows that money cannot easily be understood as a ‘sign’ (on the sign-theories of 
money see Hutter 1995). 
31 Callon mentions the law – and the law, the state, the police and ideological state  
apparatuses have exactly to ensure the stability of the script, or to put it precisely: one 
set of aspects of the potentiality of the script. 
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“new, private, messages” (ibid.: 35). But what does this mean? Of course, I can 
use a banknote as a medium of writing, but it would be outlandish to suggest that 
the role of money is thereby changed from the universal equivalent, pure calcu-
lability to something personal and individual (as the individual banknote might 
be). In a similar way, you could say that you can change the rules of soccer by 
writing some personal notes on the ball. The script of money is repressed in fa-
vor of practices by human actors. ANT’s own principle of symmetry is violated.  
To sum up: Money is severed from the notion of commodity.  This means that 32
Callon, contrary to his talk of performativity which implies processuality, erases 
the endless processual character of money changing into commodities and back, 
a movement that Marx (1990: 255) called the “automatic subject” of society – 
and which is perhaps the ‘outside’ of the performation of the economy in Cal-
lon’s sense. 
 
 
5. LABOR AND COMPUTERS 
 
If production is erased from Callon’s discourse, then labor of or in production is 
erased too. The word ‘labor’ is not mentioned once in The Laws of the Market 
(except from some titles in bibliographies); not surprisingly, for ANT, the word 
‘laboratory’ is much more frequent. The erasure of production also means that 
digital technologies can only play a role on the level of the markets, that is on the 
level of distribution and circulation – and it’s even more radical: In The Laws of 
the Markets (1998) the computer is only mentioned a few times and in Market 
Devices (2007), the word ‘computer’ shows up only once; the word ‘digital’ 
                                                           
32 It is interesting that one of the paradigmatic examples for Callon is an experimental 
strawberry market in southern France (cf. Garcia-Parpet 2007). As Callon (1998b: 20) 
underlines this was a “market with characteristics corresponding to those described in 
political economy manuals” – meaning a demonstration of the performativity of  
economics. But this strangely constructed market adhered indeed closely to neoclassi-
cal manuals, in that it was a market with an ‘auctioneer’ in the Walrasian sense (cf. 
Keen 2011: 178-180). Firstly, real markets don’t have ‘auctioneers’ (cf. Binswanger 
1990: 345), insofar this example doesn’t show that real markets can be constructed 
according to neoclassical manuals and secondly the Walrasian market is a market 
without money (cf. Binswanger 1990). Although Callon discusses money right next to 
the strawberry market (cf. 1998b: 21) he doesn’t mention with a word the exclusion of 
money in Walras’ model of markets. Again money is reduced and repressed. 
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doesn’t appear at all (cf. Mirowski/Nik-Khah 2008: 118 for a critique of Callon 
leaving out “the notorious quasi-material shape-shifter the computer”).  
We can sum up: Callon severs money from commodities and in this way, 
from capital, and he represses production and therefore, on the one hand, labor, 
and on the other hand, the role of computers or digital technologies in produc-
tion. I insist on that point, because by excluding money, labor and digital tech-
nologies from his picture of the “economy” (1998b: 1),33 Callon excludes the re-
lationship that gives at least one explanation for the moments of crisis we wit-
ness – at least if we follow the ‘critique of value’ (cf. Larsen et al. 2014). The 
thesis is – to put it in highly simplified terms – that the unavoidable competition 
results in individual companies needing to produce commodities more cheaply in 
order to succeed in the market. In order to achieve this, increasingly advanced 
technologies must be used, hence increasing productivity. This means firstly, that 
increasingly large advance investment in infrastructure is required – the first rea-
son for the increasing inflation of credit, i.e. the financial superstructure. 
Secondly, so-called ‘rationalisation’ gradually eliminates labor. A primary 
historical compensatory mechanism for this was provided by the fact that the re-
duction in prices for products caused by increased productivity used to result in 
expanding markets (e.g. nowadays, many people have a car). Even if the in-
creased productivity undermined the creation of surplus value, provided the ab-
solute quantity of commodities increased, then more surplus value could still 
have been produced. 
One argument of the ‘critique of value’ at this juncture is that, with the intro-
duction of new digital technologies, for the first time in history, the elimination 
of labor is proceeding faster than markets can expand. The argument, that in the 
past technological progress didn’t lead to structural unemployment and therefore 
this won’t happen now, is flawed. Digital technologies are much more flexible 
and can substitute cognitive work, too. The script of digital computers is their 
programmability, leading to flexibility. One might say that the medium of money 
is struggling against digital technologies – they do not coexist or ‘co-perform’ 
(cf. Callon 2007: 335) peacefully.34 Their scripts come into conflict, independent 
of human practice. Marx knew this too, in a surprising anticipation of automa-
                                                           
33  Or at least reducing them. 
34 Another aspect is the discrete digital code, which can in principle be reproduced with-
out loss – meaning the digital products are more and more difficult to ‘frame’ as 
commodities, to use Callon’s words. These are products for which Callon’s thesis 
“one is not born a commodity, one becomes it” (1999: 189) does really apply and he 
doesn’t even mention them. 
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tion: after all, if people increasingly only relate “watchman and regulator to the 
production process itself”, then (at least for most of them) labor will cease to be 
a “great well-spring of wealth”. The less that production depends on “labour 
time and on the amount of labour employed than on the power of the agencies 
set in motion during labour time […], the general state of science and on the 
progress of technology”, the more “production based on exchange value breaks 
down” (Marx 1993: 704-705). In 2005, the world’s 200 largest companies al-
ready accounted for over 25 per cent of global economic activity, but are only 
able to employ 0.75 per cent of all people (cf. Kurz 2005: 81). It is therefore re-
vealing that there have been, especially in the last years, several publications ad-
dressing exactly this problem. In 2009, the computer entrepreneur, Martin Ford, 
published a much-discussed book, The Lights in the Tunnel. The book’s blurb al-
ready poses unmistakable questions: “Where will advancing technology, job au-
tomation, outsourcing and globalization lead? Is it possible that accelerating 
computer technology was a primary cause of the current global economic cri-
sis?” (Ford 2009). In one chapter (ibid.: 67-73) he emphasizes that a significant 
number of cognitively more complex tasks can be taken over by the growing ar-
tificial intelligence of our ‘smart’ devices (which is of course why they are called 
‘smart’). Mental labor is rationalized, too. Erik Brynjolfsson, a professor at MIT 
and Director of the MIT Center for Digital Business35, published in 2011 with 
Andrew McAfee a book titled Race against the Machine. How the Digital Revo-
lution is Accelerating Innovation, Driving Productivity, and Irreversibly Trans-
forming Employment and the Economy, where the authors also discuss the poten-
tial disappearance of labor.36 Finally, I want to mention a current study that pre-
dicts that up to 47 per cent of all jobs in the United States will be prone to ra-
tionalization (cf. Frey/Osborne 2013).  
After all, a jobless person consumes less, i.e. products that are manufactured 
cannot be sold (domestic market crisis) or consumers have to take up credits to 
maintain their lifestyles, the second reason for the inflation of debt. People who 
don’t have work may be unable to pay taxes. Therefore the state, which is sup-
posed to provide the legal, educational, etc. framework for the market. cannot 
                                                           
35  See http://ebusiness.mit.edu/erik/ 
36 This is especially interesting because Brynjolffson (1993) wrote an overview on the 
‘IT productivity paradox’. If even he admits, as he does in Race against the Machine, 
that there is a problem, it really has to be serious. 
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continue to function without credits – third reason for the inflation of debt.37 If it 
is no longer possible to consume and produce, then – to put it in simplified terms 
– it is also not possible to valorize value: one consequence is the flight to ‘fic-
tional capital’, as Marx (1991: 525-542) called it, meaning, the inflation of fi-
nancial markets: if you can’t make profits with production, you may make prof-
its with assets. And the inflated financial markets can collapse, but the collapse 
from 2008 was not the cause of the crisis, but one of its symptoms (cf. Loh-
hoff/Trenkle 2012 for a very firm, but surely controversial position).38 The ex-
pansion of computer-based technologies, the increase in structural mass unem-
ployment and the ever-denser chain of financial crises, large and small, since the 
late 1970s, stand in an internal, systematic relationship. Even if one doesn’t ac-
cept this explanation for the crisis, it is at least an explanation for the crisis, 
whereas Callon has none.  
Interestingly enough, he writes (Callon 2007: 315): “Without assistance, 
economic agents are not able to produce […] all the innovations that will guaran-
tee them a competitive advantage. They need chemists, physicists, or biologists 
working in universities.” Here, production and the role of ‘science’ and ‘tech-
nology’ for competitive advantage - basically by reducing costs through reduc-
ing labor – is at least implicitly addressed. And: “Competition between calcula-
tive agencies, focused on their ability to have their decisions recognized and ac-
cepted (for example, to propose a given product on a given market segment), is 
largely determined by the respective qualities of the calculating devices. The 
probability of gain is on the side of the agency with the greatest powers of calcu-
lation” (Callon 1998b: 45). Similarly, if you understand the ‘powers of calcula-
tion’ as those computing powers that help companies to reduce costs and to in-
crease productivity, you could come close to a theory of crisis – but Callon 
doesn’t develop this any further. 
                                                           
37 Of course these are not linear developments, there are lots of digressions and counter 
movements (e. g. there are nowadays also lots of savings; in some countries like  
Germany the unemployment rate falls due to successful export economies etc.). 
38 For English-speaking readers here’s the translated introduction to the book: 
http://www.krisis.org/2012/the-great-devaluation-introduction. Interestingly Butler 
(2010: 153) writes in her debate with Callon: „The present recession in some ways 
highlights this failure at the heart of financial performativity” – meaning she really 
tries to connect the discussion on the performativity of economics to the crisis of 
2008, although she also seems to locate the reasons for the crisis in the financial realm 
without asking why there is such an inflated financial superstructure in the first place. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
My readings of Callon’s texts on the performativity of economics tried to show 
that there is a privileging of human practices in Callon’s discourse, contrary to 
the alleged symmetry of human and non-human actors.39 Perhaps the most bla-
tant example of this is the idea – following Viviana Zelizer – that earmarking 
money can somehow change the script of money (or that actors can produce 
‘private money’). This praxeocentric erasure of the specific logic or script of the 
non-human actor of money is consistent with the erasure of the idea of ‘specific 
logics’ in general, which leads to inconsistencies in Callon’s argument. The 
praxeocentrism of his (and Latour’s) discourse is masked by the alleged ‘agnos-
ticism’ of ANT-style description: “I consider that social scientists don’t have 
special access to a truth that would be inaccessible to actors themselves” (Callon 
2005: 12). This idea of a pure description of the actors themselves (cf. also 
Latour 2005: 46-50 and 147) has the problem, besides others,40 that the non-
human actors cannot speak for themselves.41 The descriptivist discourse of ANT 
                                                           
39 It seems that Butler (2010: 153) basically critiques the same point: „My worry is that 
the cultural constructivist position thinks performativity works and that it imputes a 
certain sovereign agency to the operation of performativity.” 
40 A ‘pure description’ without any premises is impossible (Hands 2001: 208-210 under-
lines the role of economic metaphors in ANT, meaning that there is always already a 
specific framework in place); even if it were impossible, it is never completed,  
because networks are infinite; and even if it were possible and it could be completed 
in a meaningful way, the question still remains what exactly the use is in simply  
doubling and mirroring an existing practice. Purely doubling the practices of actors 
makes social science superfluous – Callon, by the way, admits that: After having  
written ‘that social scientists don’t have special access to a truth that would be inac-
cessible to actors themselves’ some lines later he states: “The role of the anthropology 
of (the) econom(y)ics is, I believe, to make these anthropological struggles explaina-
ble in their theoretical and practical dimensions, by identifying and revealing the  
forces that, in a more or less articulated way, challenge the dominant models and their 
grip on real markets.” (Callon 2005: 12, emphasis added, JS). Here, the social scientist 
or anthropologist ‘reveals’ (and ‘identifies’) something, meaning that it obviously has 
been hidden and misunderstood before, hidden to the actors involved and misunder-
stood by them. Obviously, scientists also in Callon need access ‘to a truth that would 
be inaccessible to actors themselves’ – otherwise they simply would be no scientists 
and couldn’t ‘explain’ anything, a notion Callon uses in the quote.  
41 And even human actors might not know exactly what they are doing and why. 
270 | JENS SCHRÖTER 
 
leads automatically to a praxeocentric reduction of non-human actors, contrary 
to all alleged symmetry. 
Moreover, this theoretical structure makes it impossible for Callon to devel-
op a consistent theory of crisis, a theory which allows for the ‘crisicity’ of crisis, 
if you allow this strange neologism – meaning a notion of crisis, in which it is 
not a mistake of human actors (e.g. developing unfortunately flawed formulas), 
but a result of the failing ‘co-performation’ of non-human actors, that is money 
and digital technologies,42 beyond all human intentions. That’s why humans then 
experience the crisis as incomprehensible disruption, as happened in 2008. Only 
a non-praxeocentric praxeology, as might be implied by the ‘value-critical’ read-
ing of Marx, can be an appropriate theory of this.43 Marx’ notion of the “auto-
matic subject” (1990: 255) of capital – a non-human actor – is interestingly 
enough confirmed by a much-discussed paper by Gode and Sunder (1993), in 
which they made simulations of markets with ‘zero intelligence traders’. Alt-
hough the simulated actors had no intelligence at all, the allocative efficieny of 
the markets was stable – meaning that no human practices, no human knowl-
edge, is necessary at all. The structure alone (‘the rules’) determines the output, 
which is a clear indication that human practices should not be overemphasized. 
Instead of this – with Marx – the social forms (structural dynamics) have to be 
analyzed and perhaps criticized. 
Although more should be said on that topic, finally a few words on the polit-
ical implications of Callon’s discourse. Although we already heard that Callon 
doesn’t want to criticize the economists, that doesn’t mean that he just and only 
follows the mainstream discourse – he tends to argue for “diversity”:  
 
“[S]aying that economics, with the multiplicity of frames of analysis and theoretical mod-
els that it develops, contributes to the constitution of the object that it studies, means im-
plicitly claiming that there is no single way of organizing the economy and moreover of 
organizing it satisfactorily or even effectively.” 
 
  
                                                           
42 One could perhaps translate this failing co-performation into the conflict between 
forces of production and the relations of production, which are so important for the 
Marxian tradition.  
43 It would be interesting to read Marx’ notion of the “automatic subject” (1990: 255), 
which is decidedly processual and is ‘performed’ unknowingly by (and ‘through’) 
human actors everyday with Butler’s non-subject-centered notion of performativity 
(cf. Butler 1993: 7ff.). I will develop this in another essay. 
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But this diversity and pluralism is not very far-reaching:  
 
“In itself the thesis of diverse modalities of organization of economic life is by no means 
new or revolutionary – no more than that of the diversity of market configurations. What 
the performativity thesis does add, is that there is no one best way, no single form of or-
ganization that imposes itself naturally and compellingly, so to speak, as the only one able 
to ensure the optimal functioning of markets.” 
 
The form of the market, “to stick to this very specific economic form of organi-
zation” (Callon 2010: 163), is simply presupposed as – it seems – natural form.44 
The actors are not asked. No choice beyond the dichotomy of state and market 
(cf. Callon 2007: 349), although the 2009 Nobel Prize for economics was award-
ed to Elinor Ostrom, who showed that there might be solutions beyond state and 
market, solutions which, by the way, might lead to forms beyond Kapitalism.45 
Why not let these insights perform the economy?  
There is one passage in Callon (2007: 330) which sounds like an explicit al-
lusion to Friedman’s ‘Methodology of Positive Economics’, with which my text 
began: “All of the economists who say that the unrealism of their propositions 
are of no concern to them have chosen their world, a world of papers, colleagues, 
and students – the one that suits their theories.” Apart from the point that here he 
surprisingly criticizes ‘hard economists’, one cannot avoid the conclusion that 
this also applies to Callon himself.  
 
 
  
                                                           
44 It is puzzling that Callon states: “To be sure, the market can be put to the service of 
political action”. This seems quite unrealistic given the neo-classical and neo-liberal 
hegemony – on the contrary, we have to read about ‘market-conforming democracy’ 
(cf. Berger 2013). 
45 To be sure, Callon (2007: 350/351; with reference to Gibson-Graham 2003) also  
mentions in passing experimentation in cooperative forms, but not surprisingly the  
result is: “The cooperative does not propose the alternative solution to a general  
problem but a particular solution to a series of very specific problems. In so doing it 
does not help to strengthen the illusion that global forms of organization of the econ-
omy exist.” For Callon obviously such ‘global forms of organization of the economy’ 
do exist – and that are of course the holy markets. 
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Performance and democratizing digitality 
StudioLab as critical design pedagogy 
JON MCKENZIE 
 
 
Performance and digitality constitute an onto-historical1 apparatus or dispositif 
reshaping cultures globally, yet our engagement with these performative circuits 
remains out-of-sync and ineffective, especially at the levels of knowledge and 
power, thought and action. Within higher education, modern disciplinary meth-
ods, arborescent institutional structures, and logocentric literacies inhibit the crit-
ico-creative syntheses needed to engage and resist neoliberal modes of performa-
tivity. In contemporary societies of control, universities around the world face 
daunting economic and political pressures to transform and innovate, while tradi-
tional forms of academic research and education struggle to contend with young 
people’s attachments to mobile technologies, social media, and consumer-driven 
design practices. StudioLab is a critical design pedagogy that seeks to democra-
tize emerging forms and processes of digitality by supplementing seminar-based 
critical thinking with studio-based design thinking and lab-based tactical media-
making. In StudioLab, students roleplay as critical design teams to research and 
create conceptually-rich projects that address contemporary social challenges 
through a variety of media forms and events. Critical design teams combine cul-
tural, organizational, and technological performances and learn ways to intro-
duce values of cultural efficacy into structures dominated by organizational effi-
ciency and technological effectiveness, thereby generating creative and poten-
tially transformative micro-transvaluations in themselves and others. This per-
formative matrix of valorizations helps to situate StudioLab’s practices of de-
                                                           
1  This term signals that history and ontology are themselves historical and ontological 
constructs. 
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mocratizing digitality and suggests new figurations of thought and action, new 
experiential architectures. 
 
 
METHODOLOGICAL CONTEXT: ALL PERFORMANCE  
IS ELECTRONIC 
 
All P is E, all performance is electronic: Our abilities to study performance in a 
wide variety of different forms, spaces, and times – from bodies to machines, 
from theaters to rituals to outer space, from the past to present and future – are 
tied to Cold War research, as they date from the mid-20th century. It was then 
that anthropologists and artists, electrical engineers and rocket scientists, manag-
ers and sociologists began patching together concepts of performance and cyber-
netic feedback to understand behaviors of people, technologies, organizations, 
and systems in general. Indeed, the radical extension of performance measures 
and systems theory across all disciplines of knowledge was theorized as per-
formativity by Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, 
an event he dates from the late 1950s (cf. Lyotard 1979: 3). Lyotard situates per-
formativity – the postmodern legitimation of knowledge and social bonds via op-
timization of input/output matrices – with the rise of computerized societies. It is 
not just that new methods of power and knowledge arise, but that all methods 
bend to a new set of legitimating parameters. Postmodern performativity is audit 
culture, networked society, the postmodern condition: be operational or disap-
pear, perform – or else.2  
And yet beyond its postmodern, post-disciplinary valences and thus operat-
ing at an entirely different scale, performance also enacts digitality by instantiat-
ing the emergence of a massive onto-historical apparatus (dispositif), one whose 
millennial coordinates can be mapped with those of orality and literacy (cf. 
McLuhan 1967 Ong 1982; Ulmer 2002). At this scale, performative digitality 
tears at the Western foundations of episteme, at its modes of conceptual training, 
its alphabetic media, its arborescent infrastructures. From a cultural perspective, 
performance emerges ‘between’ ritual and theater for a reason: performance en-
acts digitality just as ritual embodies mythic forces of traditional oral cultures 
                                                           
2  As I argue in Perform or Else (2001), performance is a challenging-forth of humans 
into a post-disciplinary formation of power/knowledge. This performance stratum can 
be understood in terms of Lyotard’s Postmodern Condition, Deleuze’s “Postscript on 
the Societies of Control”, and Hardt and Negri’s Empire. “Perform – or else” is the 
order word of this onto-historical formation. 
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and theater represents the histories and fictions of modern literate worlds. Per-
formance quickens the oral repertoires and literate archives described by Taylor 
(2003) and more importantly the digital databases encoding them both. Digitality 
entails the performative reinscription of oral, literate, visual, and numerate traces 
within networked databases and electronically-processed media flows – as well 
as the enabling mutations in bodily formation, social habitus, and ontological 
set-ups. Performance and digitality immerse us as grand moiré patterns produced 
by transhistorical overlayings of ritual and theater, repertoire and archive, orality 
and literacy. The West’s self-defining distinctions of logos and mythos, eidos 
and imagos, dialectics and mimesis, all become unmoored in this remix of onto-
historical apparatuses, and it is within this flickering, transmedia milieu that Nie-
tzsche’s revelations, Benjamin’s flashes, and Ronell’s hallucinogenres3 emerge 
as untimely modes of thought. If all P is E, what becomes of episteme, peda-
gogy, and method in their unsettling remix with doxa, initiation, and ritual? 
 
Figure 1: Teaching Nietzsche’s double affirmation in an MBA program 
Credit: Author 
  
                                                           
3  “Hallucinogenre” is Avital Ronell’s neologism, a trippy tropic play on hallucinogenics 
and genres. Smart media, e.g., are modern pharmakons, monstrous mashes of different 
substances. 
282 | JON MCKENZIE 
 
TEACHING THE UNTEACHABLE 
 
While studying painting and film in the 1980s, I had a fantasy
 
that would come 
to guide my pedagogical orientation: how to teach Nietzsche’s double affirma-
tion in an MBA program? This question overcame me while reading Deleuze’s 
Nietzsche and Philosophy, and it struck me at the time as truly perverse: how to 
teach one of the most perplexing philosophical thoughts in one of the most reac-
tionary of institutional sites: a Masters of Business Administration program in 
Reagan’s America? How to translate Nietzsche’s prophetic call to affirm both 
chance and necessity – chance as necessity – in a context where both are calcu-
lated according to inputs and outputs and driven by utility and the profit motive? 
How to challenge profits with prophecy? 
Unbeknownst to me at the time, the perverse circuits connecting Nietzsche, 
teaching, and capital had been described decades earlier by Pierre Klossowski, 
who posed Nietzsche’s quest to communicate his revelation of the eternal return 
in these terms: how to teach the unteachable? Klossowski elaborates this ques-
tion in his comments on The Gay Science: “Nietzsche had a nostalgia for disci-
ples and perhaps also for an active, but closed, community. He always dreamed a 
grand action, of social upheavals or disruptions of political institutions […] And, 
to the extent that he estimated the possibility of an understanding, of an affinity 
with others, he also set forth the infallible law of depreciation of a rare and au-
thentic experience as soon as it enters the habitude of a number of minds […] 
But regarding this relation, depreciation has done its work by way of industrial 
standardization” (Klossowski 2007: 14). Changing gears, Klossowski contrasts 
two circuits, of phantasm4 and utensil, of artistic simulacra and capitalist goods, 
of singular impulses and general communication, circuits whose intersection 
forms the live wire of one’s existence: “Impulsive ‘phantasm’ – simulacrum; 
subsistence – utensil fabrication: two circuits which intersect with the individual 
unity, but which this same unity never manages to break, if only to postpone 
perpetually the urgency of one or the other circuit” (Klossowski, Living Curren-
cy, cited by Castanet 2014: 147). 
Short-circuiting eternal returns with nervous systems, the quest of teaching 
the unteachable – along with his poetics of Dionysus and Ariadne, his manifesto 
of a gay science, and his role as the first typewriting philosopher – make Nie-
tzsche a performative pedagogue of our digital futures. Within the context of 
performance and digitality, a gay science of teaching the unteachable takes on 
                                                           
4  “Phantasm” is an archaic term used by Klossowski and maintained by his translators 
and commentators. 
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many concrete dimensions and raises numerous quests and questions. How to 
quantify the unquantifiable? How to account for the unaccountable? How to 
teach a performative transvaluation of values within existing performative val-
ues? How to democratize digitality within institutions whose structures, habits, 
and values are founded on logocentric exclusions and hierarchies that date back 
to Plato’s Academy and whose modern instantiation as Cartesian ideation there-
by informs our disciplines, methods, and truths? What kinds of infrastructures, 
spaces, and events are needed to think and act beyond the cartographies of ei-
dos? What sorts of methods and media and bodies are needed?  
 
 
STUDIOLAB AS CRITICAL DESIGN PEDAGOGY  
 
My long-term research project is StudioLab, a transversal pedagogy that mixes 
seminar, studio, and lab activities to enable experiments in critical thinking, ex-
perience design, and media making. StudioLab’s onto-historical mission is to 
democratize digitality, just as public education has sought to democratize litera-
cy. A nomadic, decades-long experiment, StudioLab has traveled from institu-
tion to institution, taking different forms depending on the collaborators, infra-
structure, and geography. Modular projects, flexible content, emerging technolo-
gies, and diverse student bodies have driven the development of its curriculum 
and spatial configuration. I first developed StudioLab in the mid-1990s at New 
York University by shuttling students between a Broadway performance studio 
and a computer lab off Washington Square. Subsequently, at University of the 
Arts (Philadelphia), Dartmouth College, and the University of Wisconsin-
Madison, StudioLab has developed an array of design frames, media workshops, 
and an architectural form called Media Studio, whose mobile furniture and light 
tech enable students to mix seminar, studio, and lab experiences within a single 
space.  
StudioLab’s contribution to the democratization of digitality lies in its com-
bination of seminar, studio, and lab practices, which allows for the spatialization 
of conceptual discourses, their transmediation across diverse forms and situa-
tions, and the generation of thought and action through collaborative, engaged 
research. In practical terms, StudioLab has provided backend R&D for the gen-
eral theory of performance outlined in Perform or Else (2001) and subsequent 
texts, as its courses and projects combine cultural, organizational, and technolog-
ical performances. Indeed, alongside its mission to democratize digitality, Studi-
oLab seeks to resist global performativity by interjecting values of critico-
creative efficacy into socio-technical systems dominated by neoliberal mixes of 
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efficiency and effectiveness. The goal is to generate micro- and macro-
transvaluations of performative values that move across visceral, affective, and 
cognitive realms to effect changes within larger socio-technical systems.  
From a methodological perspective, StudioLab can be understood as critical 
design pedagogy for democratizing digitality, for inventing and disseminating 
new forms of post-ideational thought-action. Interaction designers Anthony 
Dunne and Fiona Raby (2007) introduced the term “critical design” to describe 
design infused with a politically critical sensitivity, both for designer and end us-
er. HCI designers Jeffry Bardzell and Shaowen Bardzell write that by “inscribing 
alternative values in designs, critical design cultivates critical attitudes among 
consumers and designers alike, creating demand for and supporting the profes-
sional emergence of alternative design futures”. Bardzell and Bardzell (2013: 
3299) draw upon Critical Theory and Metacriticism to open up Dunne and Ra-
by’s critical design practice for extension into their field of Human Computer In-
teraction (HCI). In the spirit of democratizing digitality, StudioLab likewise 
seeks to extend a specific mix of critical design across potentially all fields and 
social institutions. Like performance and media, design is a transdisciplinary and 
sometimes incoherent field of practice and study marked by disciplinary borders 
and territorial disputes. When viewed from the perspective of digitality, howev-
er, debates between specialists, as well as tensions between experts and ama-
teurs, can be recast as effects of ideational infrastructures and institutional habits 
associated with literate, disciplinary knowledge. StudioLab’s own metacritical 
move is to affirm such critical differences by devising creative syntheses across 
diverse bodies, media, and sites, thereby contributing to the emergence of critical 
design as a vector for democratizing digitality.  
 
 
CRITICAL THINKING + DESIGN THINKING  
+ TACTICAL MEDIA 
 
StudioLab’s approach to critical design pedagogy combines critical thinking 
(broader than Critical Theory), design thinking (broader than HCI), and tactical 
media (broader than writing). This stepping back or broadening of scope situates 
Frankfurt School Critical Theory, Metacriticism, and other methodological ap-
proaches within the larger, disciplinary context of critical thinking in higher edu-
cation. In the US, critical thinking refers to the use of evidence-based, logical 
reasoning as a guide to ethical decision-making and action, and it is considered 
an “Essential Learning Outcome” by the Association of American Colleges & 
Universities. These Essential Learning Outcomes inform the evaluation and as-
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sessment of academic programs across the US. The genealogy of critical think-
ing stretches from Socrates to Descartes to Kant to Marx, and it forms the foun-
dation of disciplinary research and liberal arts education and is thus taught across 
the breadth of the traditional arts and sciences. From the perspective of digitality, 
critical thinking is literate, ideational thinking whose methods bring objects 
clearly and distinctly before subjects, a dispositif carefully set up in first-year 
writing courses. StudioLab’s goal is not to replace critical thinking and writing 
but precisely to supplement and embed literate methods, subjects, and objects 
within the emerging apparatus of digitality, using media and collaborative prob-
lem-solving to connect them with new communities and situations. The logos of 
critical thinking and specialized knowledge remains operational but its efficacy 
has waned. Given the highly publicized and increasingly politicized crisis of the 
liberal arts in the US, revitalizing the forms, functions, and sites of critical think-
ing is crucial to reimagining higher education and advanced research beyond 
Platonic ideation. StudioLab starts with a simple step: connect the conceptual 
space of the seminar to the aesthetic and technical spaces of the studio and lab.  
To interface seminar learning with studio activities, the second component of 
StudioLab’s critical design pedagogy is design thinking, a human-centered de-
sign approach to strategic thinking developed by the design firm IDEO and re-
searched by the Hasso Plattner Institutes of Design at Potsdam University, Ger-
many, and Stanford University, USA. Design thinking is a collaborative method 
for addressing complex organizational and social problems. IDEO CEO Tim 
Brown argues that designers must “think big”, think beyond designing endless 
objects for meaningless needs and instead tackle complex problems facing indi-
viduals and societies, such as healthcare and climate change. Design thinking’s 
transdisciplinary design method balances three constraints – human desirability, 
economic viability, and technical feasibility – constraints that correspond to the 
performative values of cultural efficacy, organizational efficiency, and technical 
effectiveness. Moreover, design thinking’s human-centered approach prioritizes 
human desirability/cultural efficacy, focusing on empathy with various stake-
holders to define and reframe the situation at hand. Although design thinking al-
so stresses ideation or the creative generation of ideas as central to its iterative 
process, this ideation is post-Platonic in that it relies not on top-down, expert 
knowledge or episteme, but rather on empathizing with a variety of stakeholders, 
that is, on bottom-up, common knowledge or doxa. In that sense, it is already 
critical, though this criticality resides in a matrix of empathy gathered through 
ethnographic methods of interview, observation, and participation and composed 
of emotions, knowledge, and values. It is within this matrix that micro-
transvaluations can occur at both individual and group levels, revalorizations that 
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produce not exclusions of effectiveness and efficiency but remixes in a different 
space. 
Supplementing critical thinking and design thinking, the third element of 
StudioLab’s critical design pedagogy is tactical media, which emerges out of 
artist activist events and groups in Europe and North America, such as Next Five 
Minutes (N5M), Critical Art Ensemble (CAE) and Electronic Disturbance Thea-
ter (EDT): “The term ‘tactical media’ refers to a critical usage and theorization 
of media practices that draw on all forms of old and new, both lucid and sophis-
ticated media, for achieving a variety of specific noncommercial goals and push-
ing all kinds of potentially subversive political issues” (N5M, cited by CAE 
2000: 5). In Digital Resistance (2000), CAE situates tactical media within a 
comprehensive set of practices that go beyond street-based resistance against 
disciplinary institutions to function as digital resistance within our contemporary 
performative matrix. Tactical media-making enables StudioLab to supplement 
the traditional seminar study of argumentative and rhetorical writing with studio 
and lab work in a full range of media effects: from the Guerrilla Girl’s poster, to 
Reverend Billy’s performance protests, to EDT’s FloodNet software, to Molle 
Industria’s absurdist games. The digitalization and networking of embodied rep-
ertoires and discursive archives are producing forms of procedural rhetoric, dia-
grammatic semiotics, and transmedia persuasion whose circuits operate at scales 
too small and too large to perceive.  
The elements of StudioLab’s critical design approach supplement one anoth-
er. StudioLab balances the epistemological force of critical thinking’s logos with 
the collaborative empathy-driven doxa of design thinking and the radical, sub-
versive potential of tactical media-making as graphe. At the level of production, 
critical thinking pedagogies produce individual thinkers and writers, whereas de-
sign thinking and tactical media entail the production of critical design teams. 
Both design thinking and tactical media-making rely on practice-based collabo-
ration, and design thinking produces its own version of tactical media, the 
“shared media” of sketches and prototypes which emerge as part of its ideational 
process. Like tactical media, shared media do not report on things but make 
things happen: they are themselves performative, not constative, though they can 
become so through iteration. Of course, critical thinking too has its own tactical 
media: the alphabet, books, and archive, which students spend their entire school 
life learning. StudioLab is a crash course in designing transmedia thought-action.  
The rapid development of design as a critical discourse in the US can be seen 
in academic courses and programs in critical design thinking, including a gradu-
ate degree at Virginia Tech University and an undergraduate initiative at Smith 
College, a small liberal arts college in Massachusetts. “The Smith brand of de-
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sign thinking envisions design in service of broader social issues of participation, 
intervention and leadership. Design thinking can be used to question gender, 
power and ability as dynamics that shape who gets to participate in creating the 
world we live in.” (Smith College 2016) StudioLab’s mix of critical thinking, 
design thinking, and tactical media likewise seeks to intervene in institutions by 
injecting critico-creative values of social efficacy into processes and structures 
where values of organization efficiency and technical effectiveness dominate da-
ta collection and decision-making. Critical design thinking, in particular, offers 
students concrete methods for site-specific micro-transvaluations of value, and it 
is important to note that Smith College’s inaugural projects include a campus-
wide initiative to rethink the college’s work and learning spaces. From Studi-
oLab’s perspective, challenging global performativity and democratizing digital-
ity require changing values in order to transform the spaces, media, curricula, 
and organization of learning that empower students to approach knowledge and 
power in both critical and creative ways. 
 
 
CRITICAL PERFORMATIVITY  
AND INTIMATE BUREAUCRACIES 
 
The fantasy of teaching Nietzsche’s double affirmation in an MBA program ap-
proaches full-scale actualization in the emerging field of Critical Management 
Studies (CMS), where researchers have introduced Critical Theory and post-
structuralist thought into the discipline of organizational management. Like criti-
cal design, CMS explores more subversive forms of critical thinking and does so 
in institutions ruled by socially dominant values and practices that its scholars 
have explicitly theorized in terms of performativity. CMS is characterized by “its 
critical stance towards institutionalized social and intellectual practices, such as 
the profit imperative, racial inequality or environmental irresponsibility” (Wick-
ert and Schaefer 2015: 108), and within the field, the concept of critical per-
formativity offers a nuanced approach to both the efficiency-effectiveness and 
efficacy circuits of organizational performance.  
Spicer, Alvesson and Kärreman (2009) theorize critical performativity by 
contrasting critiques of Lyotardian performativity (input/output ratios) and re-
sistant practices of Butlerian performativity, understood as subversive resignifi-
cations of discourse. “Approaching performativity as possibly subversive mobi-
lizations and citations of previous performances, instead of as an overarching 
concern for efficiency” (Spicer/Alvesson/Kärreman 2009: 544), they argue for 
understanding and developing Critical Management Studies as a performative 
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and potentially subversive field, one whose own critical performativity operates 
through “an affirmative stance, an ethic of care, a pragmatic orientation, en-
gagement with potentialities, and striving for a normative orientation” (ibid.: 
546, see Table I). 
 
Table I: An Overview of Performative CMS 
Characteristic Achieved through Methodological Tactic 
Affirmative stance Location at close proximity to 
object of critique in order to 
identify potential points  
revision 
Affirming ambiguous and 
mixed metaphors found in  
organizational discourse 
Ethic of care Providing space for respond-
ents’ views, but also seeking to 
subtly challenge them 
Working with mysteries 
Pragmatism Working with particular  
aspects of an organization 
Applied communicative  
action 
Potentialities Creating a sense of what could 
be by engaging latent possibili-
ties in an organization 
Explorations of  
heterotopias 
Normative Systematic assertion of criteria 
used to judge good forms of 
organization 
Engaging  
micro-emancipations 
Adapted from Table 1 of Spicer, Alvesson and Kärreman (2009: 546) 
 
Rather than positioning organizations as objects of critique and researchers as 
outside performativity, performative CMS envisions workers as actively in-
volved in liberating performative practices that produce resignifications, hetero-
topias, and micro-emancipations – practices which CMS researchers should ac-
tively engage with through participatory methods. The goal of critical performa-
tivity is “to not only engage in systematic dismantling of existing managerial ap-
proaches, but also try to construct new and hopefully more liberating ways of 
organizing” (ibid.: 555).  
Performative CMS provides StudioLab important critico-creative models for 
combining cultural, organizational, and technological performances within the 
context of democratizing digitality and remixing performative values. Resignifi-
cation entails the queering or refunctioning not only of discourses, but also prac-
tices and infrastructures and their simultaneous reinscription within newly imag-
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ined heterotopias, spaces with alternative conceptual, physical, architectural, dig-
ital, environmental, spiritual, and even cosmic dimensions. Indeed, StudioLab 
functions as a heterotopia for generating heterotopias. Within this context, mak-
ing micro-emancipations sustainable and scalable depends upon micro-
transvaluations of performative values, augmenting the dominant circuits of effi-
ciency-effectiveness with those of critico-creative efficacy. Here we see how 
methods of design thinking and tactical media supplement traditional methods of 
critical thinking by introducing collaborative creativity and interventionist me-
dia-making. Beyond isolated critiques of the bad, collaborative creations of joy. 
It may seem counter-intuitive to initiate joyful collaborations at the intersection 
of cultural and organizational performance, but as CAE argues, the development 
of tactical media best occurs within tightly-knit activist groups, which depend on 
the shared generation of ideas and projects, tactical if not strategic thinking, self-
organization of diverse talents, and effective project management.  
StudioLab approaches art activist groups – as well as artisan guilds, theory 
schools, rap groups, and other start-ups – both as objects of study and as heuris-
tic models for democratizing the sociotechnical practices of digital culture. Stu-
dents sometimes extend their model’s direction of activism but usually head off 
in new directions, incorporating conceptual, aesthetic, technical, and organiza-
tional insights into their own projects and production processes. Art activist 
groups such as the Guerrilla Girls, Molle Industria, and the Yes Men, can be un-
derstood as intimate bureaucracies, a term Saper has coined for modes of “par-
ticipatory decentralization” (Saper 2012: 1). Intimate bureaucracies enable col-
lective action through common infrastructures, such as the streets, the Internet, 
and other public services. Saper cites Fluxus art and the Occupy Wall Street po-
litical movements and their respective sociopoetic use of the postal service and 
public parks as primary examples. “These forms of organization represent a par-
adoxical mix of artisanal production, mass-distribution techniques, and a belief 
in the democratizing potential of electronic and mechanical reproduction tech-
niques. Borrowing from mass-culture image banks, these intimate bureaucracies 
play on forms of publicity common in societies of spectacles and public rela-
tions. Intimate bureaucracies have no demands, no singular ideology, nor right-
eous path” (ibid.). Saper highlights the paradox of intimate bureaucracies: the 
impersonal institutions and procedures associated with bureaucracies are de-
toured or recircuited by artists, activists, and other community members for more 
singular, intimate ends. Within the context of higher education, colleges and 
universities have themselves long served as common infrastructures, providing 
access to resources and services through libraries, central IT, and physical space, 
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and a large part of education involves teaching students how to use these and 
other infrastructures.  
By combining singularity and institutions, intimate bureaucracies open an in-
frastructural dimension to StudioLab’s quest to teach the unteachable, to short-
circuit singular impulses and general communication. In the language of Deleuze 
and Guattari: intimate bureaucracies function as desiring machines that have 
evolved from isolated bachelor machines into full-blown collective assemblages 
of enunciation, scaling up the creation of joy across different social planes by 
constructing referential universes and planes of consistency that enable sustaina-
bility and resonance with other movements. In the terms of design thinking: the 
creative constraints of human desirability and technical feasibility that define 
any social innovation find sustenance with those of economic or ecological via-
bility, the ability to survive within a given milieu or environment. If design 
thinking brings the power of creative processes to large organizations, intimate 
bureaucracies bring the power of large organizations to creative processes. The 
student body is the site where these circuits intersect.  
 
Figure 2: “Make a Toy” Exercise 
   Credit: Author  
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TRANSVERSALITIES, PROJECTS, AND DESIGN FRAMES 
 
StudioLab’s critical design pedagogy synthesizes traditional critical thinking, 
transdisciplinary design thinking, and interventionist tactical media by moving 
students transversally through seminar, studio, and lab activities. Bodies learn 
differently in each space. Students combine cultural, organizational, and techno-
logical performances and thereby gain hands-on experience engaging the values 
of efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness. At the heart of StudioLab are projects 
and design frames that integrate conceptual, aesthetic, technical, and social 
learning through individual exercises and larger collaborative projects. In an ini-
tial “Make a Toy” exercise, students use common household materials to design 
and create toys – tiny desiring machines crafted to generate joy in others – while 
learning principles of experience design, the shaping of interactions, emotions, 
and thought. Concepts are spatialized, taken back to the drawing board and con-
nected with others, and explored through hands-on engagement. StudioLab’s 
project-based pedagogy unfolds by juxtaposing studio exercises with seminar 
discussion, lab training, and time for fieldwork, presentation, and reflection. In a 
subsequent exercise, “Design an Activist Museum”, students self-organize and 
scale-up their desiring machines into critical design teams, role-playing as inti-
mate bureaucracies. Researching art activist groups and miming their different 
mixes of social activism and tactical media, critical design teams develop names, 
logos, and mission statements, while drawing on local public commons and 
transferring their research to issues and situations that resonate with their own 
lives. Like all StudioLab projects, “Design a Museum” is modular and portable: 
it can embrace potentially any topic, field, or community.  
StudioLab’s pedagogy moves people transversally in three ways and pro-
vides critical design frames all along the way. On a first, spatial level, students in 
a StudioLab course, workshop, or even a single, 3-hour class meeting might 
begin with a hands-on studio installation, then shift to seminar discussion, lab for 
software training, and conclude with open workshop or field work. To help stu-
dents articulate these transversal thresholds, we introduce the CAT design frame 
(Conceptual-Aesthetic-Technical), which maps onto seminar, studio, and lab ac-
tivities. Conceptual work follows traditional critical thinking methods – reading, 
discussion, and written synthesis of textual and other materials – supplemented 
with dramaturgical and media approaches: students generate notes, conceptual 
spreadsheets comparing different methods, and intellectual dialogues that gather 
and dramatize ideational arguments. Aesthetic studio work focuses on the trans-
mediation of discursive and material practices, mixing arguments with physical, 
visual, aural, and environmental media while drawing on fields of performance, 
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graphic design, cinematography, installation, experience design, etc. Tactical 
media here include objects, storyboards, mood boards, user scenarios, posters, 
installations, and prototypes. CAT’s technical dimension unfolds in computer lab 
space, with students learning and using digital software and hardware to support 
the conceptual and aesthetic activities. It is important to note that seminar, stu-
dio, and lab activities each have their own conceptual, aesthetic, and technical 
dimensions and they come to the fore in different ways. Over time, StudioLab’s 
iterative process blends these dimensions precisely by incorporating their ele-
ments into the unfolding project. Students use CAT to both analyze and create, 
for it enables them to abstract and evaluate conceptual, aesthetic, and technical 
issues at any time in the creative process. In all cases, at this first level, student 
bodies are reshaped by transversal movement through distinct learning environ-
ments: seminar, studio, lab, field.  
At a second, existential level, StudioLab’s next design frame, UX or user ex-
perience, draws on fields of rhetoric, design, and performance to teach students 
ways of transforming people internally by moving them spiritually, conceptually, 
imaginatively, emotionally, sensually, and/or viscerally – experiences that unfold 
in schools, museums, churches, community centers, theme parks, or online envi-
ronments. StudioLab’s UX frame focuses on experience design or the crafting of 
experiential interactions, information architecture or the spatiotemporal structure 
of these experiences, and information design or the look-and-feel at any moment 
of their unfolding. Using the UX frame both analytically and synthetically, stu-
dents design transformational experiences for multiple stakeholders: community 
collaborators, target audiences, the general public, and themselves. To this end, 
they learn how early ACT-UP members transformed their own anger and fear in-
to love and action using social activism and tactical media, creating direct ac-
tions designed in turn to transform the feelings, thoughts, and actions of their 
target audiences and the wider general public. In our “Transform a Paper into an 
App, Service, or Social Movement” project, students scale up their intimate bu-
reaucracies toward collective assemblages of enunciation where transformations 
of larger social systems become possible. At this second level, students use the 
UX frame to engage internal, “experiential architectures” of different stakehold-
ers. These experiential architectures form the building blocks of the emerging 
heterotopias and provide the platform for micro-transvaluations of value. 
At a third, sociotechnical level, StudioLab’s critical design pedagogy moves 
students transversally across different social fields as they connect and engage 
people across disciplines, institutions, and communities. We draw on design 
thinking to tackle intractable, “wicked problems”, using social activism and tac-
tical media to connect students to community, culture, and history. In a recent 
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“Museum of Interactive Media” project, teams researched and proposed activist 
installations for an under-utilized space in the Wisconsin Institute of Discovery, 
a transdisciplinary research center at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. The 
center is built on the former site of Rennebohm’s Pharmacy, known for the sto-
rytelling of founder Oscar Rennebohm, who later served as state Governor. In-
spired by Reverend Billy’s Earthellujah project, the KAMG student design team 
composed of Miranda Curry, Aaron Hathaway, Keegan Hasbrook, and Grace 
Vriezen interviewed current and potential WID visitors and aligned their re-
search with the university’s own legacy of environmental research and art activ-
ism. Their proposed reCLAIM Cafe offers a post-apocalyptic experience for 
both reclaiming personal space and measuring one’s extension into ecological 
systems: at the VR Bar, patrons can view impacted environments and download 
a mobile app to track their waste habits, energy consumption, and water usage, 
while Trash Chutes visibly recycle consumer objects all around them.  
 
Figure 3: “Rennie’s Corner” redesign 
      Credit: Miranda Curry, Keegan Hasbrook, Aaron Hathaway, Grace Vriezen 
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In StudioLab, ideas function as the means rather than the ends, entering an open, 
iterative process where collaborative problem-solving and innovation unfold via 
shared media and the posing of counter-factual possibilities and alternative 
worlds. Ideas become collective thought-action figures by moving from virtual 
to actual across different spaces as teams apply DT’s transdisciplinary process of 
empathy, definition, ideation, prototyping, and testing. 
An essential element of StudioLab’s critical design approach to democratiz-
ing digitality is digital media itself, especially the production of smart media, 
emerging scholarly genres such as video essays, theory comics, and multimedia 
presentations which supplement traditional media forms of books and articles. 
Thought-action figures take shape via the circulation and sharing of smart media, 
whose genres mashup instruction and entertainment, logos and mythos, eidos and 
imagos, episteme and doxa. Everyday media forms such as public presentations, 
posters, and YouTube videos carry powerful communicative force, while search 
engines, wikis, and other tools have transformed knowledge discovery and em-
powered communities to connect locally and globally. At their very best, even 
the most derided of media forms, such as PowerPoint, can produce intelligent, 
sensitive effects for audiences intimate and massive: one thinks of Al Gore’s 
2006 An Inconvenient Truth, effectively an Oscar-winning PowerPoint presenta-
tion, or Chai Jing’s 2015 Under the Dome, a powerful, censored documentary 
downloaded by hundreds of millions of viewers. StudioLab’s critical design ap-
proach uses smart media to forge connections across spaces, disciplines, and 
communities. Yet while TED talks, digital storytelling, and similar media forms 
have become ubiquitous in the early 21st century, what is lacking is a language 
for analyzing them and a practice for creating them in saleable, sustainable 
ways. Together, the CAT, UX, and DT frames provide a transmedia language 
and transdisciplinary practice for combining critical thinking, design thinking, 
and tactical media at both intimate and infrastructural scales. 
 
 
CODA 
 
To teach the unteachable, to learn the unlearnable, the body becomes a test site 
of moiré patterning, the pulsating intersection of two circuits composed of im-
pulses and markets, desiring machines and sociotechnical systems, idiosyncratic 
performances and general performativity. The fields of affect theory, experience 
design, consumer behavior, and micro-marketing all attest to the contemporary 
urgency of this vast yet discrete test site. As we have seen, performative digitali-
ty can itself be figured as the onto-historical overlaying of orality and literacy, 
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ritual and theater, repertoire and archive, of two massive dispositifs for conduct-
ing these circuits’ alternating currents through generations upon generations of 
bodies. StudioLab’s overlaying of seminar, studio, lab, and field spaces attempts 
to democratize emerging modes of digitality by combining critical thinking, de-
sign thinking, and tactical media in order to tap into these circuits and intervene 
in the contemporary performative matrix. 
Learning StudioLab’s design frames through sustained project work can be 
transformational, empowering students and communities to bring critical design 
perspectives to other situations, including career and life decisions. The CAT 
frame enables students to augment conceptual making with aesthetic and tech-
nical making and thus redesign bodies of knowledge. The UX frame provides a 
language and practice for making such experiential transformations at intimate, 
interpersonal levels, while the DT frame provides a formal, ready-made process 
for attuning values of economic viability/efficiency and technical feasibil-
ity/effectiveness to those of human desirability/efficacy, as well as scaling up 
micro-transvaluations to the macro-valorizations of collective assemblages of 
enunciation. Moreover, DT’s crowd-sourced, transdisciplinary ideation process 
is post-Platonic, making it a powerful force for democratizing digitality. Displac-
ing the lone figure of the Romantic genius, StudioLab operates through intimate 
bureaucrats whose means and media of transformation are both idiosyncratic and 
common, impulsive and infrastructural. Critical design thinking produces not 
simply arguments or artistic expressions or technical objects as in traditional si-
loed learning spaces, but rather cognitive-perceptual-affective constellations of 
thought-action generated and arrayed in proposals, presentations, diagrams, pro-
totypes, objects, apps, and other tactical media. At stake is not just critical analy-
sis but creative making, and not just media-making but the building of trans-
formative experiential architectures whose performance design extends from the 
internal dynamics of intimate bureaucracies to those of collaborating groups and 
communities. Emerging from seminar, studio, lab, and field spaces, from past, 
present, and future time zones, such experiential architectures give concrete form 
to the heterotopias envisioned by Foucault and provide intimate and common 
platforms for the transvaluation of performative values.  
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